Structure and Agency: A Comparative Analysis by Ms Megan Byrne

Degree Programme: Masters in research – Social Science Research

Introduction

The following analysis seeks to critically compare Bourdieu and Archer’s theories of structure and agency. In doing so the strengths and limitations of each framework will be critically examined, and core aspects of both theories will be compared to derive a nuanced conclusion. The core argument of this analysis is that despite the many advantages of both theories, Bourdieu’s theory of structure and agency is more compelling as it avoids reifying structures and integrates structure and agency thusly accounting for the internalisation of structure and accounts for power.

Structure and Agency

The analysis centres on the concepts of structure and agency, two concepts that are seldom conceptualised in isolation and often centred in sociological debate. The debate primarily concerns whether social behaviour is governed by external social forces (structure) or by the choices of individuals (agency). This leads to varying definitions, although structure is generally conceptualised as an internal or external social force, which influences an individual’s actions, either through internalised dispositions or existing structures such as law (Archer, 1995; Elder-Vass, 2010).

Agency, on the other hand refers to the human ability to act independently of structure, the individual’s ability to make choices and decisions in their life that are not a direct result of the overarching social structures they are subjected to, although some theorists believe human agency is ultimately acquired from structure regardless (Archer, 1995; Elder-Vass, 2010).

The dilemma of reconciling agency with structure has been a foundational challenge within sociology, with Bourdieu describing it as “the most fundamental, and the most ruinous” (Bourdieu, 1990b, p.21) dichotomy of the social sciences. Historically, debates have consistently gravitated towards theoretical models that favour either structure or agency (Archer, 2010, Elder-Vass 2010). This oscillation has led to the development of two major antithetical conceptions, which have been characterised as ‘the two sociologies’ (Archer, 2010) which are: objectivism and subjectivism.

The objectivist approach is conceptually aligned with methodological collectivism or holism and is characterised by the conception of structure as a real and distinct entity whose rules and forces shape behaviour, requiring explanations to focus on structures rather than individuals (Archer, 1995; Elder-Vass 2010). This approach envisions structure as a distinct entity, external to the individual which has irreducible powers that shape and constrain action (Archer, 1995). Theories within this approach, such as Structuralist Marxism and Normative Functionalism, tilt towards structural determinism, wherein they are critiqued for portraying agents as overly passive. Within this framework structure has been described as having “virtually snuffed-out agency” (Archer, 2010, p. 225). This can be conceptualised as downward conflation, whereby causation is seen as flowing solely from structure to agent (Giddens, 1984). Accordingly, this produces the critique that the role of agency is underrepresented and that action is produced without an agent (Giddens, 1984).

Conversely, the Subjectivist approach is aligned with methodological individualism and voluntarism, meaning the internal experience, personal freedoms and consciousness of the individual actor are foregrounded (Elder-Vass, 2010). Thus, human agency becomes the more powerful force in determining action, emphasising the agent’s choice and ability to make decisions. Historically this has led to the perception that social structure has “evanescent fragility” (Archer, 2010, p.225) and is reduced to “supine plasticity because of its constructed nature” (Archer, 2010, p.225), meaning that under this approach, structures were conceptualised as malleable and weak, shaped by human design and easily changed, this can also be conceptualised as upwards conflation, which posits that causation flows one way, upwards, from agent to structure (Archer, 1995). This naturally produces the critique that the structural context is ignored and underrepresented.

These two approaches stand in stark contrast to each other, with both approaches’ major critiques being the absence of the alternative approach, beckoning the development of an alternative approach, which both Bourdieu and Archer attempt to achieve, in distinct ways.

Bourdieu

Bourdieu’s theory of structure and agency is his attempt to transcend the traditional divide between objectivism and subjectivism by arguing that structure and agency are ontologically inseparable and mutually influential (Emirbayer & Mische, 1998). Bourdieu achieves this through his concepts of field, habitus, and capital, which form the foundation of his conception. Bourdieu referred to these as his main “thinking tools” (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1989, p. 50) and emphasises that they are not independent entities, rather intertwined concepts that should be envisioned as integrated.

Bourdieu’s concept of the field is defined as a structured social space and an objective network of relations, in which agents are situated, and relations of power and inequality operate continuously, comparable to a competitive game (Grenfell, 2012). These distinct fields correspond to different social spheres, such as law, academia. Each field has its own logic and rules, which, along with the individual’s capital and habitus, determine their position within the field (economic, cultural, social, and symbolic), (Grenfell, 2012).

