Max Weber’s Methodology: A Critical Review of his ‘Basic Sociological Concepts’

By Claire Murray – 3rd Year Undergraduate Student – Sociology

Introduction

Max Weber was a German sociologist who is often viewed by the social sciences as one of the most influential figures of the 20^th century (Roth, 2002). Weber made a profound impact on sociology, political theory and economics through major writings such as The Economic Ethics of the World Religions, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism and Economy and Society (Roth, 2002; Swedberg, 2003). In his writings he maintains that’s sociology is a science that construes and understands social action, seeking casual explanations and effects of said action (Weber, 2019). This essay will focus on the Weberian topics of action, social action, meaning, understanding (Verstehen), rationalisation and ideal types. The new translation of chapter one of Max Weber’s Economy and Society will be the focus of this body of work. This essay seeks to discuss and explain the Weberian concepts, critically analysing them against other theories and sociological ideas.

Weberian Distinctions: Action vs. Social Action

Within Weberian sociology distinctions are made between action and social action (Weber, 2019). Not every form of action is social, much of which can be determined and influenced by ‘the mass’ or the crowd an individual finds themselves within (Weber, 2019:100). ‘Action’ is human behaviour which is linked to subjective ‘meanings’ construed by one or more actors (Weber, 2019:78-79). By this Weber suggests that individuals can justify and gauge their own actions and as a result attach meaning to them which are usually subjective (Kalberg, 1994). He argues that even when action is carried out in a seemingly unreflective manner, for example following conformity and customs, that this does not signify complete acquiescence (Kalberg, 1994). Instead, Weber suggests that this implies a conscious acceptance on behalf of the actor(s) (Kalberg, 1994). Weber even goes as far as to claim that without this conscious endowment and orientation of meaning to actions, that entire systems will vanish, for example, customs, values, and conventions (Kalberg, 1994).

Social action, however, involves the anticipated action of others who may be individual or numerous, familiar, or unfamiliar (Weber, 2019). This anticipated action can be past, present, or future. (Weber, 2019). These arguments follow the framework of methodological individualism which disputes the argument that social organisms or collectives are the systems within society that ‘act’ (Kalberg, 1994; Weber, 2019). Instead, they insist that action and the meaningful comprehension of behaviour as well as the “structural attributes of the group rest upon the disposition of the individual” (Andreski, 1984:39; Weber, 2019). These are often referred to as key Weberian theories. However, many argue that this ‘theory’ is nothing but a classification system, which defines the conceptual tools to select and order phenomena (Krimsky and Golding, 1992). It does not offer much explanation as to what each classification means but instead offers common sensical distinctions (Taylor, 1947; Andreski, 1984).

The Four Types of Social Action

The central and most famous of these classifications come in the form of four specific determinates of social action. Firstly, purposive rationality, also sometimes referred to as goal rationality. This involves the conscious calculation of behaviour to achieve certain ends via certain means (Brubaker, 1984; Weber, 2019). Secondly there is value rationality which involves the “conscious belief in the unconditional and intrinsic value” of behaving in a certain way (Weber, 2019:101). Thirdly there is affectual action, this is action which occurs through the emotions and strong feelings of the individuals (Brubaker, 1984; Weber, 2019).

lastly, traditional action, which occurs due to longstanding habitual behaviour (Brubaker, 1984; Weber, 2019). This fourfold typology presented by Weber is a practical and beneficial way of categorising action in order to better interpret it. This categorisation allows the reader to form a better ‘understanding’ of the nature of the actor, their potential states and moods, and their ability to combine these factors to create elaborate internal configurations (Stones, 2009). The manifestation of these internal configurations then forms a “hybrid orientation to action” (Stones, 2009:8). While this is the case, one also could argue that these distinctions have faults and are oftentimes viewed as basic and assumptive (Brubaker, 1984; Swingewood, 1984).

Critiques of Weber’s Typology of Action

Comparisons and criticisms have been made against purposive (goal) rationality and value rationality (Andreski, 1984). One could argue that these terms are interchangeable and could be viewed as having overlapping definitions (Andreski,1984). Therefore, they do not possess the necessary and significant distinctions to remain as two separate ideas and could benefit from being amalgamated into one (Andreski, 1984). Arguably, similar criticisms can be drawn against the use of the term ‘traditional action’ (Andreski, 1984:37). This is because it creates confusion with regards to the antiquity of the patterns of behaviour calling to question whether or not it involves ratiocination (Andreski, 1984). Thus, it could be suggested that the term ‘habitual’ would be better suited to this specific distinction (Andreski, 1984).

