Symbolic Violence and Microphysics of Power: A Critical Analysis of Pierre Bourdieu and Michel Foucault.

Willian Murcia Ryan – MRes  PGT Social Science Research.

Pierre Bourdieu and Michel Foucault are among the most influential thinkers of the twentieth century, whose distinct yet intersecting legacies continue to shape debates in sociology, political theory, and cultural analysis (Lukes, 2005; Garland, 2014). Despite contrasting social origins—Bourdieu from a modest rural background and Foucault from a bourgeois milieu—both ascended through France’s elite academic institutions (Eribon, 1991; Macey, 2005; Robbins, 2000). This essay brings their perspectives into dialogue to explore how power operates through social structures and embodied experience.

Power and violence represent two fundamental phenomena that contribute to a comprehensive framework through which the social and human sciences can be conceptualised and interrogated. As central notions, they are instrumental in the phenomenological rationalisation of human experience from a sociological perspective, allowing these domains to address both theoretically and empirically (Lukes, 2004). These concepts have established themselves as paradigms in the intellectual and scientific endeavours of Michel Foucault (1975, 1982, 1998, 2000, 2006) and Pierre Bourdieu (1964, 1979,1992, 1998, 2002, 2004). The influence of these theorists on the human and social sciences and other fields of knowledge is particularly noteworthy, as they continue to shape the practice and development of the discipline not only in France but also worldwide. This is demonstrated by Etienne Ollion and Andrew Abbott, who highlight the “appropriation of French sociologists by US sociologists” (2016), covering the period from 1972 to 2012.

Though Miller and Branson argue that the complexity of Bourdieu’s work resists “succinct summarization within a limited number of pages” (1987, p.214), and applying the same lens of complexity to Foucault’s work, this essay endeavours to conduct a comparative analysis between the theory of “la violence symbolique” [symbolic violence] (Bourdieu, 1979) and “microphysique du pouvoir”. [microphysics of power] (Foucault, 1975) (All translations in brackets from French to English were undertaken by the author of this essay). This essay will first examine the theoretical framework developed by Pierre Bourdieu. It will then engage with Michel Foucault’s conceptualisations of discipline and domination. Finally, it will undertake a comparative analysis, highlighting both the convergences and divergences in the respective approaches of these two theorists. “How we understand what power [and violence] is both reflects and affects how we see the social world and how we conduct ourselves in it” (Lukes, 2004, p. 4). If violence exists in society, how can we grasp and explain it?  As argued by Cavanaugh (2012), different theoretical perspectives from social science are necessary to understand its definitions and, moreover, to comprehend the ‘causes’ of violence. “For example, psychology highlights intrapsychic attributes and behaviours; sociology emphasises the influence of social factors and structures; anthropology points to socio-cultural influences and traditions” (Cavanaugh, 2012, p.608).

Biology also plays a fundamental role in understanding violence, as argued by Accomazzo (2012), who, through a systematic review of the anthropology of violence, distinguishes between physical and socio-cultural anthropology. Within this distinction, a consensus has emerged that “the anthropology of violence must incorporate both a biological and an environmental, cultural perspective” (Accomazzo, 2012, p.548). Despite the differences and commonalities among disciplines in theorising violence, “a multidisciplinary, multivariate theoretical understanding of violence offers a unique opportunity to move beyond the traditional, univariate explanations of violence” (Cavanaugh, 2012, p.616). It needs to consider developmental factors, psychodynamic factors, culture, race, gender, beliefs, attitudes, behaviours, access to resources, socioeconomic factors, social support, and traditions, for example. As demonstrated, the classification of violence remains a contested concept, shaped by the theoretical lens through which it is examined. The primary aim of this essay is to examine how Foucault and Bourdieu conceptualise the social world through their respective theories, particularly regarding violence and power, by narrowing the focus to a theoretical analysis while underscoring the relevance of their empirical contributions

Pierre Bourdieu: Symbolic violence.

