{"id":941,"date":"2019-03-29T21:19:21","date_gmt":"2019-03-29T21:19:21","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/blogs.qub.ac.uk\/studentlawjournal\/?p=941"},"modified":"2019-03-29T21:19:26","modified_gmt":"2019-03-29T21:19:26","slug":"the-trump-administration-policy-toward-the-international-criminal-court","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/blogs.qub.ac.uk\/studentlawjournal\/2019\/03\/29\/the-trump-administration-policy-toward-the-international-criminal-court\/","title":{"rendered":"The Trump Administration Policy Toward the International Criminal Court"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

The Trump Administration Policy Toward the International Criminal Court
Author: Clodagh <\/strong>McIlhatton<\/strong>
Queen’s University Belfast. <\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Introduction<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Trump administration\u2019s policy towards international law\nwas always going to be controversial. Trump made his disregard for\ninternational laws evident even throughout the campaign stage. [1] Thus, there\nwas no doubt that when Trump became president, US hostility   towards international justice institutions\nwould be heightened. Such predictions came to light on the 10th<\/sup> of\nSeptember 2018 with the \u201cmajor foreign policy address\u201d by Trump\u2019s national\nsecurity advisor, John Bolton, which focused mainly on outlining the US\u2019\nopposition to the ICC and its investigations. [2] Bolton\u2019s speech consisted of\nextremely aggressive rhetoric, and a range of threats to the ICC which creates\na plethora of problems for the US.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Thus, this briefing paper will provide an analysis of the\nTrump Administration\u2019s issues with the ICC and decide whether the US\u2019s hostile\nposition is justified or whether this is just another way for the US to\nwithdraw from International institutions to advance the rhetoric of \u201cputting\nAmerica first\u201d at the consequence of international unrest. The paper shall\nconclude with recommendations for the US and other international actors in a\nbid to salvage a relationship between the US and ICC before the policies cause\n\u201cirreversible damage.\u201d [3]<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Background<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The ICC began functioning on the 1st<\/sup> of July 2002\nwhen the Rome statute came into force. [4] From the beginning the US\u2019s\nrelationship with the ICC was problematic. The Clinton administration signed\nthe Rome statute in 2000, however it was not ratified. The start of the Bush\nAdministration marked the beginning of a more hostile period with the ICC. Led\nby John Bolton, the administration unsigned the Rome Statute, [5] and stated\nits intention not to ratify the Rome Treaty. [6] The Bush administration also\nbrought in the American Service-Members\u2019 Protection Act [7] which contained a\nrange of extremely Anti-ICC provisions, including the so called \u201cHague invasion\nclause\u201d [8] which authorised the use of military force to liberate any American\nor citizen of a US-allied country being held by the ICC. [9] The US also\nnegotiated Security Council resolutions which granted immunity to US peace\nkeepers from prosecution by the ICC, [10] and obtained over 100 bilateral\nimmunity agreements, [11] in which the signing countries guaranteed they would\nnot surrender US citizens to the ICC.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

These measures led other states to question why the US should\nbe above the rule of law, and many of these measures damaged the US\u2019 reputation\ninternationally. However, in Bush\u2019s second term, the administration changed its\nposition, finding it more beneficial to work with the ICC. The US did not veto\nthe UN Security Council referral of the atrocities in Dufar, Sudan to the ICC\n[12] and the state departments legal advisor noted the US\u2019s support of the\nICC\u2019s investigation. [13] The Obama Administration also cooperated with the\nICC.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

