From Petitions of Concern to Political Collapse: How can POS Explain the Emergence and Success of Marriage Equality in Northern Ireland by: Lewis Lavery

Degree Programme: English and Sociology

Year of Study: Third year

Introduction

This article examines the extent to which Political Opportunity Structures (POS) can explain both the emergence of same-sex marriage equality and its achievement in Northern Ireland. It begins by reviewing the key literature and core concepts associated with POS, providing a theoretical framework through which the development of same-sex marriage equality can be analysed. The article then explores several factors that contributed to the closure of political opportunities for marriage equality in Northern Ireland. First, it considers how the reduction in the number of Members of the Legislative Assembly (MLAs) constituted a narrowing of the POS. Second, it critiques the use of the Petition of Concern as an institutional constraint that limited opportunities for legislative change. Third, it highlights the suspension of the Northern Ireland Executive between 2017 and 2020 as a significant factor contributing to the closure of political opportunities. Finally, the article argues that although the POS within Northern Ireland remained largely closed to same-sex marriage equality, the broader system of multi-level governance provided alternative political opportunities through which reform could be achieved.

The article contends that, when Northern Ireland is examined in isolation, POS theory is insufficient to fully explain the emergence and achievement of same-sex marriage equality. However, when situated within the wider context of the United Kingdom’s political system, POS provides a more convincing explanation for both the movement’s development and its eventual success in securing marriage equality in Northern Ireland.

Literature Review

Meyer and Minkoff (2004), argue the basic premise of POS is that there are external factors that open and close the prospects for a social movement organisation (SMO) to mobilise, advance claims, for particular strategies to be influenced, and to affect mainstream politics and policies (Meyer and Minkoff, 2004:1457-1458). Therefore, when the POS becomes more open rather than closed, it is more likely that a SMO will achieve its goals. Abrams (2022), summarises McAdams (1996) key dimensions of POS. The first dimension is the relative openness or closedness of the ‘institutionalised political system’ in a given state, the second dimension is that opportunities arise from relationships with power holders, the third dimension is that there is a presence or absence of elite allies who may be able to aid the movement, the last dimension is that the state has a capacity and propensity to represses SMO’s by formal or informal means (Abrams, 2022:611-612). Furthermore, it has been argued that the POS is made up of a set of structures that conditions collective action, diverts attention from the interaction of actors with long lasting processes, and has several actors acting within it (della Porta and Diani, 2020:201).

The key feature of the POS is that it may be open or closed. In an open POS, there is generally a greater number of actors who share political power; which allows for political decisions to be dispersed through a greater intersection of society, thus allowing for SMO’s greater ability to gain access to the system (della Porta and Diani, 2020:204). Whereas, in closed POS the previously existing power relations remain unstable, elites are unsympathetic to the goals of the SMO, and the state is willing and able to crack down on SMO activity (Abrams, 2022:612).

Much of the literature on the theory of POS aims to apply the theory to specific SMO’s, rather than conceptualising the concept and dimensions that it is made of. As Meyer and Minkoff have noted, there is a “need for more careful and more explicit conceptualization and specification of political opportunity variables and models” (Meyer and Minkoff, 2004:1458). However, there has been a failure in the following literature to do so. The literature continues to explain the concept through application to specific SMO’s, such as in della Porta and Diani’s application of POS to the Latin American left-wing electoral victories of the late 1990’s and early 2000’s (della Porta and Diani, 2020). As previously highlighted, each theorist and academic scholarship brings together its own definition and dimension of what POS consist off. As such reinforcing the view of Gamson and Meyer, that the theory of POS is “in danger of becoming a sponge that soaks up every aspect of the social movement environment.” (Gamson and Meyer, 1996:275).

Analysis

Northern Ireland was the last constituent nation of the United Kingdom to decriminalise homosexuality through the Homosexual Offences (Northern Ireland) Order 1982 (SI 1982/1536). Similarly, Northern Ireland was the last jurisdiction within both the United Kingdom and Ireland to legalise same-sex marriage, doing so through the Marriage (Same-sex Couples) and Civil Partnership (Opposite-sex Couples) (Northern Ireland) Regulations 2019 (SI 2019/1514). These developments suggest that legislative progress on LGBTQ+ rights in Northern Ireland has occurred at a slower pace than in the rest of the United Kingdom and Ireland, making it a particularly relevant case through which to examine the political factors that shape the advancement of LGBTQ+ equality.

