By Domhnall Lynam, Queen’s University Belfast <\/p>\n\n\n\n
The Non-Human Rights Project (NHRP) pioneered by the eminent human rights lawyer Steven Wise argues for the recognition of animal personhood; that animals should be granted legal personhood, which is the capacity to exercise legal rights. The principle arguments advocated by the NHRP, which this essay will critically analyse, represent a bio-centric turn in the law as the project seeks to fundamentally change the legal status of animals. The NHRP\u2019s principle arguments are premised on autonomy, bodily liberty, bodily integrity, focus on vertebrates and utilization of the common law through a strategic pragmatic approach. Stone\u2019s notion of expanding legal personhood to the natural world was a radical notion almost fifty years ago and this remains the case today.[1]<\/a> As a result, the principle arguments advanced by the NHRP have received a plethora of criticism from various quarters which this essay will also critically examine. <\/p>\n\n\n\n Legal personhood is not synonymous with a \u2018human being,\u2019 rather it is an emancipatory process through the exercise of legal right. For example, in the USA corporations have been granted legal personhood.[2]<\/a> Although animal personhood is a revolutionary idea, it has a strong historical underpinning. For example, in the Middle Ages a pig stood trial for eating a human being.[4]<\/a> Stone\u2019s seminal article in 1972 \u2018Should Trees Have Standing?\u2019 led to the re-emergence of the idea that natural objects should be recognized as legal persons.[4]<\/a> People are now more amenable to the NHRP arguments because of the destruction of the commons and climate change, evidenced by lifestyle trends such as veganism. In recent years animal personhood has gained prominence, for example, in 2014 in India non-human animals were designated as legal persons, in New Zealand a river was granted legal personhood and Ecuador, Colombia and Bolivia have followed a similar direction.[5]<\/a> This demonstrates increased respect for the commons and the natural world. <\/p>\n\n\n\n Never has there been a more pertinent time to analyse our relationship with non-human animals. In 2021, the world is in the depths of the Anthropocene, an era of dramatic environmental change, as illustrated by Attenborough\u2019s stark warning that \u2018one million of the world\u2019s species are under threat.\u2019[6]<\/a> Geller argues the advent of the Anthropocene suggests that a novel approach is necessary.[7]<\/a> Increased legislative protection for animals and the environment is an effective response and the NHRP is at the forefront of this transformation towards respectful co-existence. Attenborough provocatively emphasized that \u2018what happens next is up to all of us.\u2019[8]<\/a> Raising awareness of the principle arguments of the NHRP and supporting the project\u2019s work through advocacy and donations is a preliminary measure to reverse the dramatic destruction of the commons and their species. <\/p>\n\n\n\n Autonomy<\/strong> <\/p>\n\n\n\n The NHRP\u2019s principle arguments spearheaded by Wise are inspired by the work of Peter Singer, premised upon a voice for the voiceless and defending the defenseless.[9]<\/a> Their arguments are based on the common law writ of habeas corpus from Somerset v Stewart<\/em> where a writ was issued on behalf of James Somerset, a slave, by Lord Mansfield.[10]<\/a> Never had a slave been considered a legal person in a process described by Wise as \u2018legal transubstantiation,\u2019[11]<\/a> and a landmark case in dismantling human captivity. The NHRP is searching for a 21st<\/sup> century version of Lord Mansfield to eradicate animal captivity through the recognition of animals as legal persons. In 2013, the world\u2019s first common law habeas corpus hearings on behalf of non-human animals were issued.[12]<\/a> The NHRP have premised their arguments upon the common law values of bodily liberty and integrity, something which judges have used \u2018for a millennium to decide cases which turn on general legal principles.\u2019[13]<\/a> Autonomous beings are entitled to these rights and proving autonomy before a Court grants animals legal rights which traditionally they have been denied, indeed this has been the \u2018single most important obstacle to more humane treatment.\u2019[14]<\/a><\/strong> <\/p>\n\n\n\n Autonomy is a \u2018powerful starting point\u2019 to initiate their conquest of legal personhood.[15]<\/a> Their habeas corpus suit in 2013 was about proofing that chimpanzees are autonomous beings. Jane Goodall\u2019s research into chimpanzees demonstrated that they have an extremely high cognitive ability, in a similar way to humans.