By Morgan Hickman LL.B., Queen’s University Belfast

The Trump campaign called for an overhaul of the regulation of finance in the United States, variously demanding the repeal of the Dodd-Frank act, the reinstatement of the Glass-Steagall act and significant deregulative measures within regulators. The transition from campaign to administration, however, has exposed some of the puff: while there have been some deregulative measures, some of which are substantial, alongside the watering down of the Dodd-Frank act, it does not represent the cataclysmic gear shift the President’s supporters hoped for and his detractors feared. Though there have been criticisms from both sides of the aisle with the Trump administration’s regulatory agenda being both too flimsy and overzealous.

In order to understand the current debate, a broad analysis of the proposals implemented thus far in the administration will be outlined, before examining the perspectives of commentators, reflecting particularly on how they engage in, and contribute to, the general discussion regarding deregulation of finance in the modern United States of America. It is anticipated that much of the debate will favour neither stricter regulation nor substantial deregulation, instead supporting a lateral shift through regulatory reform. Furthermore, the perception of policies will be coloured by the rhetoric of the President, leading many potential supporters of the administration’s agenda to be sceptical of both its efficacy and motives.

Trump’s Regulatory Agenda

Prima facie, the Trump administration could easily be characterised as pursing a neoliberal agenda: slashing regulation to make way for exploitation by big business, championing the role of the market in self-regulation and economic stability. However, rarely are matters so cut and dried, and it is contended that such a characterisation lacks nuance.

There have been four key areas of financial policy that have had significant regulatory attention: the application of Dodd-Frank to community banks, non-bank regulation, capital requirements and proprietary trading. Each of these have either been subject to deregulative action by Congress or by regulators under the Trump administration. However, the President has also engaged in structural reform of the regulatory system through the use of executive orders, which will be considered as part of his regulatory agenda.

Community Banks

Congress recently passed the Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief and Consumer Protection Act,[1] which significantly impacts the regulation of banks holding under USD 10bn of assets (‘community banks’). This reform provides greater freedom from the Basel III accords and the Volcker rule, subject to satisfying specific regulatory requirements; some commentators have hailed this as a boost to the financial sector generally.[2]

Supporters of the relaxation of the post-crisis regulation expect that this will “push community banks to win back credit market shares, help US SMEs and foster growth”,[3] Garatti also comments that should these reforms allow community banks to return to their pre-crisis/Dodd-Frank share of the loan market (26.7%), it would liberate approximately USD 500bn of additional credit for US enterprise and consumers.[4] The substantial increase in credit available would decrease the cost of capital for customers, thus boosting their capacity for borrowing (and therefore growth) while simultaneously increasing the profitability of investments made by the banks.

However, both Subran and Garatti also note that this would expose community banks to significantly higher risk, with Subran identifying that nearly 500 community banks have CRE assets that represent over 300% of their capital.[5] Following the recent reforms, these banks may be able to depart from the Basel III requirement for capital if their ‘Community Bank Leverage Ratio’ is above the 8–10% threshold.[6] Due to the concentration of CRE, and agriculture, assets in these banks, they are exposed to fluctuations in those markets and have a high risk concentration. By relaxing the regulation, this may lead to increased instability in these core markets.

Ultimately it is clear that community banks were collateral damage when the Dodd-Frank act was enacted, significantly and negatively effecting credit availability in ‘Smalltown, USA’, thus unwinding of some of the Dodd-Frank provisions was inevitable. While the risks associated with this reform are apparent, the current debate seems to support limited deregulation in order to stimulate economic growth.

Non-Bank Regulation

Following the Great Recession, non-bank credit providing institutions have been the focus of controversy. Voices from traditional banks contend that overzealous regulation of finance creates the fertile soil for the growth of so-called ‘shadow banks’.[7] This represents an orthodox perspective, which argues that, to avoid regulatory arbitrage, regulations that restrict the abilities of banks to offer (high risk) credit should be relaxed.