Emmanuel Renault names Bourdieu as the “porte-parole de la souffrance sociale,” [spokesperson for social suffering] (2002) a term that Bourdieu references explicitly or implicitly in multiple works throughout his oeuvre. This social malaise should be understood, from a Bourdieusian perspective, as a product, among other factors, of symbolic violence. In other words, ‘symbolic violence’ contributes to suffering in individuals’ bodies.  According to Bourdieu, “Nous apprenons par corps» [we learn from body] (1998, p.95); the social order is inscribed, manifested, executed, and reproduced in and from the body. This somewhat dramatic confrontation of affective interaction with the social order triggers a violent phenomenon, not characterised by physical contact or direct aggression, but rather is “fondée sur l’ajustement inconscient des structures subjectives aux structures objectives” [based on the unconscious adjustment of subjective structures to objective structures] (Bourdieu and Loïc J. D. Wacquant, 2002 p. 245). Under this Bourdieusian logic, “the form par excellence of symbolic violence is power” (1998, p.57). To understand these multiple interactions, Bourdieu examines the relationships between individuals and structures, as well as the connections from subjective to objective structures through individuals, and the body’s presence in the world, alongside the underlying dynamics of power and domination. In a broader sense, Bourdieu poses two questions: What are the social conditions necessary for the experience of the social world to be possible, and how are the structures built that the agent deploys to navigate the social sphere?

Bourdieu addresses these questions through the ‘principle of action’, which describes the interaction between two dimensions of the social world. On the one hand, there are the structures Bourdieu refers to as champs [fields], defined as “social space in which interactions, transactions and events occur” (Thomson in Grenfell, 2013, p. 65). On the other hand, there is the habitus, which Bourdieu describes as “a system of dispositions to be and to do, […] a principle generating objectively classifiable practices and classification systems (principium divisionis)” (Bourdieu, 1998, p. 195). It is a potentiality—a desire to be—that seeks to create conditions for its realisation.

In other words, the habitus constitutes a system of behavioural predispositions inherited and reproduced through recurring social experiences. As Bourdieu states, it is “the analysis of the presence in the world, [of the body] by historicising it” (2004 [2001], pp. 59–70).

This dynamic forms the foundation of what Bourdieu calls the game, in which the agent is simultaneously the product and producer of social reality. When a habitus is attuned to a given field—competent, with a sense of the game—“the space of positions […] functions as a space of possibles” (Bourdieu, 2004 [2001], pp. 59-70). The game consists of an exchange where the agent is both product and producer at the same time, the agent in a given social position assumes “the space of positions, when perceived by a habitus adapted to it (competent, endowed with a sense of the game), functions as a space of possible” (Bourdieu, 2004 [2001], pp. 59-70).

Thus, according to Bourdieu, the analysis of the interaction between multiple habitus and/or multiple fields allows us to explain the functioning of the social world and the power relations in which the agents participate.  However, this alone does not provide an explanation for the product of  ‘Symbolique Violence’ and how it crystallises in the body. For this, Bourdieu turns to the theorisation of capital: social, cultural, economic, and the sum of the first three notions: Symbolic capital. The latter arises from the internalisation of cultural and social structures, and becomes embodied in agents (e.g. individuals), shaping their dispositions and reinforcing power relations through unconscious compliance.

Power and dominance derive not only from the accumulation of material resources, as in Marx’s theory, but also from agents’ accumulation of cultural and social resources, which are embodied in them in the form of symbolic capital. At the intersection of different habitus and social fields, unconscious forms of power are reproduced and created, where inequalities among different social classes are present. According to Grenfell, there is an interdependent “co-constructed trio”: the field, capital, and habitus. (2013, p.67). It is the agent who, through ‘strategies’, plays a game in different fields with the acquired symbolic capital to improve their positions in those fields or to accumulate more symbolic capital. In Bourdieu and Wacquant’s words, “through the ‘strategies’ and practices via which agents temporalise themselves and make the time of the world” (1992, p.139). This suggests that the agent renders historicity feasible in both time and space through the embodiment of symbolic capital and social structures passed down through generations. Within this framework, ‘Habitus’ is a product that simultaneously participates in its reproduction, enabling the perpetuation of power.