[16]<\/a> Over 100 pages of affidavits explained how chimpanzees possess an extremely complex cognitive ability. Habeas corpus claims have also faced criticism; one claim was dismissed by the Court because according to them the animal was being moved from one place of confinement to another: from a cage to an island sanctuary. This undermined the NHRP\u2019s habeas corpus claims. However, Wise dismissed this by arguing that if the species were sent back to their natural habitats immediately, they would not survive there. The NHRP are not seeking absolute freedom for their clients, \u2018they will not be driven to Times Square and let out.\u2019[17]<\/a> Furthermore, a habeas corpus claim on behalf of Tommy was dismissed on the grounds of community membership because \u2018while a chimpanzee is aware and intelligent, they cannot bear duties or responsibilities.\u2019[18]<\/a> This is a fundamentally flawed argument because the \u2018current legal reality\u2019 is that children and the disabled have rights but lack duties and responsibilities and personhood has already been granted to non-human entities such as rivers.[19]<\/a> Despite these criticisms the autonomy argument has been vindicated by the Courts. In 2020 Justice Alison Y. Tuitt stated that Happy is an \u2018intelligent, autonomous being \u2026who may be entitled to liberty.\u2019[20]<\/a> The concept of animal personhood through demonstrating autonomy has become an increasingly popular concept. <\/p>\n\n\n\n Focus on vertebrates<\/strong> <\/p>\n\n\n\n The NHRP seeks to change the \u2018common law status of at least some non-human animals from mere things to legal persons,\u2019 a process they hope will eventually lead to the recognition of animal personhood for all non-human animals.[21]<\/a> The project\u2019s initial clients are vertebrates who demonstrate some degree of autonomy through cognitive capabilities and similar human characteristics such as chimpanzees and bonobos. This has led to criticisms of speciesism and Scala naturae (ladder of nature) \u2018reinforcing an existing hierarchy between us and them.\u2019[22]<\/a> This is quite ironic considering the foundational argument of the NHRP: eradication of destructive hierarchies which \u2018just keeps the old thinking and the old line and simply shifts several species to the other side.\u2019[23]<\/a> In addition to this, Wise has stated that if a being is not conscious, it is difficult to decipher what rights would mean for that being and \u2018we doubt that cockroaches and flies should have legal rights.\u2019[24]<\/a> Echoes of Orwell\u2019s famous line that \u2018all animals are equal, some more equal than others,\u2019 overshadow the NHRP\u2019s arguments.[25]<\/a> A \u2018capabilities approach\u2019 would be a \u2018more inclusive and respectful\u2019 argument for the NHRP to pursue. Any approach which departs from Scala naturae which has perpetuated toxic practices of racism and misogyny, a cause of societal destabilization, is a welcome development.[26]<\/a> <\/p>\n\n\n\n However, Wise has stated that autonomy is a \u2018sufficient but not a necessary condition\u2019 in the pursuit of legal personhood for non-human animals.[27]<\/a> The NHRP pragmatically choose vertebrates to demonstrate to judges their cognitive ability, which according to Wise gave the project \u2018the best chance of making that breakthrough.\u2019[28]<\/a> The aim of the NHRP is that this breakthrough will activate the extension of animal personhood to other animals as well. However, the Animal Charity Evaluators organisation is doubtful as to whether the NHRP work will expand to all animals.[29]<\/a> The project is firmly aware of the \u2018slippery slope\u2019 critiques of their arguments and the idea that granting rights to chimpanzees will gradually lead to a cockroach being granted legal rights. A sensible incremental approach allows the project to bring a wide cross-section of society on a journey with them. However, Justice Barbara Jaffe rejected the slippery slope argument by arguing that \u2018social evolution is needed to allow future societies to expand the ambit of rights.\u2019[30]<\/a> <\/p>\n\n\n\n The NHRP has received much criticism for its failure to utilize sentience as a proposed legal standard, a departure from the notion of animal sentience, promulgated by thinkers such as Singer \u2018animals deserve certain rights based on their ability to suffer,\u2019 premised on the work of Mill, Gandhi, and Tolstoy.[31]<\/a> However, the NHRP have pursued the path of autonomy, something which an abundance of evidence suggests is immensely valued by the judiciary. The project is open to the possibility of exploring further areas such as canine cognition. Their optimum utilization of the common law provides the project with a future trajectory of \u2018innate flexibility and openness to new discovery.