Individualism and Social Phenomena

These concepts of action presented by Weber highlight the importance of recognising individual agency and individual decisions making when it comes to the shaping of social phenomena (Weber, 2019). Similarly, the individualistic approach to these theories was previously supported by Herbert Spencer, of whom remained strictly individualistic within his concepts of society (Swingewood, 1984). Throughout his work in the ‘Principles of Sociology, (1873)’, Spencer argued that the labelling of the social world as a ‘society’ is essentially a “collective name for a number of individuals” (Swingewood, 1984:57). He insisted that in order to obtain a true theory of society, that one must inquire about the “nature of its component individuals” (Swingewood, 1984:57).

This individualistic approach to action also emphasises the importance of recognising the complexity, subjective experiences, and the diversity within individual motivations for action (Weber, 2019). This concept offers a flexible and adaptive approach to analysing social phenomena. However, it could be argued that an individualistic approach is ignorant to the impact that the collective can have upon social structures in society. ‘Individualism pertains to societies where the ties between individuals are loose’ and the is an emphasis on individual consciousness and autonomy (Kim, 1995:4). Collectivism however is the complete opposite, referring to cohesive groups with an emphasis on collective identity and consciousness (Kim, 1995). The significance placed upon the individual throughout Weber’s theory of action is fundamentally different from Durkheim’s theory of social facts (Swingewood, 1984).

Contrasting Theories: Durkheim, Comte, and Marx

Durkheim in his sociological theories took more of a collectivist approach (Kalberg, 1994). He argues that “sociological explanation deals with collective, not individual forces” and that these ‘social facts’ such as religion or family are “invested with coercive behaviour”, imposing influence upon individuals (Swingewood, 1984:99). Durkheim insists that these social facts do indeed develop autonomously, however they do so without participation or influence of man. (Freund, 1968). This is fundamentally different from the sense of autonomy that Weber affords individuals through his theories of meaningful action (Weber, 2019).

In continuation of the argument of individualism versus collectivism, several other sociological figures denounce the idea of placing significance on the action of one or more individuals. Comte and his theory of positivism, which Weber rejects, utilises the natural sciences and applies them (Swingewood, 1984). He asserts that society as a biological organism cannot be reduced to its component parts, such as the meaningful actions of actors discussed by Weber (Swingewood, 1984). Therefore, society and social action cannot be decomposed into individuals but instead, a collective organism (Swingewood, 1984). Unlike Comte’s sociological positivism and in refutation of Weber’s individualism, Marx “depicts humanity as the active producer of the social world” (Swingewood 1984:91).

Marx denies Weber’s claims that individuals are the origins and source of all that they think and of all actions they take (Stones, 2009). Instead, he suggests that it is the social conditions in which one is raised, works or lives in that has power and influence over how individuals act, think and feel (Stones, 2009). Thus, meaningful action is not a conscious, autonomous decision made by isolated individuals with individual wills as suggested by Weber but instead a result the influence of social groups and class constructs outside of the individuals’ control (Swingewood, 1984; Stones, 2009; Weber, 2019).

Understanding (Verstehen) and Evidenz

Throughout this piece of writing, Weber consistently identifies and discusses the concepts of Verstehen and Evidenz. These concepts come hand in hand and are necessary for Weber’s interpretation of action and or meaningful action (Weber, 2019). The term Verstehen in sociology refers to the ability to gain understanding about certain sociological concepts (Andreski, 1984). Evidenz or the degree of  Evidenz, on the other hand refers to the basis for clarity and certainty within this ‘understanding’ (Turner, 2012; Weber, 2019). This is essential for the interpretation of the meaning attached to actions. Within this chapter, Weber oftentimes refers to the concept of understanding; identifying the different kinds and how they connect to the contexts and construal of meaning (Weber, 2019). He identifies two types of understanding.

Firstly, he acknowledges direct and immediate understanding, this is usually vocalising the intended meaning of an action (Weber, 2019). He secondly highlights explanatory understanding as the motivation of the meaning that one has expressed or written (Weber, 2019). Through these types of understanding, we can determine that understanding means the construal of what was really intended in both an individual and an average instance as well as the pure or ideal type of commonly reoccurring phenomenon (Weber, 2019). The identification of these types of understanding affords the reader and or potential researcher with distinctive guidelines that, for Weber, should be considered when attempting to interpret the meaningful actions of individuals.