In the book La Distinction (1979), Bourdieu explains the mechanisms through which symbolic violence is inscribed on the body: “Les goûts (c’est-à-dire les préférences manifestées) sont l’affirmation pratique d’une différence inévitable” [Tastes (that is, the preferences expressed) are a practical affirmation of an inevitable difference] (Bourdieu, 1979, p. 42). These differences in taste are conditioned by forms of capital—social or cultural—and are sustained through systems of aesthetic evaluation that derive their authority from the fields the agent inhabits throughout their life. This system not only incorporates but also reproduces the type of food we enjoy, the tastes and choices in shopping according to the educational status and social origin of individuals, hobbies, musical preferences, and the choice of sports and social spaces frequented. According to the French theorist, these aspects are part of a habitus that, in practice, manifests a hierarchy endowed with unequal values, “where the greater part of cultural consumerism also implies an economic cost” (Bourdieu, 1979, p.83).

The next example introduced in the lecture ‘Theory and Debates in Social Research’ at Queen’s University Belfast by Dr. Jonathan G. Heaney explains how ‘Symbolic Violence’ operates:  in the TV series called ‘The Wire’ (Simon, 2006) in the ninth episode of the fourth season, former police officer Howard Colvin decides to participate in a University of Maryland investigation to look at the marginalised kids, a group of gang members involved in drug dealing, that are disruptive in class and involved in various crimes. Colvin decides to invite three students to a ‘good’ restaurant. Upon entering, these students find a place with different habits than they usually have, different ways of behaving, different eating habits, different lexical expressions, and different ways of dressing. Ultimately, the dissonance between their habitual dispositions and the restaurant’s social norms diminishes their confidence and curtails their motivation to engage.

This cultural shock is expressed through a sense of discomfort that each of the three students displays in different ways. Although fictionalised, this example succinctly illustrates Pierre Bourdieu’s theoretical insight: social stratification and power differentials stem not only from the accumulation of capital, as previously noted, but also from the dispositions and embodied competencies that individuals must mobilise within specific social fields. When individuals lack the necessary cultural capital or feel out of place, their participation is inhibited, reinforcing their marginalisation and reproducing existing social hierarchies.  The interaction of opposing class-based habitus in the restaurant setting makes social distinctions explicit, exemplifying Bourdieu’s assertion that “toute détermination est négation” [every determination is a negation] (Bourdieu, 1979, p. 42). The distinction in this example is a performative act of exclusion; thus, tastes and customs reveal how symbolic violence, apparently unconscious and not manifest, becomes a conscious feeling, corporeal and objective, and in turn manifests in emotional distress, as experienced by the young people of the series.

Another example that explains the triple dynamic between the interdependent and “co-constructed trio [:] the field, capital, and habitus” (Grenfell, 2013, p.67), is the French school system, where students from different family backgrounds experience indices of outcomes that polarise the privileged classes and the peasant or working-class origin. The analysis is intentionally limited to France since it is the location where Bourdieu and his team conducted their research to conclude that the positive results of the privileged classes are due to what Bourdieu describes as “based above all on the blindness to social inequalities that occur in schools and culture; the simple description of the relationship between academic success and social origin is a virtue critique” (Bourdieu, 1964, p.93). In this context, those who experience the ‘Violence Symbolique’ are students whose origins are linked to the working and peasant classes; paradoxically, this occurs within an educational system that is declared democratic and egalitarian. 

Having outlined the functioning of symbolic violence in Bourdieu’s framework, it is now necessary to critically assess the central criticisms that have been levelled against his theoretical foundations and key concepts:

Agency: Bourdieu is generally strongly criticised for being a “reproduction theorist” (Wacquant, 1992) who neglects agency and misinterprets the working class. According to Archer, Bourdieu fails to articulate this notion clearly (1996) because he overlooks agentivity, wherein the subjectivity and reflexivity of agents determine relationships of power. Among the myriad criticisms, Lukes argues that Bourdieu’s perspective is “excessively pessimistic” (Lukes, 2004, p. 206) in the sense that he is a structuralist theorist.