Duca supports this perspective, contending that empirical analysis demonstrates that, in particular, the relative burden placed on bank credit versus non-bank credit is a key factor in the reliance on shadow banking for short-term credit.[8] Similarly, Calomiris provides two examples that illustrate how the demand for shadow banking is created by strict regulation on bank credit: high risk credit card customers and those seeking leveraged loans for private equity deals are no longer provided for by banks, however are still in need of a line of credit and therefore naturally turn to non-bank credit providers.[9]

Conversely, Garatti adduces evidence of a strong correlative relationship between deregulation and shadow banking (R²=0.90),[10] contending that the deregulation of banks increases the capital generally available to financial institutions, thus increasing the attractiveness of lucrative opportunities offered by shadow banks.[11]

While not deregulation sensu stricto, the Trump administration is utilising its influence within the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) to trigger significant change in the practice of regulating non-bank credit. Specifically, the vote to withdraw the designation of Prudential as a non-bank systemically important financial institution (SIFI).[12] The SIFI designation is intended to bring non-bank institutions under the purview of Federal Reserve, becoming subject to stress tests.[13] While there has been no move to withdraw the rules or repeal them, as there are no longer any institutions designated as SIFIs, this represents a de facto deregulative act. This has been deemed a “step in the right direction for the asset management industry”[14] as SIFI designated companies find it very challenging to actively invest in the capital markets.[15] However, critics are concerned that the designation will fall into disuse until another non-bank displays a systemic issue, which would be too late for it to be used effectively.[16]

The actions of the regulators under the Trump administration clearly represent a relaxing of controls akin to deregulation. While it remains unclear whether non-bank credit is inherently problematic, most commentators believe that the risk can be found when a significant financial institution (bank or non-bank) becomes leveraged in unregulated securities, it could pose a systemic risk. The FSOC was instituted as a guardrail to prevent non-banks becoming leveraged in this way without regulatory oversight, thus many critics are concerned that the US economy may now be exposed to an unhealthy level of risk.

Capital Requirements

The reduction of capital requirements throughout the financial industry, another key regulatory project of the Trump administration, has attracted controversy. The significant reform in this field has been through decisions made by the regulators who have been installed under this administration. These proposals will impact significantly the compliance required by the largest financial institutions. Regulators have been able to affect this change by modifying the calculation of the leverage ratio, with trading desks exposed to a higher proportion of low risk instruments able to enjoy adjusted regulation.[17]

Some commentators have argued that, in reality, capital requirements do not effectively ensure solvency in periods of financial instability, with Calomiris citing the example of Citigroup, which had a capital ratio of 12% (over 3 times the current regulatory requirement) at the time of its collapse in 2008.[18] He comments wryly that the requirements imposed by the Dodd-Frank act ensure that “every bank will be just as safe and sound as Citi was in December 2008.”[19] Similarly, in the context of the repo market, an investigation by Allahrakha, Cetina and Munyan concludes that “the leverage ratio as a risk-insensitive capital standard may encourage firms to increase the risk profile of their remaining activities”[20], which mirrors the approach being taken by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and supports, at least limited, deregulation.

This perspective is not shared by critics of deregulation, who contend that by taking this step, regulators will open the door to another financial crisis,[21] with yet others commenting that this change undermines the core aims of both Basel III and Dodd-Frank.[22] Some economists are calling for a simple (i.e. fixed) book-value leverage of at least 15% (nearly 4 times the current regulatory minimum), which they claim would accelerate the rate of recovery, if not actually decrease the risk of another financial crisis.[23] However, other economists believe that a counter-cyclical framework for the regulation of the leverage ratio is required,[24] as this would moderate bank lending over the boom cycle and embolden banks on the downswing. This approach clearly conflicts with the recent FDIC policy and the general deregulative scheme being undertaken by the Trump administration. Calomiris, having criticised the principles underpinning the Dodd-Frank act, subsequently argues that the leverage calculation should be based on the ratio between the market value of equity and the market value of assets, contending that this represents the investors’ perceptions of the institutions solvency more accurately than a ratio relying on book value;[25] this could limit the ability of institutions to influence their ratio by accounting, furthermore it could be contended that it makes effective hedging crucial.

It is clear that no commentator is wholly happy with the status quo and that some form of reform is necessary in the imminent future; the current debate turns on how and in which direction the regulatory shift should move. It is contended that, though some academic and political opinion tends towards (limited) deregulation of the capital requirement ­– often through a return to risk based requirements – the majority favours newer, more innovative regulation, with specific calls for market value leverage and counter-cyclically adjusted capital requirements. In the round, the current perspective on deregulation is broadly negative in the context of capital requirements.