Bourdieu defines habitus as a system of durable, transposable dispositions, which have been structured by past social conditions and function as a generator of future practices and perceptions. Bourdieu argues that habitus is not stagnant and that over time the agent’s experiences within fields create changes within their habitus. This malleable habitus allows agents to understand and navigate (Archer, 1995; Bourdieu, 1990b) better unconsciously.

Bourdieu uses his idea of habitus to explain structural reproduction or transformation. He argues that the unconscious understanding of the world is an agent ‘feel for the game.’ This feel for the game reproduces preexisting social structures, because agents adopt actions that are already possible and valued in the field (Bourdieu, 1990a). Individuals are not consciously reproducing social structures, or intentionally rule following, rather their habitus facilitates them to do it unconsciously (Grenfell, 2012). Social transformation, on the other hand, occurs when there is a mismatch or disjuncture between the subjective structures of the habitus and the objective conditions of the field. This creates a lag between the habitus and field (hysteresis), which forces ‘practical reflection’ within the individual, whereby they consciously assess the mismatch they have been presented with, assess the crisis, change their habits and formulate a strategy to navigate the changed field, thereby opening a pathway for structural change (Bourdieu, 2000; Decoteau & Laurier, 2016; Grenfell, 2012)

Bourdieu’s conception of capital proposes that it is the primary source of social energy or power that allows agents to participate in their fields and maximise their positions within them. (Bourdieu, 1990a; Bourdieu, 1990b; Grenfell, 2012). Unlike traditional economics, which focus on money, Bourdieu views capital as a broad system of both material and immaterial assets that can be accumulated, exchanged, and converted to other forms (Grenfell, 2012).

He defines four primary types of capital; economic capital: monetary wealth, property, and material assets, cultural capital: symbolic capital such as knowledge, skills or educational qualifications, social capital: derived from social networks, affiliations or prestigious connects, symbolic capital: honour, prestige or legitimacy, it refers to the value that other forms of capital can provide when they are legitimised within social contexts (Grenfell, 2012).

The concepts of field, habitus and capital are the core conceptions of Bourdieu’s theory. With field creating social spaces in which agents are situated according to their capital, which they navigate according to their habitus. Under this conception agency is neither fully free nor fully structurally determined. It emerges from the engagement of habitus with the constraints and opportunities of the field, although this is influenced by the agent’s capital. Through this process social structures are typically reproduced, yet transformation exists as a possibility via shifts in fields. In this way Bourdieu’s framework demonstrates how suture and agency are continuously co-constituted in social life.

Archer

Contrastingly, Archer’s theory of structure and agency is built on the idea that the two concepts should be separated and analysed as such. She proposes that this approach allows us to truly conceptualise and understand how structure and agency affect each other. She calls this approach analytical dualism (Archer, 1995).

Analytical dualism hypothesises that structure and agency must be conceptualised as separate but interacting parts. This approach requires sociologists to acknowledge that both structure and agency are indispensable in explaining social outcomes and how both have their own distinct existence and independent causal powers, which is the “capability of an entity to have a certain sort of causal effect on the world in its own right” (Elder-Vass, 2010, p. 66).

Archers’ framework is built upon two distinct ontological realities, social structure (T1), and human agency (T2-T3). Firstly, structure (T1) is conceived through ontological realism, meaning it conceptualised as real social forms and cultural patterns which exist outside of individuals as a separate entity and exist before social action (Burkitt, 2016; Decoteau & Laurier, 2016; Dépelteau, 2008; Elder-Vass, 2010). She describes these as collective realities which may be organisations, institutions and roles and they function as powerful conditioning forces. Structure exserts its causal influences on individuals by confronting them with an external reality that either constrains or enables their actions. Social structures, such as institutions, established relationships and collective resources exist as an external reality that possesses a casual power that affects the life outcomes of agents, determining what it is possible for them to do (Burkitt, 2016; Elder-Vass, 2010)

Secondly, human agency (T2-T3) is defined as the individual’s inherent capacity or ability for reflexive deliberation or conscious thinking (Burkitt, 2016; Emirbayer & Mische, 1998). This is an internal thought process referred to as the internal conversation, and Archer theorises that it is this that is the mediating link between external structures and the agents’ actions (Burkitt, 2016; Dépelteau, 2008). It is through this process that agents become cognisant of their objective structural circumstances (T1), evaluate their ultimate concerns and formulate projects (strategies) for action (T2-T3).

Archers final phase is structural outcome (T4), this is the outcome of T2-T3. It is a critical stage because it reveals whether the existing social structure is maintained or fundamentally altered (Burkitt, 2016; Dépelteau, 2008). This manifests in either structural elaboration (morphogenesis) or structural reproduction (morphostasis). Morphogenesis is the complex interchanges that produce change in a system, which result in a product that exists independently of the practices that generated it, carrying over to influence the future. In simple terms an agent’s project influenced change within the structure which will go on to influence other agents (Archer, 2010; Burkitt, 2016).