Fields: Grenfell (2013), proposes four main problems that present the theory of Bourdieu as follows: 1. the problem of borders between fields, which makes them hard to identify and to establish a limit. 2. The problem of ‘too many fields’. 3. The problem of change in the field, which means that he focuses more on the reproduction of the fields than on their changes (Grenfell, 2013, p.77). 4. The problem of inter-field connections, as criticised by Lane, refers to a “lack of articulation of the forms of intellectual, cultural or economic power” (Lane, 2000, p.198). Blasius addresses a similar criticism, arguing that the dimensionally structured relations presented by Bourdieu are unsatisfactory, as they do not theorise the linkages between fields (Blasius et al., 2020) pp.5-15). In summary, the theory cannot be an operative relational concept because the descriptions of the practices are not separate from one another.

Habitus: Bernard Lahire argued that the theory of habitus and the transferability of capital leads to false or premature generalisations. (2003); Or in strong words ‘blind to ethnicity’ (Blasius et al., 2020, p.15). Lahire also focuses on the term ‘dispositions’ which Bourdieu uses in the book La Distinction, qualifying his modifiers imprecisely, arguing that “not one example is given of social construction, inculcation, embodiment, or the ‘transmission’ of these dispositions” (Lahire, 2003, p. 334). According to Lahire, the theory does not elucidate the process underlying the acts.  

Symbolic Violence: Aron specifically emphasises the concept of symbolic violence, arguing that this theory fails to adequately encompass the diversity of the phenomena it seeks to include, such as the ‘fields’ and ‘symbolic capital’ (1973, p. 256).

Michael Foucault: Microphysics of power.

Having summarised Bourdieu’s theory of Habitus, let us now turn to Foucault’s theory of the Microphysics of Power, starting with the subject which, according to Foucault, is the main focus of his entire work, rather than power, as is usually interpreted in discussions of his work. Before continuing, it is important to note that Foucault did not identify as a theorist (Foucault, 1982). Foucault’s objective is to explain a history of the different modes by which, in ‘our culture’, human beings are “made subjects” (Foucault, 1982, p. 326). As argued by the author, all power is physical, and there is a direct connection between the body and political power; “what is essential in all power is that ultimately its point of application is always the body commanded by all the dispositions of a kind of microphysics of bodies” (Foucault, 1982, p. 14). For Foucault, violence is a completely “unbalanced force” (Foucault, 1982, p. 14) of power; however, to make sense of this notion, he proposes changing the questions about what power is to “by what means is it exercised? And what happens when individuals exert power over others?” (Foucault, 1982, p. 786).

Foucault’s concept of power arises from individuals’ competencies and objective capacities, which manifest through the body and external instruments. Power is characterised as “a set of actions upon other actions” that ‘conduct’ or lead to a purpose and produce an effect on bodies (Foucault, 1982, p. 789). This enables the modification, utilisation, or consumption of power within the interactions between individuals or groups. It is pivotal to his theory to distinguish between power relations, communicative relationships, and the objective capacities that are interconnected, reciprocal, and serve as means to an end (Foucault, 1982). However, not all power relationships, according to Foucault, imply a violent connotation. Power becomes violent when there is an imbalance of power that lacks reciprocity, which can occur on various scales and in multiple directions.  As explained previously, it is ultimately the body that plays a dual role, serving as both a vector and a receptor of violence.