Proprietary Trading

The separation of investment banking activities (principally speculative proprietary trading) from retail banking, under which deposits are backed by the lender of last resort, is not a scheme novel in the 21^st century. It was first implemented rigorously by the 1930s Congress in the Glass-Steagall Act.[26] However, the mechanism by which it is implemented and who is subjected to the restrictions has been subject to significant debate. There has been significant deregulation championed by the Trump administration against the current incarnation of the principle in the ‘Volcker rule’.[27]

The recent Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief and Consumer Protection Act exempted community banks from the Volker Rule. This comes at a time where, as identified by Bubb and Kahan, there is a “rare bipartisan consensus” that “the Volcker rule must be pared back or even repealed.”[28] Clearly, it was under this auspice that Congress was able to pass the recent reforms. However, in the same vein, the FDIC recently voted to “simplify and tailor the implementing regulations” with a view to “increase efficiency, reduce excess demands…and allow banking entities to more efficiently provide services to clients”.[29]

These changes clearly represent a regulatory perspective that wishes to support business activity, however has come under significant criticism as a “dangerous plan to carve up the Volcker rule”, with Gelzinis stating that banks with access to federal deposit insurance or the Federal Reserve’s discount window should be barred from proprietary trading. He claims that the changes to the regulation will allow high-risk activity to take place “under the guise of risk-mitigating hedging”.[30] Other critics have labelled this an example of regulatory capture,[31] given the recent appointments by the Trump administration, which enables financial institutions “to play casino again”.[32]

On the other hand, commentators such as Blackwell contend that this is a mischaracterisation of the changes: these represent more of a “streamlining than a dramatic overhaul.”[33] Other critics support a radical change to the regulatory scheme, arguing that the Volcker rule is simultaneously over- and under-effective,[34] mischaracterisations of trading activity by banks (deliberate or otherwise) means that they could still engage in prohibited trading,[35] while another, cautious bank, may restrict the desirable, permitted activity in case it is mistaken for proprietary trading.[36] There is force to this argument against the ‘define-and-ban’ approach to regulation in general and against the Volcker rule in particular.

There is significant appetite for a reform of the Volcker rule, with the general consensus being that it is not fit for purpose. The lobby divides over the necessity of an outright ban on universal banking, however in general there is little support for a return to the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act era.

The New Glass-Steagall

In terms of proprietary trading, as has been identified, calls for a strict division between investment and retail banking has not disappeared since the repeal of the Glass-Steagall act in 1999. Most notably, the commitment to its return was found in the Trump campaign of 2016.[37] In the context of what is now the Trump administration, a reinstatement of the Glass-Steagall act would represent a radical culture shift within the White House and a U-turn on the key deregulatory and cost control measures the Federal Reserve, FDIC and Office of the Comptroller of Currency (OCC) have implemented over the first two years of the administration, outlined above.

In spite of the rhetoric of the Trump campaign, it does not appear that this administration will oversee the return of the New Deal regulation; it appears that the new Glass-Steagall may more closely resemble a two-tier regulatory system, introducing more flexibility for those not guaranteed by the lender of last resort.[38] However, the perception of heavy regulation sheds light on the foundations of some of the perspectives on deregulation in the current debate.

In the round, and unsurprisingly, there is little desire for a wholesale return to the strict Glass-Steagall restrictions on the practice of banks.[39] Furthermore, key critics of the legislation argue that it was not (and feasibly could never have been) fully enforced by the OCC due to the burden it would place upon the core business of banks.[40] As has been identified, attempts to permit only actions required for the core operations of banks are futile, and have led to the complexities and ineffectiveness of the Volcker rule.

Proposals for the return of the rule, or some near permutation of it, has found support from politicians and former policy makers, arguing that the Volcker rule is needlessly complex and under-ambitious, whereas the simplicity and aggressive approach of the Glass-Steagall act could resolve the issue.[41] Other critics simply argue that the US did not experience a crisis like the Great Recession while the Glass-Steagall act was in force, and that if it wasn’t broken, there was no need to change it.[42]

In general, while the movement to bring back the Glass-Steagall act has sustained itself since the repeal nearly 20 year ago, it has usually been a minority of fringe voices in support.[43] The overwhelming majority recognise that the financial system of the United States has moved on from the 1930s, and as such the solutions to problems need to move on too.

Structural Reforms

The Trump administration has implemented the key elements of regulatory reform either by congressional act or by appointments to key regulators which have subsequently advanced a regulatory agenda that mirrors that of the administration. These, alongside other strategic moves to reform the culture of regulators such as deregulation task forces and regulatory reform officers, are familiar from the tools used in the Reagan and Bush (41 and 43) administrations. However, the Trump administration has also implemented an innovative technique in the form of the “two-for-one” executive order.[44] Much like other aspects of the administrations agenda, this move has received heavy criticisms from across the political and economic spectrum.