Morphostasis on the other hand refers to the self-regulating processes that exist within complex systems that work to preserve or maintain the existing form of the social system (Archer, 2010; Elder-Vass, 2010), Archer argues that this is not an automatic process, rather, it depends fundamentally on the collective agency of the individuals, who through conscious reflexive deliberation, have chosen to act within the constraints of T1 (Archer, 2010), determining the transformation or replication of the social feature.

This T4 stage then determines the conditioning environment, meaning a new or repeated set of influences will be in place for subsequent agents, which will initiate the next phase of the cycle, making T4 the new T1 (Archer, 2010; Burkitt, 2016). Thusly, the cycle repeats.

Evidently, Archer, through her concept of analytical dualism, presents a framework depicting structure and agency as distinct but interconnected components. By separating the concepts Archer allows for a clear understanding of their independent causal powers, clearly arguing that structure is an external reality that conditions individual action and that agency is the internal and reflexive deliberation that shapes how agents act either within or against structures. Archer allows for change within these structures through morphogenesis, wherein the actions of individuals, through active deliberation and reflexivity, alters or maintains existing structures. Morphostasis on the other hand depicts the collective reproduction and preservation of existing structures. Thusly, Archer’s framework highlights the dynamic relationship betweenstructure and agency whereby agents shape the structure and are shaped by the structure.

Analysis

The critical comparison of Bourdieu’s and Archer’s theories of structure and agency will centre around several main dimensions; firstly, the ontological and epistemological treatment of structure/agency, secondly the integration of structure and agency and lastly the role of power within both theories. Both frameworks with be critically compared, and critiqued, to support the claim that Bourdieu offers the more compelling framework.

A key point of divergence between Bourdieu and Archer is the ontological and epistemological differences in their conceptualisation of the relationship between structure and agency. These are also areas under which they both face the greatest criticism.

As aforementioned, Archer’s approach insists structure and agency are ontologically distinct, which offers separation for the purposes of analytical clarity. However, this clarity comes with disadvantage. It is argued that Archer’s move from analytical separation to ontological distinction is problematic. King (1999) proposes that “Archer converts the temporal priority of other people’s actions into the ontological priority and autonomy of structure” (p.211). This means that Archer takes the fact that structures exist before you act (temporal priority) and uses it for proof that structures exist independently of human activity (ontological priority).

Bourdieu on the other hand rejects dualism and treats structure and agency as both interdependent and mutually constitutive, using his aforementioned ‘thinking tools.’ Despite this he faces criticism in that he similarly (though not identically) blurs the distinction between ontology and epistemology. Vandenberghe (1999) critiques Bourdieu for committing an ‘epistemic fallacy’, wherein Bourdieu conflates ontology and epistemology and treats scientific representations of the world as both a reflection of reality and the basis for constructing it. Meaning instead of concepts like habitus being useful tools to help us explain behaviour, they become representations of how reality is structured, thusly Bourdieu conflates representations of reality with reality itself.

These criticisms raise questions about the validity of both Archer’s and Bourdieu’s theories, they suggest that both theorists at times conflate representation with reality, however the implications of this conflation differ in severity. Archer’s approach introduces a metaphysical gap that reifies structure and isolates agency, weakening the theory. Bourdieu’s approach remains more compelling because despite the risk of determinism, he can still provide a relational explanation or account of social life, where in structures have the capacity to be reproduced or transformed, making it the analytically stronger argument.

Regardless, it is reasonable to assume both theories may remain useful ensuring academics and scholars remain cognisant of these limitations and ensure both models are used as an analytical or conceptual tool, instead of a literal reflection of the world.

Additionally, Archer’s separation of structure and agency (and consequential metaphysical dualism) is argued to risk the reification of social structures (treating abstract social relations as if they are real, independent things), rather than viewing them as dynamic processes or relationships between people (Burkitt 2016). Dépelteau (2008) asserts that this framework imposes an unnecessary philosophical requirement for linking the two autonomous levels back together. Likewise, King (1999) challenges Archer’s claim of ontologically separate structure. He argues that if structures are fundamentally rooted in social relations, they are people acting in complex relationships, this suggests that Archer’s argument of dualism is weakened as treating structures as independent entities reifies what are dynamic social processes.