Foucault’s primary concern with power is to understand how it is legitimised and how to address the relationship between power and political rationality as exercised through the ‘technologies of power’, as outlined in Surveiller et Punir: naissance de la prison [Discipline and Punish: The birth of the prison] (2020). The purpose of Foucault is to study the changes in punishment throughout history, where the “the political technology of the body” (2000, [1975], p. 28) enables relationships of power. The prison is one of these technologies which allows the construction of individuals through discipline; it becomes the “vecteur de pouvoir […] la technologie du pouvoir sur le corps” [vector of power […] the technology of power over the body] (Foucault, 2000, [1975] p. 25). As the notion of violence is not accurate or reasonable to use for Foucault, he prefers to speak of a “microphysics of power” (Foucault, 2006, p. 16). This notion challenges the assumption that power resides solely within governmental bodies or legal frameworks. Instead, power permeates every facet of society, interwoven within social norms, family, institutions, and epistemic systems, thereby exerting an influence on individuals’ cognition, behaviour, and interpersonal interactions; as mentioned before, shaping the capacities and aptitudes of individuals. This underscores Foucault’s aim to analyse the tactics and strategies of power relations in all conceivable scenarios where confrontation occurs at varying scales. This implies not analysing the rationality of power itself but studying the confrontations that unfold, which, in Foucault’s words, involves examining power through the “strategies of antagonism,” where resistance to power, domination, and violence occur, such as in the dynamics of sanity-insanity, legality-illegality, woman-man, parents-children, and psychiatry-mental illness. (Foucault 1998, p. 780).

These pairings do not merely represent binary oppositions; rather, they expose asymmetrical relations embedded in systems of hierarchy, discipline, and social control, where one pole often asserts normative authority over the other. For Foucault, such tensions are not fixed but historically contingent, shaped by discourses and institutional practices that produce subjects and define the terms of inclusion and exclusion

Lefranc identifies the key characteristics of power, as conceptualised by Foucault, as follows: power is immanent, perpetually evolving, constitutes a dual conditioning, and is intrinsically connected to knowledge (2024). For Foucault, power embodies an overarching logic, serving as a defining feature of society interwoven with its historical context. It is manifested in various contexts, alters the dynamics among its agents, and can be analysed through the lens of institutions. Furthermore, it can be understood differently as well, as illustrated in the realm of micropolitics of power, such as within familial structures or the body itself, at a micro social scale (Lefranc, 2024). The ‘technologies of power’ should be viewed as all apparatuses that enable power to transition from one place, institution, society, or from one body to another, like, for example, by the “technology of discourse […or the] “technology for the construction of truth” (Foucault, 2006, p. 326), as well as the technology of the prison, educational technologies, and disciplinary practices. It is not merely a physical space but various modalities of knowledge where power utilises a vector to operate. Ultimately, the modern individual body acts as the performative subject of power. As noted by Potte-Bonneville (2012) in Surveiller et Punir, discipline shapes the individuality of the body. Within a designated space, individuals are required to comply with the rules and codes prescribed therein, while simultaneously engaging with various forces that are both controlled and enacted by the body (2012).

The performance of the body and power in Foucault’s work derives from the same epistemological paradigm, from Power and Knowledge, Surveiller et Punir”, and History of Sexuality or the Birth of Biopolitics, etc. The logic of its methodology is the same: “find out how a human being was envisaged in a particular epoch” (Veyne, 2010, p.107). How subjects and bodies, power, and ways of thinking have been shaped in different periods of history, or what Foucault himself calls ‘the Archeologies’ and ‘the genealogies’ of humans, describe and explain their practices and beliefs. His conclusion is that there are no fixed structures or ‘universalities’, but what he calls ‘singularities’ or discourses of the individual. When multiple discourses or practices are developed and implemented, one can think, according to Foucault’s logic, of one possible way of power or domination at a certain period. For example, in the medieval discourse of ‘sovereignty’ or ‘sovereign power’, domination was exercised directly on the body by the king, who held the power to take life and publicly torture the body, as described in the opening pages of Surveiller et Punir Punir; in this scenario, violence is directly inflicted upon the body, underscoring the clear power disparity between the agents, is “a relationship of violence [that] acts upon a body or upon things; it forces, it bends, it breaks on the wheel, it destroys, or it closes the door on all” (Foucault, 1982, p.789).

            In contrast, power wielded by governments is not exercised by decree and force, but rather through administration and the shaping of individuals’ actions.  According to Foucault, there is a ‘new’ way of thinking and practices of ‘governmentality’ that guide individuals’ actions. This is illustrated by the prison, where the body is under constant surveillance, resulting in disciplinary power, similar to that in schools or military systems, which serve as fundamental examples in Foucault’s work. This process of reshaping bodies is what he refers to as ‘biopolitics’, wherein life is not taken by force as in ‘sovereign power’, but is managed through various technologies of power, such as the healthcare system and medical practices (Foucault, 2000).