Those in support of deregulation have objected to the mechanisms the administration has implemented on the basis that it “hardly counts as durable regulatory reform.”[45] This concern is founded in the fact that an executive order can be overturned by a successive president without any intervention of Congress.[46] Batkins and Brannon have given the damning indictment of the attempts at deregulation by the administration as “piecemeal, subject to intense litigation, and likely to be unwound by a progressive successor”, challenging the fact that the administration is not “actually repealing swathes of regulations” as many had hoped.[47] Other critics have pragmatically noted that the two-for-one scheme should not be expected to make major headway as regulators are not expected to pass much regulation under the Trump administration, thus rending the deregulative obligation moot.[48] Stronger critics have claimed that the mechanism for implementation was defective: in particular, by only considering the bare costs the scheme fails to consider the net benefits of regulations to be repealed, thus leading to a substantially suboptimal outcome.[49]

The other key objection to the method for regulatory reform is in relation to Executive Order 13777,[50] specifically, criticising the fact that many of the appointees or contributors to the taskforces given the task of reviewing the efficacy of regulations have (or have had) deep industry ties, thus increasing the risk of regulatory capture.[51]

Other commentators have been more generous in contending that this is a pragmatic and sensible policy, even stating “that if anyone other than Trump had decided to review post-crisis rulemaking over the past six years, the response would be one of general agreement.”[52] How the perspective commentators have taken on the President and the impact this has on the perspective on the regulation his administration have advanced will be addressed below.

Overall, there appears to be opposition to the specific manner in which the Trump administration has implemented structural reforms to regulation, with specific objections as diverse as the critics. However, in broad terms, there seems to be general support for reviews and reforms at this time: while EO 13771 is clearly intended to deregulate finance, value is recognised in unwinding some of the pro-cyclical reforms made in the aftermath of the Great Recession.

Concluding Notes

It is apparent that the contemporary debate has reacted to each specific regulatory policy and proposal by the Trump administration differently, however at this point it is helpful to examine the threads which can be seen featuring throughout the debate. The debate about administrations agenda can be neatly drawn into two categories: the first being holistic or systemic criticism of deregulation and the second specific criticism of the policies in the context of the character of the President. It is contended that the former provides the core understanding of the general perception of deregulation, however the latter is required in order to isolate responses founded in perceptions of the character of the President.

It is necessary to address the latter category of criticism first, in order to provide a meaningful analysis of the former, in this context it is contended that there is a general public, political, and – to a limited extent – academic, attribution of cynical neoliberalism to the President, thus leading to a presumption that all policies that concern financial regulation are part of a radical deregulatory agenda. Though this preconception can largely be attributed to the President’s own rhetoric both during his presidential campaign and the administration, it shouldn’t be allowed to influence an objective examination of policy. Upon a high level analysis of deregulation under the Trump administration, it appears that the underlying ideology is not exclusively, or even predominantly, neoliberal. Rather, it appears that the President is promoting a moderate regulatory position; albeit requiring a level of deregulation. This is exhibited in the relaxation of regulation where it has been applied too strictly (e.g. community banks) and where it is uncontroversially ineffective (e.g. the Volcker rule) in concert with regulators reassessing the regulations they have on the books when proposing new additions (e.g. EO 13771) and how they subsequently apply them (e.g. capital requirements). The regulatory projects thus far represent a pragmatic agenda which should be taken into account in future examinations of proposals and policies.

In terms of systemic criticism of deregulation, it is suggested that, as anticipated, there is little appetite for radical changes or extreme ideological positions. The consequences of the Great Recession remain a recent reminder of the risks associated with finance under liberalised regulation, as such most commentators advocate for innovative regulations with a focus on risk-control, in most circumstances regulatory reform is necessary to achieve this aim. This appears to reflect a consensus against procyclical regulation, in contradiction with the calls from politicians and the industry to significantly relax regulation in light of the recovery from the last crisis. The contemporary debate, particularly in the context of capital requirements, calls for a countercyclical scheme; while this will inhibit economic growth in the short term, it will significantly reduce the risk of return to a ‘boom-and-bust’ economy.

In totality, it is contended that the Trump administration’s clearly deregulatory agenda is more moderate than was anticipated, however still conforms to the expectations of a procyclical model of financial regulation. The contemporary debate does not show particular sympathy for a substantial deregulatory agenda and appears to broadly tolerate the administration’s proposals. However, in the round, the majority of the voices examined in the current debate support a wide-ranging scheme of regulatory reform to introduce countercyclical measures to minimise the exposure of the United States economy to systemic risk. The lack of political will to enact such reforms at this time, however, unfortunately appears to leave the hopes and innovative suggestions of the academy at the side-lines for now: at least until the next financial crisis.