Critiques of Understanding and Evidenz

On the other hand, Weber can be seen as failing to do one simple, yet significant thing. He does not clearly and directly identify what we exactly understand by understanding (Andreski, 1984). Andreski argues that the lack of specificity around the concept of ‘understanding’ leads to one to analyse the innovation in terms of the commonly accepted meaning of the word (Andreski, 1984). As a result of this, he insists that the notion of ‘understanding’ therefore becomes “superfluous, presumptuous and misleading” (Andreski, 1984:27). The common understanding of the word itself does not “presuppose the possession of adequate knowledge” which is necessary to explain and predict the behaviour and actions of individuals throughout society (Andreski, 1984:28). It instead leads to one approaching the concept with a more commonsensical perspective. Additionally, to the criticism of Weber’s concept of ‘understanding’, philosopher Franz Brentano also criticizes his discussion and portrayal of Evidenz (Turner, 2012). He argues against Weber’s idea of existing ‘degrees’ of Evidenz, stating that something was either evident or not, that there was no additional recourse (Turner, 2012). Brentano’s concept of Evidenz therefore lay within the restraint of “logical and mathematical truths about which one had insight” (Turner, 2012:395).

Weber’s Ideal Types

As briefly mentioned beforehand, Weber constructed and frequently referred to his concept of ‘ideal or pure types’ throughout this chapter. Ideal types as defined by Weber “represent the course that a particular sort of human action would follow if its purposive rationality were rigorously formulated” (Weber, 2019:58). These ideal types are without errors and are distinctly aligned to a singular objective (Weber, 2019). Weber proclaimed that these ‘ideal types’ can manifest in three ways, historical formations, abstract ideal types, and types of action (Swingewood, 1984). Ideal types can be beneficial as they can be utilised as a heuristic device and method of investigating the real world and the social phenomena that occurs within it (Swedberg, 2018). They allow sociological researchers to learn how the real world works through the construction and comparison of the conceptualised ideal types, to reality (Swedberg, 2018). Therefore, they are a valuable tool for sociological research, offering guidance and structure when interpreting, scrutinising, and characterising social phenomena (Swedberg, 2018).

Critiques of Ideal Types

This concept of ‘ideal or pure types’ has however been heavily criticised by several sociological academics such as Freund, Andreski and Swedberg to name a few. A common denominator between the variety of criticisms towards this concept is that it is vague, generic, and unclear, giving rise to misunderstanding and confusion (Freund, 1968; Andreski, 1984; Swedberg, 2018). The classifications for these ideal types are ambiguous in nature (Coenen-Huther, 2003). The term itself has even been denounced due to its ambiguity by Becker and McKinney, who suggest that a more definitive and applicable term such as ‘constructed type’ should be favoured instead (Coenen-Huther, 2003). Central to this classification is the Hegelian linkage between “subjective and objective aspects of action” (Knapp, 1986:602). However, Weber fails to offer these “objective controls for the formation of ideal types”, lending to the criticism that this work is undeveloped, general and lacks clarity (Kalberg,1994:86). Additionally, Weber is often criticised throughout his ideal type for being a nominalist and only recognising individual entities (Kalberg, 1994; Ferrari, 2022). Although Weber himself does accept that ideal types are essentially “nomological in nature” he rejects the idea that they themselves have normative status (Mommsen, 1992:123).

Conclusion

Weber’s introduction to Economy & Society, ‘Basic Sociological Concepts’ offers the reader with a range of methodological ideas and perspectives which can be utilised to better interpret and understand sociological phenomena. Action, social action, meaning, understanding (Verstehen) rationalisation and ideal types are all substantive and significantly important conceptual ideas. However, it must be recognised that these ideas were envisioned over a century ago. Which leads one to ask the question, how relevant are they in today’s society? Although these concepts have not lost all their relevance, one must acknowledge that the absolute interpretation of social phenomena, strictly following the application of these Weberian ideas, would be reductive and irrelevant in today’s modern society. Therefore, for positive analysis of societal phenomena, future research should consider all relevant sociological perspectives, both classical and modern to create a median outlook on society.

Reference List

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Weber, M. (2019) ‘Basic Sociological Concepts ‘, in Tribe, K. (ed.) Economy and Society. United States of America: Harvard University Press, pp. 74-138.