There are other forces which, according to Foucault, act differently: discourses and performative practices that stay “subconscious [and] escape our notice” (Veyne, 2010, p. 13). One example is the academic discourse or scientific discourse. In this sense, the microphysics of power could be embodied by subjects depending on the discourse in which they participate. Even if violence is a term that troubles Foucault, he prefers to refer to the microphysics of power: “the point where power reaches into the very grain of individuals, touches their bodies, and inserts itself into their very actions and attitudes, their discourses, learning processes, and everyday lives” (Foucault, 1980, p.39). Under this logic, school, hospitals, or even the discourse of sexuality are technologies of power; in other words, education, medical practices, or sex are practices embodied by power that consequently shape the bodies of the agents.

Despite the sophistication and influence of Foucault’s conceptualisation of power, his work has provoked substantial critique, particularly around questions of agency, domination, historical framing, and methodological precision. The following section outlines some of the most frequently cited concerns, highlighting tensions that continue to shape interpretations and applications of his theory.

Agentivity – Power – Domination: according to Lukes, for Foucault, “there is no escaping [from] domination” (Lukes, 2004, p.17) and “there cannot be liberation from power” (Lukes, 2004, p.96), as he remains in the “Nietzschean rhetoric” (Lukes, 2004, p.96) where power excludes freedom and truth, throughout his work, something that Taylor qualifies as a “terrible simplifier” (1984, p.164), concerning Foucault’s inadequate information about the scope of action for agents involved in power relationships, where they could activate their own subjectivity and potential capacity (freedom) for action, thereby labelling Foucault as a structuralist and determinist intellectual; Taylor uses power and domination as synonymous terms, whereas freedom is opposed to power; however, for Foucault, freedom is the condition under which power is exercised, where individual or collective subjects face a range of possibilities. When the determining factors saturate the whole, freedom disappears, and such relationships of power dissipate. This implies that domination and freedom exclude each other, transforming from a relationship of power to a relationship of domination (Patton, 1989).

 Foucault himself emphasises that power is unstable and there is a constant “reciprocal appeal” between the agents that struggle in power relationships. (Foucault, 1982, p.794); in other words, the relationship of power is constantly subject to change because, thanks to resistance it is possible to reverse the mechanisms of power and domination.  In this sense, Taylor does not “fully address Foucault’s position” (Patton, 1989, 260). For Taylor, it is absurd that Foucault depicts humanitarianism “exclusively in terms of the new technologies of control […not taking into account other possible practices or disciplines] that have made possible new kinds of collective action characterised by more egalitarian forms of participation” (Taylor, 1984, p.164). The humanitarian position of Taylor portrays the subject as an agent capable of judging and differentiating between its own desires and motivations, as well as taking responsibility for its actions; in other words, a moral subject, part of a civilisation’s achievement. In this sense, power (or domination for Taylor) limits self-realisation. Foucault, conversely, rejects any natural ideal of humanity, proposing instead a contested notion that is constructed. (Patton, 1989).

Microphysics of Power: For Taylor (1984), it remains unclear how to elucidate the relationships of power at the micro level, as suggested by Foucault. In alignment with Taylor’s critique of this notion, one might question how to evaluate the power disparity between agents to differentiate between a relationship of power and one of violence, based on such subjective parameters.

Historicism: Foucault endeavours to explain the rupture from pastoral or ecclesiastical power to political power and to reveal its differences; starting in Mesopotamia to illustrate, through the history of religion, the characteristics and structure of that singular dispositive of power or ‘governmentality’. In Foucault’s words, “which is the type of power involved in this type of notion” (Foucault, 1978, p.119). According to Agamben, there is an absence and a lack of awareness within the theological dispositive. He argues that the transformation in the dispositive of power is more significant than a secularisation or rupture, as he interprets Foucault’s explanation (2008).

Methodology of research: The lack of “methodological rigour” is a general debate on Foucault’s work (Lukes, 2004, p.63).