However, come the time of Trumps election in 2016, Fatou\nBensouda, Prosecutor for the ICC released a report on preliminary examination\nactivities, [14] detailing evidence of war crimes by the US Central\nIntelligence Agency ( CIA) and US armed forces and in 2017 the prosecutor\nannounced her decision to request judicial authorisation to commence an\ninvestigation into the situation in Afghanistan. [15] Thus, probing the hostile\nresponse from the Trump administration in September. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

International\nLegal Issues<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

In his speech, Bolton points out a range of different reasons\nthe US objects to the ICC, which gives rise to a range of different legal\nissues to be considered.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Bolton claims that the ICC investigation in Afghanistan\n\u201cthreatens American Sovereignty\u201d and insinuates that the prosecutor does not\nhave jurisdiction to investigate crimes by the US military and the CIA, as the\nUS has not signed nor ratified the Rome Statute and the ICC has not gained\nconsent from the US nor the individuals over which it \u201cpurports to exercise\njurisdiction.\u201d[16]<\/p>\n\n\n\n

However, this argument is deeply flawed and is verging on\nbeing unreasonable. Foreign institutions regularly exercise jurisdiction over\nAmerican citizens; for example, if an American was to commit a crime in Paris,\nthey could be tried under the French legal system. [17] In addition, the US\ndoesn\u2019t seek permission from other countries to prosecute terrorists. [18]\nThus, this argument demonstrates a degree of hypocrisy from the US, and it\nseems Bolton is using the scare tactic of \u201cthreatened sovereignty\u201d to gain\nsupport for the administration\u2019s anti-ICC agenda.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Furthermore, the ICC\u2019s jurisdiction over crimes by US\nnationals in Afghanistan is clearly set out in the Rome Statute. Since\nAfghanistan has ratified the ICC\u2019s Rome Statute, under article 12, the ICC has\njurisdiction over genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes committed by\nAfghan nationals and any crimes committed on Afghan territory. [19] Therefore,\nthe ICC has every legal right to investigate crimes committed by Americans in\nAfghanistan, and Bolton\u2019s claims appear to be clear misrepresentations and\nhyperbole. The use of such propaganda tactics to de-legitimize a vital judicial\ninstitution for prosecuting international crimes, undermines the rule of law,\nand needs to be addressed by the international community. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Bolton also states that one of the US\u2019 principal concerns\nabout the ICC is that it claims jurisdiction over crimes that have disputed\ndefinitions. Namely the crime of aggression. [20]<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Bolton\u2019s suggestion that the Crime of Aggression could even\napply to the US is false. The Court cannot exercise its jurisdiction regarding\ncrimes of aggression when it is committed by a national or on the territory of\na state party that has not ratified or accepted the amendment. [21] Since the\nUS is not party to the Rome statute let alone having ratified the amendment,\nand most certainly will not accede to the ICC having jurisdiction for this\nmatter, the US cannot be prosecuted for the crime of aggression at all.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Thus, it would be fair to say, this supposed objection of the\nICC, is once again just a scare tactic used by Bolton to garner support for his\nICC rhetoric, and not an actual concern about the US\u2019 security and sovereignty.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Bolton claimed that the ICC is \u201csuperfluous\u201d since the US has\nan effective domestic legal system which already holds American citizens to the\nhighest legal standards. [22] Thus, HE claims there is no need for the ICC to\ninvestigate and prosecute US crimes, as if there were crimes to be prosecuted,\nthe American domestic legal system would do so.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Under the Rome Statute, there are certain circumstances in\nwhich a case to the ICC is considered inadmissible, one being when the case is\nbeing investigated or prosecuted by a State which has jurisdiction over it.