Put simply, Archer’s separation of structure and agency can weaken the explanatory power of her theory by unintentionally reproducing an overly rigid objectivism, reifying structure, and imposing unnecessary philosophical constraints to reconcile structure and agency, reducing the applicability of her theory to real world dynamics.

Bourdieu, contrastingly, conceptualises structure and agency as mutually constitutive, although critics such as King (2000) argue this is disguised objectivism, meaning his approach undervalues the role of conscious choice. King explains, “the habitus marks the moment when Bourdieu collapses back into the very sociological objectivism which he putatively rejected” (King, 2000, p. 426) In essence, habitus allows social agents to fulfil a predetermined social destiny as it is partly determined by structure and has no room for internal dialog regarding decision making. Therefore, it is arguably still a form of objectivism.

King (2000) asserts that this creates a further challenge, that because the habitus ensures practices reproduce structures, logically, social change is ruled out. Bourdieu attempted to explain this change using hysteresis, though King (2000) proposes this mechanism is merely sidestepping the problem. Similarly, Garnham and Williams (1980) argue the deterministic residue in Bourdieu’s concept limits his ability to account for real change, supporting the idea that habitus slips back into objectivity. Jenkins (1982) attests to this, strengthening the argument further, he particularly critiques the objectivist description of the interplay between structure and habitus.

Together, these criticisms suggest that Bourdieu’s theory is open to accusations of objectivism and a lack of authentic agency, particularly in its tendency to prioritise reproduction of structure over social change/agency. This threatens the plausibility of his theory, as despite Bourdieu’s efforts to avoid determinism, he inadvertently creates it.

Archers’ theory is under criticism for the issues arising from her separation of structure and agency, Bourdieu on the other hand is criticised for the specific way in which he combines structure and agency (habitus). There is a clear mirroring of the two criticisms here. Together they highlight a shared, long-standing, theoretical tension concerning how to account for both structural constraint and human agency without reification or reduction. Despite this mirroring, Bourdieu’s approach remains more compelling. His integration of structure and agency clearly risks determinism; however, it persists in its provision of a relational account of social life, preserving the interconnectedness of structure and agency, something Archer does not do. With Archer’s critique of reification in mind, it is reasonable to assume this makes her framework less applicable or reflective of social relations, here Bourdieu’s integration of structure and agency gives him the upper hand.

Bourdieu’s framework has been praised for its sophisticated analysis of power. He conceptualises power as symbolic violence, which is an invisible and gentle form of domination that is maintained via the misrecognition of arbitrary social hierarchies as legitimate and natural (Bourdieu, P., 1990b; Grenfell, 2012). This power is exercised though the attainment and deployment of capital. The habitus facilitates this process by ensuring the dominated unconsciously participate in their own subordination, allowing dominant groups to maintain their control, by simply letting social systems take their own courses (Brubaker, 1985; King, 2000)

Archer on the other hand is critiqued for her limited engagement with the complex nature of power. Luckett (2008) argues that Archer treats power primarily as an external constraint or enablement, which does not explain how social structures are involuntarily internalised to shape underlying dispositions regarding power. This implies a key limitation, with the underestimation of internalisation comes a limit in the explanatory power of Archer’s framework, as she cannot explain why people ‘take in’ social norms or hierarchies unconsciously. Without a concept such as Bourdieu’s habitus, Archer’s theory cannot account fully for this every day, internalised reproduction of society, making her explanation less complete and giving Bourdieu a more advantageous position.

Conclusion

Bourdieu’s framework provides a more compelling account of structure and agency, for several key reasons. Firstly, although both theorists conflate representation with reality, the implications vary in severity. With Archer’s Dualism introducing a metaphysical gap that risks reifying structures and isolating agency and Bourdieu, despite the risk of determinism, offers a relational account under which structures can be reproduced or negotiated through everyday practice. Secondly, Archer’s emphasis on ontologically separate structures limits the applicability of her framework to real life relations, however as Bourdieu embeds structure within agency, he avoids this reification and captures the fluid nature of social life. Thirdly, Archer’s theory underplays the internalisation of power, making it difficult to conceptualise how both social norms and hierarchies are unconsciously reproduced by agents. Bourdieu’s concept of habitus contrastingly explicitly accounts for this internalised reproduction, giving his theory better explanatory power. Bourdieu’s integration of structure and agency, his relational ontology and his treatment of internalised power provide a robust and empirically useful framework, gaining an advantageous position over Archer’s dualistic approach. This conclusion highlights a broader theoretical implication, that sociological explanations of structure and agency are in a delicate balance, attempting to avoid both objectification and subjectification in a way that prevents the reification of structure and the isolation of agency, instead they should locate social order within the ongoing, embodied nature of practice.

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