Table of Statutes

Banking Act of 1933, 12 USC §§ 221–522; Pub L No 73-66, 48 Stat 162 (1933)

Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 12 USC §§ 5301–5641; Pub L No 111-203, 124 Stat 1376 (2010)

Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief and Consumer Protection Act of 2018, Pub L No 115-174.

Table of Official Documentation/Quasi-Legislation

Executive Order 13771, 82 Fed Reg 9339

Executive Order 13777 (2017) 82 Fed Reg 12285

Proposed Revisions to Prohibitions and Restrictions on Proprietary Trading and Certain Interests in, and Relationships With, Hedge Funds and Private Equity Funds, 83 Fed Reg 137 (17 July 2018) 33518

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[1] Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief and Consumer Protection Act of 2018, Pub L No 115-174.

[2] L Subran, ‘A New Era of Financial Deregulation in the US to Boost Growth (and Risk)’ (2018) 120(8) Business Credit 38.

[3] A Garatti and A Laroche, ‘US Financial Deregulation: Higher Growth and Risk’ The View (Euler Hermes Economic Research, June 2018) 12

<https://www.eulerhermes.com/content/dam/onemarketing/euh/eulerhermes_com/erd/newsimport/pdf/the-view-the-hot-season-jun18.pdf> accessed 8 December 2018.

[4] ibid 17.

[5] Subran (n 2) 39.

[6] Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief and Consumer Protection Act (n 1) s 201(b)(1)

[7] See generally, G Buchak and others, ‘Fintech, regulatory arbitrage, and the rise of shadow banks’ (2018) 130(3) Journal of Financial Economics 453, 482.

[8] J Duca, ‘How capital regulation and other factors drive the role of shadow banking in funding short-term business credit’ (2016) 69 Journal of Banking & Finance S10.

[9] C Calomiris, ‘Handicapping Financial Reform’ (2018) 41(1) Regulation 32.

[10] Garatti and Laroche (n 3) 22.

[11] ibid.

[12] Financial Stability Oversight Council, ‘Notice and Explanation of the Basis for the Financial Stability Oversight Council’s Rescission of Its Determination Regarding Prudential Financial, Inc. (Prudential)’ (16 October 2018) <https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/261/Prudential-Financial-Inc-Rescission.pdf> accessed 08 December 2018.

[13] Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 12 USC §§ 5301–5641; Pub L No 111-203, 124 Stat 1376 (2010) s 113(a)(1).

[14] D Tittsworth, quoted in J Crabb, ‘FSOC and SIFI designation reform welcomed’ IFLRev (22 November 2017) <http://www.iflr.com/Article/3769124/FSOC-and-Sifi-designation-reform-welcomed.html> accessed 8 December 2018.

[15] S Kerr, ‘Even without legislation, Trump could bring sea change to banking regs’ GlobalCapital (Mar 04, 2017) 164.

[16] V Finkle, ‘Goodbye, nonbank SIFIs. We hardly knew you.’ (2018) 183 American Banker 115.

[17] Proposed Revisions to Prohibitions and Restrictions on Proprietary Trading and Certain Interests in, and Relationships With, Hedge Funds and Private Equity Funds, 83 Fed Reg 137 (17 July 2018) 33518

[18] Calomiris (n 9) 34.

[19] ibid. It should be noted that Calomiris is not advocating deregulation in this article, however his arguments against the capital requirements are still relevant when considering support for deregulation. For discussion of Calomiris’ alternative proposals, see text to note 25.

[20] M Allahrakha, J Cetina and B Munyan, ‘Do higher capital standards always reduce bank risk? The impact of the Basel leverage ratio on the U.S. triparty repo market’ (2018) 34 Journal of Financial Intermediation 3, 14.

[21] T Sedoric, ‘It’s time to break up the big banks: Now is not the time to ease oversight and supervision of the largest financial institutions’ (2018) 40(10) New Hampshire Business Review 20.

[22] G Gelzinis, ‘Treasury wants to weaken a crucial post-crisis capital requirement’ (2017) 182 American Banker 118.

[23] J Barth and S Miller, ‘Benefits and costs of a higher bank “leverage ratio”’ (2018) 38 Journal of Financial Stability 37, 49.

[24] S Aiyar, C Calomiris, T Wieladek, ‘How does credit supply respond to monetary policy and bank minimum capital requirements?’ (2016) 82 Eur Economic Rev 142, 159.