Decreases in Political Representatives

POS are more open when political decisions are dispersed, and there is a greater number of actors with political power (della Porta and Diani, 2020:204); an example of this is there being a greater number of elected officials.  Following the GFA (Good Friday Agreement) in 1998, each election saw 108 MLAs elected, however in 2017 this number was reduced to 90 (Sargeant, Rycroft, and Fright, 2022). In line with the third dimension of the relative openness of closedness of POS, the decrease of elected officials constitutes a decrease in the presence of elite allies who may be able to aid same-sex marriage equality in Northern Ireland. In the view of both POS, the decrease in political representatives makes it less likely that same-sex marriage equality achieves its aim. Moreover, the political field has been reformed which “reinforce[s] the concentration of power within this field and possibly foster[s] the stagnation, even the decline of contentious mobilization.” (Ancelovici, 2021:165). In the view of both POS, the politically institutions of Northern Ireland are not closed but reduced at the devolved level to the achievement of same-sex marriage equality. However, the decrease in political representatives in Northern Ireland was not the only issue in preventing marriage equality being legalised, as in the last vote on the issue in 2015 the majority of MLAs voted in favour of legalising marriage equality (Northern Ireland Assembly, 2015). As the following section will highlight, the overwhelming issue in legalising marriage equality in Northern Ireland was due to the petition of concern.

Power-Sharing and Petitions of Concern

The Northern Irish Assembly debated on the issue of same-sex marriage equality legalisation five times between 2012-2015. In the final debate in 2015, marriage equality received majority support in the Assembly; with 53 MLA’s voting in favour and 52 voting against (Northern Ireland Assembly, 2015). However, the DUP launched a ‘petition of concern’ on the legislation of same-sex marriage, resulting in the legislation being subjected to requiring cross-community support arrangements (McCormick and Stewart, 2020:558). As such, this would require that 60% of the assembly voted in favour, alongside at least 40% from both designated nationalists and unionists (Murtagh and Nagle, 2024:6). By launching a petition of concern, the DUP effectively presented the issue of same-sex marriage as being an ethnonationalist issue rather than an equality issue. As pointed out by Murtagh and Nagle, issues that affect all areas of society, such as sexuality, can become ‘ethnicized’ (Murtagh and Nagle, 2024:5), as evidenced by the DUP launching a petition of concern.

The nature of the consociational power-sharing agreement of the Northern Ireland Assembly and the petition of concern, highlights how the POS in Northern Ireland was closed to the issue of same-sex marriage. The DUP commandeered the petition of concern, which was “[i]intended as a guarantee for unionist and nationalist blocs on issue affecting their vital national interest[s]” (Murtagh and Nagle, 2024:9). Therefore, highlighting how in consociational power-sharing agreements the democratic processes can be circumvented. This is a clear example of how the structure of the Northern Irish government serves to act as a closed political system, in which politicians serve their own interests. In as such reinforcing Abrams first dimension of a closed POS; that the power relations remain unstable.

Furthermore, as one activist noted they needed “to be very careful about not being seen to favour any particular parties or…to allow our issues to be perceived by parties to be a proxy” (Murtagh and Nagle, 2024:11). As such reinforcing the idea that such issues can become easily ethicised. In line with Ancelovici’s fields of FOS, which builds on POS, the space of position-takings that actors can adopt are restricted due to the antagonistic stance they are confronted with (Ancelovici, 2021:163). Activists can connect with elite actors, such as within Nationalist parties, but have trouble doing so as it allows for the issue of same-sex marriage to be presented along ethnic lines. Moreover, reinforcing the idea that the POS in Northern Ireland can be considered closed due to power-sharing agreement and ethicised political issues.

Stormont Collapses

It has been argued that the decentralisation of power to regional and local bodies, such as the devolved administrations within the United Kingdom, increases opportunities for social movement organisations (SMOs) to mobilise and influence political decision-making (della Porta and Diani, 2020: 204). However, the Northern Irish case suggests a more complex relationship between devolution and political opportunities. Rather than creating an open Political Opportunity Structure (POS), the devolved institutions in Northern Ireland often constrained opportunities for the advancement of same-sex marriage equality.