If there is a common characteristic of Foucault’s work, criticism from different authors, such as those referenced in this essay, is that he “has hugely influenced our thinking about power, across many fields and disciplines, notably cultural studies, comparative literature, social history, anthropology, criminology and women’s [and feminist theories] studies,” as quoted by Lukes (2004, p.92), due to his unique approach to the subject of the body and the agency of power.

Different Paths, Society as Purpose. A Critical Comparison of Symbolic Violence and the Microphysics of Power.

Having provided a summary of Bourdieu’s and Foucault’s concepts of symbolic violence and the microphysics of power, respectively, we shall now engage in a comparative analysis of these two perspectives to draw a conclusion regarding this matter. The main commonality of their work is the body; for both intellectuals, it serves as the agent that experiences power or violence through their physicality. For both, power is everywhere. However, the significant difference is that for Foucault, not all power relationships stem from violence; rather, there is always a relationship of domination, which may sometimes manifest as a structure of power and, at other times, can be seen as a strategy that consolidates confrontations between agents (Patton 1989). The “microphysics of power” permeates micro-levels in society, such as the family, to provide just one example, and is not necessarily manifested by large institutions, such as government, as mentioned before. In Pierre Bourdieu’s framework, symbolic violence is pervasive, particularly evident in the interactions between individuals or groups possessing disparate backgrounds in symbolic capital, which encompasses varying levels of social, cultural, and economic capital. In other words, symbolic violence manifests during interactions between different ‘habitus’ and ‘fields’, prominently affecting those who possess lesser forms of symbolic capital. However, one might question whether the concept and mechanisms of symbolic violence could function in reverse, specifically, when the ‘upper class’ finds itself affected while navigating an unfamiliar field or engaging with individuals whose symbolic capital is theoretically lower than that of the privileged individual.

Although neither theorist explicitly incorporates emotions into their theoretical frameworks, their active engagement in socio-political movements in France suggests that emotions are nonetheless closely entangled with their conceptualisations of violence and power. One can interpret Bourdieu’s and Foucault’s statements on suffering as a personal concern about emotions, as we shall see at the end of this text.

Both perspectives have been analysed by other theorists as determinists. How power is manifested is a common enterprise for both theorists, but one can observe the polysemic meaning that involves depending on the approach. Taking Lukes definition of power as “a dispositionalconcept, comprising a conjunction of conditional or hypothetical statements specifying what would occur under a range of circumstances if and when the power is exercised. Thus, power refers to an ability or capacity of an agent or agents, which they may or may not exercise” (2004, p.68). For both Bourdieu and Foucault, despite various critiques, the exercise of power ultimately manifests in and through the body, whether as violence symbolique or through the microphysics of power. In that sense, both notions of power remain valid, despite significant epistemological differences in their approaches. Bourdieu, for example, draws on a rigorous background in anthropology and philosophy, combining this with large-scale sociological tools such as ethnography, simple correspondence analysis (CA), and multiple correspondence analysis (MCA). These methods, alongside long-term surveys conducted across various fields, have contributed significantly to the development of sociology’s capacity to analyse “the field of power and its subfields” (Blasius et al., 2020, p. 43).

On the other hand, Foucault’s work is a historicity research project, a philosophical endeavour that inevitably involves sociological and anthropological analysis, even if the author denies being categorised as belonging to one of the aforementioned disciplines. This does not imply that the research lacks rigour or that his empirical approach, supported by texts, theories, and his own life, loses its impact or influence in social science or other disciplines. What is more important about his methodology, as argued by Lukes and mentioned before, is that Foucault provides a different perspective on the agency of power to be analysed. There is something common in the way these thinkers assume different critiques; they did not want to be categorised, as Bourdieu stated when he rejects “les insultes classificatoires,  marxiste , holiste, déterministe, etc.” [the classificatory insults such as Marxist, holistic, determinist, etc] (1998, p. 84) of his work.