[25] Calomiris (n 9) 34.

[26] Banking Act of 1933, 12 USC §§ 221–522; Pub L No 73-66, 48 Stat 162 (1933) ss 16, 20, 21, 32.

[27] Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 12 USC §§ 5301–5641; Pub L No 111-203, 124 Stat 1376 (2010) s 619.

[28] R Bubb and M Kahan, ‘Regulating Motivation: A New Perspective on the Volcker Rule’ (2018) 96(5) Tex L Rev 1019.

[29] Proposed Revisions to Prohibitions and Restrictions on Proprietary Trading and Certain Interests in, and Relationships With, Hedge Funds and Private Equity Funds (n 18).

[30] G Gelzinis, ‘Regulators’ dangerous plan to carve up the Volcker Rule’ (2018) 183 American Banker 117.

[31] Sedoric (n 22).

[32] R Blackwell, ‘No, regulators did not gut the Volcker Rule’ (2018) 183 American Banker 104.

[33] ibid.

[34] Bubb and Kahan (n 29) 1020.

[35] ibid 1028.

[36] ibid 1032.

[37] C Allegri, ‘Trump calls for ’21st century’ Glass-Steagall banking law’ Reuters (Oct 26, 2016) <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-election-trump-banks/trump-calls-for-21st-century-glass-steagall-banking-law-idUSKCN12Q2WA> accessed 07 December 2018.

[38] R Trace, ‘Big banks can relax, Trump’s modern Glass-Steagall isn’t aimed at breaking them up’ Wall Street Journal (New York, 18 May 2017) <https://www.wsj.com/articles/big-banks-can-relax-trumps-modern-glass-steagall-probably-doesnt-mean-breaking-them-up-1495099803> accessed 8 December 2018. It is noted that this ‘two-tier’ scheme of regulation appears to be at least partially implemented by the Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief and Consumer Protection Act, as discussed above in the context of community banks.

[39] J Crabb, ‘Market rejects Glass–Steagall’s return’ (2017) IFLRev <http://www.iflr.com/Article/3673098/Market-rejects-Glass-Steagalls-return.html> accessed 8 December 2018.

[40] O McDonald, ‘The Repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act: Myth and Reality’804 Policy Analysis (Cato Institute, 16 November 2016) 9.

[41] A Sloan, ‘What’s so tough about this financial reform bill?’ Fortune (New York, 29 June 2010) <https://money.cnn.com/2010/06/29/news/economy/sloan_financial_reform.fortune/index.htm> accessed 8 December 2018; S Bair, ‘We need a new Volcker rule for banks’ Fortune (New York, 9 December 2011) <http://fortune.com/2011/12/09/we-need-a-new-volcker-rule-for-banks/> accessed 8 December 2018.

[42] W Black quoted in R England, ‘Glass-Steagall Revisited’ (2016) 76(5) Mortgage Banking 82, 83.

[43] ibid 89.

[44] Executive Order 13771, 82 Fed Reg 9339.

[45] S Batkins and I Brannon, ‘Achieving Durable Success in the Fight for Deregulation’ (2018) 41(1) Regulation 4, 5.

[46] S Thrower, ‘To Revoke or Not Revoke? The Political Determinants of Executive Order Longevity’ (2017) 61(3) AJPS 642, 643–4.

[47] Batkins and Brannon (n 46) 4.

[48] K Belton, K Krutilla and J Graham, ‘Regulatory Reform in the Trump Era’ (2017) 77(5) PAR 643, 644.

[49] J Tomain, ‘Executive orders reforming regulation and reducing regulatory costs’ (2017) 48(6) Trends (American Bar Association, Aug 25, 2017) <https://www.americanbar.org/publications/trends/2016-2017/july-august-2017/executive-orders-reforming-regulation-and-reducing-regulatory-costs/> accessed 8 December 2018.

[50] Executive Order 13777 (2017) 82 Fed Reg 12285.

[51] C Clark, ‘Democratic Lawmakers Challenge Secrecy of Trump Deregulation Task Forces’ (Government Executive, 2018) <https://www.govexec.com/oversight/2017/08/democratic-lawmakers-challenge-secrecy-trump-deregulation-task-forces/140052/> accessed 8 December 2018.

[52] ‘Americas: A sheep in wolf’s clothing?’ (2017) IFLRev <http://www.iflr.com/Article/3664160/IFLR-magazine/Americas-A-sheep-in-wolfs-clothing.html> accessed 8 December 2018.