The Northern Ireland Executive has been described as both ‘fragile’ and ‘prone to crisis’ (Birrell and Heenan, 2017: 473). This fragility was demonstrated in 2017 when Deputy First Minister Martin McGuinness resigned in response to the Democratic Unionist Party’s handling of the Renewable Heat Incentive (RHI) scheme, triggering the collapse of the power-sharing institutions (Heenan and Birrell, 2021: 597). Unlike previous periods of political crisis, Westminster did not immediately reintroduce direct rule (Heenan and Birrell, 2021: 597), leaving Northern Ireland without a functioning devolved government. Under the consociational arrangements established by the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement, the participation of both the largest unionist and nationalist parties is required for government formation. Consequently, the absence of one party prevented the restoration of the Executive. The suspension of the institutions meant that there was no capacity to formulate policy, introduce legislation, or implement political reforms (Heenan and Birrell, 2021: 598). As a result, opportunities for advancing same-sex marriage equality through devolved political channels were effectively closed.

Nagle (2011: 167) further argues that government departments within Northern Ireland often operate as separate political ‘fiefdoms’, reflecting the fragmented nature of governance under consociationalism. Building on this argument, Murtagh and Nagle (2024: 10) suggest that progress on LGBTQ+ rights is heavily dependent upon the political actors in power at a given time and may be vulnerable to reversal. Together, these arguments highlight how the institutional design of Northern Ireland’s power-sharing system can restrict the opening of political opportunities for social movements. In this respect, the instability and fragmentation associated with consociational governance reinforce Abrams’ contention that power relations remain unstable within closed political opportunity structures.

Westminster and Multi-Level Governance

Although the POS in Northern Ireland can be viewed as closing in the face of government shutdowns, petitions of concern, and decreases in the number of MLA’s, the POS for same-sex marriage equality was open in other parts of the UK.

In the aftermath of the collapse of power-sharing in Northern Ireland, activists increasingly directed their efforts towards policymakers and representatives at the UK-wide level (Murtagh and Nagle, 2024: 13). This demonstrates how Political Opportunity Structures (POS) can simultaneously be open and closed to claim-making activities. While opportunities for advancing same-sex marriage equality were largely closed within Northern Ireland’s devolved institutions, the wider UK political system provided alternative avenues through which activists could pursue their objectives. Consequently, campaigners increasingly circumvented Stormont and focused their efforts on Westminster (Murtagh and Nagle, 2024: 13). The suspension of the Northern Ireland Executive created an opportunity for intervention by the UK Parliament, culminating in the introduction of the Northern Ireland (Executive Formation etc.) Act 2019. The legislation stipulated that an Executive had to be restored by 21 October 2019; failing this, the UK Government would be required to implement measures relating to specific devolved policy areas (Heenan and Birrell, 2021: 602). Among these measures was the legalisation of same-sex marriage in Northern Ireland. As a result, the movement achieved its primary objective not through the opening of political opportunities within Northern Ireland itself, but through the opportunities presented by the UK’s system of multi-level governance.

As the Northern Irish Assembly was unable to form an executive by the specified date, same-sex marriage was legalised in Northern Ireland. Activists campaigning for same-sex marriage succeeded in their goals for legalisation, as well as “convincing MPs to include marriage equality into the Northern Ireland Functions Bill” (Murtagh and Nagle, 2024:13). In the face of a closed POS in Northern Ireland, activists were able to circumvent Stormont and engage in claim-making directly with officials in Westminster. Thus, highlighting how countries with multi-level systems of governance can have POS’s both open and closed depending on the jurisdiction. In the case of Westminster, the POS should be considered open due to the presence of elite allies such as Labour MP (Member of Parliament), Conor McGinn.

Discussion & Concluding Remarks

When considering only the political institutions of Northern Ireland, Political Opportunity Structure (POS) theory struggles to explain both the emergence of same-sex marriage equality and its eventual success. This is largely due to the predominantly closed nature of the political opportunity structure, reflected in the reduction of Members of the Legislative Assembly (MLAs), the repeated use of Petitions of Concern, and the suspension of devolved government. Furthermore, the consociational power-sharing arrangements that characterise Northern Ireland’s political system arguably reinforce this closure. This article goes further by suggesting that aspects of this institutional framework can hinder democratic decision-making, as demonstrated by the Democratic Unionist Party’s use of the Petition of Concern to block the legalisation of same-sex marriage despite the measure receiving majority support within the Assembly.