\u2019[32]<\/a> Continued technological advances may exert pressure on the NHRP to define parameters on the extent of legal personhood for different objects. Controversially, the possibility of robots replacing humans in the legal sector and whether these robots should be granted legal rights is an interesting development. Andrews argues that \u2018if you have a computer or robot that is self-aware, it would be very hard to say it is not a person.\u2019[33]<\/a>Naturally, the NHRP would wish to terminate the undermining of the legal profession which could break down the legal system which they have maximized effectively to alter the legal property status quo. <\/p>\n\n\n\n Common law approach<\/strong> <\/p>\n\n\n\n The NHRP have utilized the receptivity of the USA common law to achieve their principle arguments for animal personhood which facilitates \u2018litigant activism.\u2019[34]<\/a> The common law develops in response to the types of issues brought before the Court and are \u2018a barometer of public conscience.\u2019[35]<\/a> The NHRP are not solely campaigning for legislative change, instead they are doing it themselves through the Courts. Stalker argues that unsuccessful Court decisions illustrates \u2018that society is not yet ready to abandon the human-animal divide.\u2019[36]<\/a> This reflects the attitudes of the Anthropocentric age which we are currently living in. Even unsuccessful decisions exacerbate the process of transforming societal views. However, this is an incremental process and judges are \u2018reluctant for political and professional reasons to change the law.\u2019[37]<\/a> For example, a judge stated, \u2018I do not want to be the first to do this.\u2019[38]<\/a> The impacts of this prolonged process will be discussed later. <\/p>\n\n\n\n At this juncture, the NHRP arguments in relation to their compatibility towards the UK legal system merits some consideration. The doctrine of Parliamentary Sovereignty in the UK means that Parliament is supreme and can quash decisions of the domestic courts, precluding the growth of judicial creativity. However, its relevance in the 21st century context is subject to debate.[39]<\/a> It is questionable as to whether the common law approach of the NHRP adopted in the United States, would be effective and enable change in the more traditional UK system. Furthermore, the composition of the UK\u2019s judiciary, white middle-class males making political decisions, leads to a questioning of the credibility of any potential UK court decisions in relation to animals. Schneider states that the NHRP approach \u2018will differ significantly from country to country.\u2019[40]<\/a> Certainly, in the UK sphere a context specific approach will be needed if the principle arguments of the NHRP are to have any success. <\/p>\n\n\n\n Strategic pragmatic approach<\/strong> <\/p>\n\n\n\n The NHRP have achieved their principle arguments thus far through \u2018a long-term, strategic, open-ended campaign.\u2019[41]<\/a> From the outset they choose chimpanzees for their first writ of habeas corpus due to their large abundance, low economic value and not integral to the functioning of any industry. Their strategic approach was visibly evident in their decision not to advance PETA\u2019s complaint of enslaving its orcas who was captive in violation of the 13th<\/sup> Amendment. Wise knew that simply this endeavor would not win, consistent with the NHRP\u2019s approach of \u2018win big, lose small.\u2019[42]<\/a> Wise is acutely aware of the longevity and incremental nature of this ambitious project, he repeatedly makes reference to breaking down a legal wall that has existed for over two thousand years with animals on one side as legal things and human beings on the other side as legal persons highlighted by the fact that it took over twenty-eight years for him to file his first law suit to ensure a \u2018reasonable chance of winning.\u2019[43]<\/a> <\/p>\n\n\n\n The NHRP have achieved tremendous change in a relatively short space of time. As recently as 2016 all animals were on the metaphorical legal \u2018thing\u2019 side of the wall. Now many have moved from the darkness of \u2018thinghood\u2019 into the light of legal personhood.[44]<\/a> The NHRP litigation model premised upon their principle arguments have been extended successfully to various jurisdictions outside of the USA, for example, in Argentina a judge recognised a chimpanzee, as a legal person meaning that Cecilia was transferred to an animal sanctuary.[45]<\/a> Despite this, it appears to be slow and geographically limited to certain areas with large amounts of time, expense and resources utilized for often minimal outcomes. Attenborough urges people that we have approximately ten years to change our ways, and at the forefront of this is the human relationship with non-human animals.