Does power sharing limit effective governance in Northern Ireland?

Powersharing is a process wherein governance of a state or country is shared between two distinct groups. It is different from a simple coalition as it is implemented to occur regardless of the outcome of a general election. The party with the highest majority cannot choose who they join a coalition with; they instead must defer to the highest party in the other group.

The question that arises here is: can this process limit a state’s ability to govern its people effectively?

Northern Ireland has historically been referred to as a ‘deeply divided society’. These are characterised by two or more distinct ethnic groups fighting for possession of a common land. In Northern Ireland, Irish-ethnicity nationalists and British-ethnicity unionists consistently disagreed, bubbling to a head during the Troubles from the 60s to the late 90s. In this Extract by Rose and McAllister, we can see the mindset of political theorists in the lead-up to powersharing’s introduction in Northern Ireland:

“Since 1921 there have been two major constitutional alternatives for Northern Ireland: rule by a Unionist and British majority in a Northern Ireland Parliament at Stormont, or a united Ireland. The suspension of the Stormont Parliament in 1972 created a third alternative-direct rule from London. Direct rule is seen as temporary; the British Parliament endorses a third option-power sharing-in which Protestant and Catholic elected representatives would be compelled to form a coalition government in the province, whatever the election outcome” (McAllister, Rose, 1983).

So, what does this mean today?

Currently, Stormont is run by joint first ministers Michelle O’Neill – leader of nationalist party Sínn Féin – and Emma Little-Pengelly – member of unionist party the Democratic Unionist Party. However, to claim that governance is effective in Northern Ireland would be to discredit the past few years Northern Ireland lived through a government shutdown and a return to direct rule.

This shutdown was caused by the Democratic Unionist Party’s refusal to rejoin Stormont following Sínn Féin winning the majority of seats in the General Election.

As power in Northern Ireland is shared equally among the highest democratically elected nationalist and unionist parties, without the DUP’s support, government could not re-open. Even if the second-largest unionist party, the Ulster Unionist Party, had agreed to join a coalition with Sínn Féin, they still could not legally re-open Stormont.

“In the meantime, there are two huge obstacles to progress: republican leaders’ foot-dragging on policing, the renunciation of violence, and the legitimacy of the Union; and the unionist electorate’s corresponding mistrust of republicans and of the Government which oversold the Agreement to them. Until these are removed, there will be no further progress” (Smith, 2006).

It is undeniable that a government as unstable as Northern Ireland’s under powersharing cannot govern at peak efficacy. However, we must consider that the government is much more effective now than it ever was, as summarized by political theorist John Doyle:

“Twenty years after the Good Friday Agreement, Northern Ireland continues to have very low levels of political violence by the standards of its own history or by any comparative analysis of peace agreements internationally” (Doyle, 2018).

Prior to the Troubles, no form of intersectional government was ever conceptualized. Rather, the state fell victim to gerrymandering and, at any point, either to total unionist rule or direct Parliament rule. One could argue that powersharing actually enhances governance in Northern Ireland purely since it is the only feasible means of facilitating it.

In general, powersharing mostly works as a step in the right direction for future, truly intersectional governments to take root, as summarised by three political theorists for Northern Ireland:

“The pattern that emerges is that power sharing can be an effective means to prompt parties to sign an agreement and cease hostilities in the short run, but it can create long-term obstacles for peace consolidation and reconciliation… In addition, power-sharing agreements often contain ambiguities or unresolved issues that lead to disagreements down the line” (Lanz, Nathan, Raffoul, 2019).

So, powersharing does limit effective governance in Northern Ireland. It is also the primary reason there even is governance in Northern Ireland without a return to conflict. In many ways, the pros of powersharing – not returning to a conflict with over 3,000 casualties – outweigh the cons – a return to direct rule if communities cannot cooperate.

REFERENCES

Doyle, J. (2018), Reflecting on the Northern Ireland Peace Process: 20 years since the Good Friday Agreement, Irish Studies in International Affairs, Reflections on the Northern Ireland Conflict and Peace Process, p. 16.

Lanz, D., Nathan, L., Raffoul, A. (2019), Negotiations, Continued: Ensuring the Positive Performance of Power-Sharing Agreements, pp. 4/5.

McAllister, I., Rose, R. (1983), Can Political Change Be Resolved by Social Change? Northern Ireland as a Test Case, The Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 27, no. 3, p. 551.

Smith, B. (2006), Getting to Powersharing, Fortnight, no. 445, p. 9.