\n[23] This is known as the principle of complementarity. The ICC is a \u2018court of last\nresort\u2019 and will not act unless the state is unwilling or genuinely unable to\ncarry out the investigation or prosecution itself. [24] Bolton states that the US has \u201cthe most robust system of investigation,\naccountability and transparency in the world<\/a>\u201d questioning why the ICC still seeking to investigate crimes\nby Americans in Afghanistan?<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In the Preliminary Examination report, the prosecutor noted\nthat the US was capable of carrying out prosecutions itself in the civilian or\nmilitary courts, [25] yet goes on to explain despite US records the prosecution\ncould not identify any\nindividual in the armed services prosecuted by courts martial for the\nill-treatment of detainees. [26] Moreover the Department of Justice\nconducted a two-year review of allegations related to the abuse of detainees in\nthe Custody of the CIA which reviewed allegations of ill-treatment of 101\ndetainees. Yet full criminal investigations were only conducted into the cases\nof two detainees that died in custody and both investigations did not lead to\nindictments or prosecutions due to a lack of evidence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Thus, whilst on the face of things, it may appear that the US\nhas a working domestic legal system, upon further investigation, the facts beg\nthe question as to whether it has been effectively applied to the US Military\nand CIA who have committed war crimes. It does not seem from the information\nmade available to the prosecutor for the preliminary investigation that US have\ndone enough to satisfy the principle of complementarity. [27]<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Recommendations\nand Conclusions<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

In conclusion, John Bolton\u2019s speech is not about protecting\nUS national security and sovereignty, but instead about ensuring that American\nmilitary or CIA implicated in torture in Afghanistan are above the rule of law.\n[28] The US wishes to promote a policy of \u201cexceptionalism,\u201d where it cannot be\nheld accountable for international crimes, but other states should. Therefore,\nthe trump administration feigns objections to the ICC which under examination,\ndon\u2019t stand up. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Therefore, to the US I would recommend that they conduct a\ncomplementarity into the crimes committed in Afghanistan. If the US conducts\nits own investigation\/prosecution into war crimes committed by US nationals in\ngood faith, this will divest the ICC of Jurisdiction. [29] Also, in doing so\nthe US would be endorsing the rule of law and ensuring it sets an example for\nthe international community that war crimes will not be tolerated.\nAdditionally, it would salvage a workable relationship with the ICC. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

I would also remind the Trump Administration of the\nconsequences of the harsh stance against the ICC during the Bush\nadministration, and that the US found that a workable relationship with the ICC\nwas preferable to hostility.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

US allies should continue to demonstrate support for ICC. The\nadministrations hostility can only go so far without support from other\ninternational actors. 123 states are members of the ICC including nearly every\ncountry in NATO. Therefore, if US allies continue their political, rhetorical\nand economic support for the ICC, the Trump administration is likely to find\nthat such isolationist and exceptionalism approaches to international is\ncounter-intuitive. [30] <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Finally, it is not a hostile act for US allies to demand Trump discontinues his attack against the ICC and complies with international law principles and it does not threaten the US\u2019 sovereignty and security in doing so either. It simply ensures the rule of law is upheld and that the ICC, can continue bringing perpetrators of mass atrocities to justice.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/p>\n\n\n\n

  1. Ben\nJacobs, \u201cDonald Trump on Waterboarding: \u2018Even if it doesn\u2019t work, they deserve\nit.\u2019\u201d (The Guardian<\/em>, 24th<\/sup>\nNovember 2015) <https:\/\/www.theguardian.com\/us-news\/2015\/nov\/24\/donald-trump-on-waterboarding-even-if-it-doesnt-work-they-deserve-it<\/a>>\nAccessed 5th<\/sup> November 2018.<\/li>