If, for Foucault, ‘the political technologies of the body’, or the ‘technologies of power’, are the vectors through which power can traverse from one place to another, from one person to another, or from one period of history to another, for Bourdieu, it is ‘habitus’ and the ‘champs’ [Field] that explains how power is reproduced and deployed. The common aspect, again, is the body as the main vector, regardless of whether we discuss the microphysics of power, institutions, social class, or heritage.  Both intellectuals agree that the relationships of power are present everywhere, and the historicity of the body determines the way in which the ‘violence symbolique’ and the “microphysique du pouvoir” operate.

As noted by Staf Callewaert in his article titled Bourdieu, Critic of Foucault: The Case of Empirical Social Science Against Double-Game (2006, p. 73), “Not everyone knew that they were not only colleagues at the Collège de France but also personal friends.” This highlights the context of their relationship and emphasises their commitment to political and social movements that contributed to reshaping social science in France and beyond, as well as their previously mentioned theoretical approaches. Foucault did not directly critique Bourdieu’s work in his oeuvre; rather, it is Bourdieu who elucidated his divergence from Foucault’s studies. His main criticism concerns Foucault’s “deep mistrust of philosophy playing a double game with its critique of the very possibility of empirical science” (Callewaert, 2006, p. 75) and the “structuralist and internalist position of Foucault’s work” (Callewaert, 2006, p. 77). As suggested by Callewaert, the primary divergence between these two theorists relates to “the genesis and structure of cultural fields, along with his response to methodological questions regarding the study of cultural production and products” (p. 78). Bourdieu himself highlights the key differences in his work concerning the notion of the ‘Field’ and its divergence in how violence operates, in contrast to Foucault’s theory, as demonstrated in The Rules of Art (Bourdieu, 1992):

…he [Foucault] explicitly refuses to search outside the ‘field of discourse’ for the principle, which would elucidate each of the discourses within it. He rejects … the endeavour to find in the ‘field of polemics’ or in the ‘divergences of interests or mental habits of individuals’ (all of what I put, more or less at the same time, into the notions of field and habitus) the explanatory principle of what happens in the ‘field of strategic possibilities’ . . . . In this way he transfers to the myriads of ideas oppositions and antagonisms that are rooted (without being reduced to them) in the relations between the producers and he rejects any relating of works to the social conditions of their production (as he will later continue to do in a critical discourse on knowledge and power which – for want of taking into account agents and their interests, and especially violence in its symbolic dimension – remains abstract and idealist. (Bourdieu, 1992, pp. 195-206)

In Wacquant’s words, “Bourdieu clearly states that Foucault lacked the notion of habitus in his work on power, and that this deficiency limited his understanding of the acceptance of ‘symbolic violence’ (1993, p. 34).”

To conclude, despite the differences between the two theorists, their works utilise analogous approaches, providing novel perspectives on structuralism. As cited by Vazquez, the linguistic action is analysed as a historical and social performance in which the relationships of power and domination among agents are determined by their social and institutional positions (2002, p. 347). This should be regarded as one of the most robust common approaches of Bourdieu and Foucault in rejecting a conventional structural perspective on their works, which both analyse the social practice of language or discursive practice as a socio-historical act shaped by the social and institutional positions of individuals. This suggests that it is inadequate to analyse language as a fixed structure through the codes that operate within its logic; rather, one must incorporate the extralinguistic factors that evolve over time (2002, p. 347).

Vazquez also highlights the rejection of the dichotomous way of thinking influenced by Bachelard. We can find in both intellectuals an auto-critique of the intellectual world, which leads to a politically active work, “une réflexivité critique” [ a critical reflexivity] (Vazquez, 2002, p. 361). As aforementioned, the motivation for such an intellectual enterprise in both cases could be summarised in Bourdieu’s words: ‘the sociological message’ “ peut s’exercer en permettant à ceux qui souffrent de découvrir la possibilité d’imputer leur souffrance à des causes sociales et de se sentir ainsi disculpés ” [can be exercised by allowing those who suffer to discover the possibility of attributing their suffering to social causes and thus feeling exonerated] (Bourdieu, 1998, p. 1453). “The misrecognition” (Jenkins, 2002, p.104) or ignorance of the agency of power, as discussed by both Foucault and Bourdieu, legitimates one of its key characteristics: domination.

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