This article has examined the extent to which POS theory can explain the emergence of same-sex marriage equality and its achievement in Northern Ireland. In doing so, it reviewed the relevant literature on POS and outlined the key concepts underpinning the theory. This framework was then applied to the case of same-sex marriage equality, demonstrating how political opportunities within Northern Ireland were largely closed to the advancement of claim-making, mobilisation, and influence over mainstream political institutions. At the same time, the article highlighted how the UK’s system of multi-level governance created alternative political opportunities through which the movement was ultimately able to achieve its objectives.

The analysis suggests that POS theory is insufficient when Northern Ireland is examined in isolation. However, when the wider political context of the United Kingdom is considered, particularly the role of Westminster, POS provides a more convincing explanation for how same-sex marriage equality was able to achieve its goals. Future research should further explore the operation of political opportunity structures in Northern Ireland, particularly the role of the Petition of Concern in shaping social policy outcomes and the interaction between Northern Ireland’s institutions and broader UK political structures.

References

Abrams, B. (2023) ‘Mobilisation without opportunity: The UK’s 2020 Black Lives Matter protests’, European Journal of Cultural and Political Sociology, 10(4), pp. 603-631.

Ancelovici, M. (2021) ‘Bourdieu in movement: toward a field theory of contentious politics’, Social Movement Studies, 20(2), pp. 155-173.

BBC (2018).NI same-sex marriage bill to be introduced in Commons. BBC (2011) Northern Ireland elections.

Birrell, D., and Heenan, D. (2017) ‘The Continuing Volatility of Devolution in Northern Ireland: The Shadow of Direct Rule,’ The Political Quarterly, 88(3), pp. 473-479.

della Porta, D., and Diani. (2020) Social Movements: An Introduction. Third Edition. Chichester, Wiley & Sons Ltd.

Gamson, A. W., Meyer, S. D. (1996) ‘Framing Political Opportunity,’ in Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer Zald. Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements. Cambridge University Press, pp. 275-290.

Hayes, C. B., Nagle, J. (2019) ‘Ethnonationalism and attitudes towards same-sex marriage and abortion in Northern Ireland,’ International Political Science Review, 40(4), pp. 455-469.

Heenan, D., and Birrell, D. (2022) ‘Exploring Responses to the Collapse of Devolution in Northern Ireland 2017-2020 Through the Lens of Multi-Level Governance’, Parliamentary Affairs, 75(3), pp. 596-615.

McAdam, D. (1996) ‘Conceptual Origins, Current Problems, Future Direction,’ in Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer Zald. Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements. Cambridge University Press, pp. 23-40.

McCormick, C., and Stewart, T. (2021) ‘The legalisation of same-sex marriage in Northern Ireland,’ Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly, 71(4), pp. 557-570.

Meyer, S. D., and Minkoff, C. D. (2004) ‘Conceptualizing Political Opportunity,’ Social Forces, 82(4), pp. 1457-1492.

Murtagh, C., and McCulloch, A. (2021) ‘Beyond the core: Do ethnic parties ‘reach out’ in power-sharing system?’ The British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 23(3), pp. 533-551.

Murtagh, C. and Nagle, J. (2024) ‘Contesting Power-Sharing? LGBTQ+ Activism and the Sexual Citizenship of Consociationalism,’ Ethnopolitics, pp. 1-19.

Nagle, J. (2011) ‘Plying Nostrums of Exporting Peace Models? An Examination of the Contradictions Between the Northern Irish Peace Process and International Peacebuilding,’ Democracy and Security, 7(2), pp. 160-183.

Northern Ireland Assembly (2015) Plenary Details: Motion Marriage Equality.

Sargeant, J., Rycroft, L, and Fright, M. (2022) Northern Ireland assembly.

The Homosexual Offences (Northern Ireland) Order 1982, SI 1982/1536 (N.I. 19).

The Marriage (Same-sex Couples) and Civil Partnership (Opposite-sex Couples) (Northern Ireland) Regulations 2019, SI 2019/1514.

Whyte, N. (2010) Northern Ireland Assembly Elections 2011