  2. John\nBolton, National Security Advisor, \u2018 Protecting American Constitutionalism and\nSovereignty from International Threats\u2019 (Address to the Federalist Society,\nWashington D.C., 10th <\/sup>September 2018) < https:\/\/www.justsecurity.org\/60674\/national-security-adviser-john-bolton-remarks-international-criminal-court\/<\/a>>\naccessed 5th<\/sup> November 2018.<\/li>
  3. \u201cWhy\nJohn Bolton vs Int\u2019l Criminal Court 2.0 is Different from Version 1.0\u201d Alex\nWhiting, 10th<\/sup> September 2018. https:\/\/www.justsecurity.org\/60680\/international-criminal-court-john-bolton-afghanistan-torture\/<\/a>  Accessed 5th<\/sup> November 2018.<\/li>
  4. The\nRome Statute of the International Criminal Court (2002). <\/li>
  5. N4.<\/li>
  6. Curtis\nA. Bradley, \u201cUS announces Intent not to\nRatify International Criminal Court Treaty\u201d <\/em>(2002) Volume 7 Issue 7 < https:\/\/www.asil.org\/insights\/volume\/7\/issue\/7\/us-announces-intent-not-ratify-international-criminal-court-treaty<\/a>>\naccessed 5th<\/sup> November 2018.<\/li>
  7. American\nService-Members Protection Act (2002) Title 2 of Pub.L. 107\u2013206<\/a>, H.R. 4775<\/a>, 116 Stat.<\/a> 820<\/a>.<\/li>
  8. Human\nRights Watch , \u201cU.S.: \u2018Hague Invasion Act\u2019 Becomes Law\u201d  (2002) <https:\/\/www.hrw.org\/news\/2002\/08\/03\/us-hague-invasion-act-becomes-law<\/a>>\naccessed 5th<\/sup> November 2018.<\/li>
  9. N7\nSEC. 2008.<\/li>
  10. UNSC\nRes 1422 (12 July 2002) UN Doc S\/RES\/1422.<\/li>
  11. Human\nRights Watch,  \u2018 Bilateral Immunity\nAgreements\u2019 (2003) <https:\/\/www.hrw.org\/legacy\/campaigns\/icc\/docs\/bilateralagreements.pdf<\/a>>  accessed 5th<\/sup> November 2018.<\/li>
  12. UNSC\nRes 1593 (31 March 2005) UN Doc S\/RES\/1593.<\/li>
  13. John\nB. Bellinger, State Departments Legal Advisor \u201c The United States and\nInternational Law\u201d (Speech at The Hague, Netherlands, June 6 2007)<https:\/\/2001-2009.state.gov\/s\/l\/2007\/112666.htm<\/a>>\naccessed 5th<\/sup> November 2018.<\/li>
  14. The Office of the Prosecutor, ‘Report on Preliminary\nExamination Activities 2016’ (International Criminal Court 2017) <https:\/\/www.icc-cpi.int\/iccdocs\/otp\/161114-otp-rep-PE_ENG.pdf<\/a>>  accessed 5\nNovember 2018.<\/li>
  15. International\nCriminal Court, Statement of ICC Prosecutor regarding her decision to request\njudicial authorisation to commence an investigation into the situation in the\nIslamic Republic of Afghanistan, 3rd<\/sup> November 2017, <https:\/\/www.icc-cpi.int\/Pages\/item.aspx?name=171103_OTP_Statement<\/a>>  accessed 5th<\/sup> November 2018<\/li>
  16. N2.<\/li>
  17. Jennifer\nTrahan, \u201cThe Fallacy\nthat attacking a judicial institution and its personnel protects Americans: A\nresponse to John Bolton\u2019s Speech\u2019 (Opinio Juris 12th<\/sup> September 2018)\n< http:\/\/opiniojuris.org\/2018\/0its\n9\/12\/the-fallacy-that-attacking-a-judicial-institution-and-its-personnel-protects-americans-a-response-to-john-boltons-speech\/<\/a>> accessed 6th<\/sup>\nNovember 2018.<\/li>
  18. N18.<\/li>
  19. N4\nArticle 12.<\/li>
  20. N2.<\/li>
  21. ICC-ASP\/16\/\/L-10\n(2017).<\/li>
  22. N2.<\/li>
  23. N4\nArticle 17 (1) (a).<\/li>
  24. N4\nArticle 17 (1) (a).<\/li>
  25. N15\n219.<\/li>
  26. N15\n220.<\/li>
  27. N4\nArticle 17.<\/li>
  28. N18.<\/li>
  29. N4\nArticle 17 (1) (a).<\/li>
  30. Rosa\nBrooks, \u201cFriends Don\u2019t Let Friends Drive Drunk: The Role of US Allies in\nKeeping the U.S. Honest, 48 Geo. J. Int\u2019l L. 923 (2017).<\/li><\/ol>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

    The Trump Administration Policy Toward the International Criminal CourtAuthor: Clodagh McIlhatton Queen’s University Belfast. Introduction The Trump administration\u2019s policy towards international law was always going to be controversial. Trump made his disregard for international laws evident even throughout the campaign stage. [1] Thus, there was no doubt that when Trump became president, US hostility   towards international justice institutions would be heightened. Such predictions came to light on the 10th of September 2018 with the \u201cmajor foreign policy address\u201d by Trump\u2019s national security advisor, John Bolton, which focused mainly on outlining the US\u2019 opposition to the ICC and its investigations. [2] Bolton\u2019s speech consisted of extremely aggressive rhetoric, and a range of threats to the ICC which creates a plethora of problems for the US. Thus, this briefing paper will provide an analysis of the Trump Administration\u2019s issues with the ICC and decide whether the US\u2019s hostile position is justified or whether this is just another way for the US to withdraw from International institutions to advance the rhetoric of \u201cputting America first\u201d at the consequence of international unrest. The paper shall conclude with recommendations for the US and other international actors in a bid to salvage a relationship between the US and ICC before the policies cause \u201cirreversible damage.\u201d [3] Background The ICC began functioning on the 1st of July 2002 when the Rome statute came into force. [4] From the beginning the US\u2019s relationship with the ICC was problematic. The Clinton administration signed the Rome statute in 2000, however it was not ratified. The start of the Bush Administration marked the beginning of a more hostile period with the ICC. Led by John Bolton, the administration unsigned the Rome Statute, [5] and stated its intention not to ratify the Rome Treaty. [6] The Bush administration also brought in the American Service-Members\u2019 Protection Act [7] which contained a range of extremely Anti-ICC provisions, including the so called \u201cHague invasion clause\u201d [8] which authorised the use of military force to liberate any American or citizen of a US-allied country being held by the ICC. [9] The US also negotiated Security Council resolutions which granted immunity to US peace keepers from prosecution by the ICC, [10] and obtained over 100 bilateral immunity agreements, [11] in which the signing countries guaranteed they would not surrender US citizens to the ICC. These measures led other states to question why the US should be above the rule of law, and many of these measures damaged the US\u2019 reputation internationally. However, in Bush\u2019s second term, the administration changed its position, finding it more beneficial to work with the ICC. The US did not veto the UN Security Council referral of the atrocities in Dufar, Sudan to the ICC [12] and the state departments legal advisor noted the US\u2019s support of the ICC\u2019s investigation. [13] The Obama Administration also cooperated with the ICC. However, come the time of Trumps election in 2016, Fatou Bensouda, Prosecutor for the ICC released a report on preliminary examination activities, [14] detailing evidence of war crimes by the US Central Intelligence Agency ( CIA) and US armed forces and in 2017 the prosecutor announced her decision to request judicial authorisation to commence an investigation into the situation in Afghanistan. [15] Thus, probing the hostile response from the Trump administration in September. International Legal Issues In his speech, Bolton points out a range of different reasons the US objects to the ICC, which gives rise to a range of different legal issues to be considered. Bolton claims that the ICC investigation in Afghanistan \u201cthreatens American Sovereignty\u201d and insinuates that the prosecutor does not have jurisdiction to investigate crimes by the US military and the CIA, as the US has not signed nor ratified the Rome Statute and the ICC has not gained consent from the US nor the individuals over which it \u201cpurports to exercise jurisdiction.\u201d[16] However, this argument is deeply flawed and is verging on being unreasonable. Foreign institutions regularly exercise jurisdiction over American citizens; for example, if an American was to commit a crime in Paris, they could be tried under the French legal system. [17] In addition, the US doesn\u2019t seek permission from other countries to prosecute terrorists. [18] Thus, this argument demonstrates a degree of hypocrisy from the US, and it seems Bolton is using the scare tactic of \u201cthreatened sovereignty\u201d to gain support for the administration\u2019s anti-ICC agenda. Furthermore, the ICC\u2019s jurisdiction over crimes by US nationals in Afghanistan is clearly set out in the Rome Statute. Since Afghanistan has ratified the ICC\u2019s Rome Statute, under article 12, the ICC has jurisdiction over genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes committed by Afghan nationals and any crimes committed on Afghan territory. [19] Therefore, the ICC has every legal right to investigate crimes committed by Americans in Afghanistan, and Bolton\u2019s claims appear to be clear misrepresentations and hyperbole. The use of such propaganda tactics to de-legitimize a vital judicial institution for prosecuting international crimes, undermines the rule of law, and needs to be addressed by the international community. Bolton also states that one of the US\u2019 principal concerns about the ICC is that it claims jurisdiction over crimes that have disputed definitions. Namely the crime of aggression. [20] Bolton\u2019s suggestion that the Crime of Aggression could even apply to the US is false. The Court cannot exercise its jurisdiction regarding crimes of aggression when it is committed by a national or on the territory of a state party that has not ratified or accepted the amendment. [21] Since the US is not party to the Rome statute let alone having ratified the amendment, and most certainly will not accede to the ICC having jurisdiction for this matter, the US cannot be prosecuted for the crime of aggression at all. Thus, it would be fair to say, this supposed objection of the ICC, is once again just a scare tactic used by Bolton to garner support for his ICC rhetoric, and not an actual concern about the US\u2019 security and sovereignty. Bolton claimed that the ICC is \u201csuperfluous\u201d since the US has an effective domestic legal system which already holds American citizens to the highest legal standards. [22] Thus, HE claims there is no need for the ICC to investigate and prosecute US crimes, as if there were crimes to be prosecuted, the American domestic legal system would do so. Under the Rome Statute, there are certain circumstances in which a case to the ICC is considered inadmissible, one being when the case is being investigated or prosecuted by a State which has jurisdiction over it. [23] This is known as the principle of complementarity. The ICC is a \u2018court of last resort\u2019 and will not act unless the state is unwilling or genuinely unable to carry out the investigation or prosecution itself. [24] Bolton states that the US has \u201cthe most robust system of investigation, accountability and transparency in the world\u201d questioning why the ICC still seeking to investigate crimes by Americans in Afghanistan? In the Preliminary Examination report, the prosecutor noted that the US was capable of carrying out prosecutions itself in the civilian or military courts, [25] yet goes on to explain despite US records the prosecution could not identify any individual in the armed services prosecuted by courts martial for the ill-treatment of detainees. [26] Moreover the Department of Justice conducted a two-year review of allegations related to the abuse of detainees in the Custody of the CIA which reviewed allegations of ill-treatment of 101 detainees. Yet full criminal investigations were only conducted into the cases of two detainees that died in custody and both investigations did not lead to indictments or prosecutions due to a lack of evidence. Thus, whilst on the face of things, it may appear that the US has a working domestic legal system, upon further investigation, the facts beg the question as to whether it has been effectively applied to the US Military and CIA who have committed war crimes. It does not seem from the information made available to the prosecutor for the preliminary investigation that US have done enough to satisfy the principle of complementarity. [27] Recommendations and Conclusions In conclusion, John Bolton\u2019s speech is not about protecting US national security and sovereignty, but instead about ensuring that American military or CIA implicated in torture in Afghanistan are above the rule of law. [28] The US wishes to promote a policy of \u201cexceptionalism,\u201d where it cannot be held accountable for international crimes, but other states should. Therefore, the trump administration feigns objections to the ICC which under examination, don\u2019t stand up. Therefore, to the US I would recommend that they conduct a complementarity into the crimes committed in Afghanistan. If the US conducts its own investigation\/prosecution into war crimes committed by US nationals in good faith, this will divest the ICC of Jurisdiction. [29] Also, in doing so the US would be endorsing the rule of law and ensuring it sets an example for the international community that war crimes will not be tolerated. Additionally, it would salvage a workable relationship with the ICC. I would also remind the Trump Administration of the consequences of the harsh stance against the ICC during the Bush administration, and that the US found that a workable relationship with the ICC was preferable to hostility. US allies should continue to demonstrate support for ICC. The administrations hostility can only go so far without support from other international actors. 123 states are members of the ICC including nearly every country in NATO. Therefore, if US allies continue their political, rhetorical and economic support for the ICC, the Trump administration is likely to find that such isolationist and exceptionalism approaches to international is counter-intuitive. [30] Finally, it is not a hostile act for US allies to demand Trump discontinues his attack against the ICC and complies with international law principles and it does not threaten the US\u2019 sovereignty and security in doing so either. It simply ensures the rule of law is upheld and that the ICC, can continue bringing perpetrators of mass atrocities to justice. Ben Jacobs, \u201cDonald Trump on Waterboarding: \u2018Even if it doesn\u2019t work, they deserve it.\u2019\u201d (The Guardian, 24th November 2015) <https:\/\/www.theguardian.com\/us-news\/2015\/nov\/24\/donald-trump-on-waterboarding-even-if-it-doesnt-work-they-deserve-it> Accessed 5th November 2018. John Bolton, National Security Advisor, \u2018 Protecting American Constitutionalism and Sovereignty from International Threats\u2019 (Address to the Federalist Society, Washington D.C., 10th September 2018) < https:\/\/www.justsecurity.org\/60674\/national-security-adviser-john-bolton-remarks-international-criminal-court\/> accessed 5th November 2018. \u201cWhy John Bolton vs Int\u2019l Criminal Court 2.0 is Different from Version 1.0\u201d Alex Whiting, 10th September 2018. https:\/\/www.justsecurity.org\/60680\/international-criminal-court-john-bolton-afghanistan-torture\/  Accessed 5th November 2018. The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (2002). N4. Curtis A. Bradley, \u201cUS announces Intent not to Ratify International Criminal Court Treaty\u201d (2002) Volume 7 Issue 7 < https:\/\/www.asil.org\/insights\/volume\/7\/issue\/7\/us-announces-intent-not-ratify-international-criminal-court-treaty> accessed 5th November 2018. American Service-Members Protection Act (2002) Title 2 of Pub.L. 107\u2013206, H.R. 4775, 116 Stat. 820. Human Rights Watch , \u201cU.S.: \u2018Hague Invasion Act\u2019 Becomes Law\u201d  (2002) <https:\/\/www.hrw.org\/news\/2002\/08\/03\/us-hague-invasion-act-becomes-law> accessed 5th November 2018. N7 SEC. 2008. UNSC Res 1422 (12 July 2002) UN Doc S\/RES\/1422. Human Rights Watch,  \u2018 Bilateral Immunity Agreements\u2019 (2003) <https:\/\/www.hrw.org\/legacy\/campaigns\/icc\/docs\/bilateralagreements.pdf>  accessed 5th November 2018. UNSC Res 1593 (31 March 2005) UN Doc S\/RES\/1593. John B. Bellinger, State Departments Legal Advisor \u201c The United States and International Law\u201d (Speech at The Hague, Netherlands, June 6 2007)<https:\/\/2001-2009.state.gov\/s\/l\/2007\/112666.htm> accessed 5th November 2018. The Office of the Prosecutor, ‘Report on Preliminary Examination Activities 2016’ (International Criminal Court 2017) <https:\/\/www.icc-cpi.int\/iccdocs\/otp\/161114-otp-rep-PE_ENG.pdf>  accessed 5 November 2018. International Criminal Court, Statement of ICC Prosecutor regarding her decision to request judicial authorisation to commence an investigation into the situation in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 3rd November 2017, <https:\/\/www.icc-cpi.int\/Pages\/item.aspx?name=171103_OTP_Statement>  accessed 5th November 2018 N2. Jennifer Trahan, \u201cThe Fallacy that attacking a judicial institution and its personnel protects Americans: A response to John Bolton\u2019s Speech\u2019 (Opinio Juris 12th September 2018) < http:\/\/opiniojuris.org\/2018\/0its 9\/12\/the-fallacy-that-attacking-a-judicial-institution-and-its-personnel-protects-americans-a-response-to-john-boltons-speech\/> accessed 6th November 2018. N18. N4 Article 12. N2. ICC-ASP\/16\/\/L-10 (2017). N2. N4 Article 17 (1) (a). N4 Article 17 (1) (a). N15 219. N15 220. N4 Article 17. N18. N4 Article 17 (1) (a). 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