[46]<\/a> This is an incredibly short time frame and beyond the NHRP\u2019s current rate of successful litigation cases, perhaps greater NHRP\u2019s resources need to be channeled towards legislative change. Even a groundbreaking Court decision \u2018could not have a transformative effect without well-coordinated political actions.\u2019[47]<\/a> The project had begun to utilize the legislator at Capitol Hill more extensively, but Covid-19 has stagnated this. The pandemic will undoubtedly dictate the course of government business for the foreseeable future in a process of rebuilding after the hardship of the pandemic. Despite this, it is imperative that the principle arguments of the NHRP are channeled simultaneously via litigation and legislation, there is not enough time to \u2018invest energy into the wrong solutions.\u2019[48]<\/a> <\/p>\n\n\n\n Criticisms<\/strong> <\/p>\n\n\n\n The NHRP\u2019s principle arguments are a transformative bio-centric evolution in legal jurisprudence, and therefore have faced a myriad of criticism. Wise\u2019s assertion that animal personhood is \u2018hardly a revolutionary idea,\u2019 simply an extension of the process of bestowing rights to groups traditionally excluded such as Indigenous people. However, on a superficial level it is a radical proposal, that is why the NHRP\u2019s litigation model is such an onerous process. NHRP has concentrated upon animal rights as opposed to animal welfare. Welfarists such as Cupp argue that animal welfare legislation offers sufficient protection to protect the welfare of animals.[49]<\/a> The template of welfare law is well-established and perhaps the logical approach is to ameliorate existing welfare provisions. Furthermore, Radford argues that animal welfare laws \u2018regulate the exploitation of animals\u2019 which will not be terminated in the short term because of the \u2018social interdependence\u2019 between humans and animals.[50]<\/a> Indeed, this interdependence is further evidence of the strategic advantages of litigation as opposed to legislative action because politicians will be reluctant to interfere with industries which profiteer from exploiting animals for pragmatic vote winning reasons. <\/p>\n\n\n\n However, the NHRP argues that animal welfare laws are insufficient and do not radically alter the binary subordination of animals as \u2018mere things\u2019 and legal property. However, the NHRP are not dismissive of the work of animal welfare groups, a realization exists of its central importance until the utopian position of animal personhood is conquered. There is a wealth of evidence unequivocally demonstrating that welfare laws are insufficient in protecting non-human animals. Media coverage, even in the NI context, demonstrates grave injustices and mistreatment of animals increasingly prevalent during the Covid-19 lockdown.[51]<\/a> Welfare laws, since the first anti-cruelty laws, such as the British Cruelty to Animals Act [1876], were enacted and are not achieving their intended purpose, exacerbated by a departure from EU animal welfare standards. Persisting on this futile trajectory would not fundamentally change the status of animals to ensure their survival. Animal welfare laws will no longer be needed once legal personhood is established because it means that animals are not irreducible to the cruelty of humans.[52]<\/a> <\/p>\n\n\n\n In addition to this, it is debatable as to whether the NHRP\u2019s argument for animal personhood is sufficient to dramatically improve the lives of animals and to arrest the cataclysmic destruction of ecosystems. Legal personhood is an effective preliminary step in the altercation of societal values, but new ideas, customs and lifestyles need to emanate from this statutory reversal of an ancient legal framework. Zimmermann analyses ways humans exploit animal species indirectly through our western lifestyle and choices. For example, products and medicines developed using animal testing.[53]<\/a> Francione argues that domesticating animals as household pets restricts their freedom; it is ponderable how many of us are prepared to surrender this luxury. Ironically, he displays elements of his own concept of moral schizophrenia by his continuation of the practice of domesticating animals as household pets. Even minor changes require large-scale changes to human behaviour, for example, eating habits. Giving animals legal rights would mean that the Nazi Holocaust is \u2018comparable to the speciesism inherent in eating meat or using animal by-products.\u2019[54]<\/a> Wider society is not yet ready to embrace these changes; the NHRP is playing a pivotal part in leading this change but a \u2018paradigm shift\u2019 is needed with engagement from various social and political actors.[55]<\/a> <\/p>\n\n\n\n A more radical and dismissive criticism against the principle arguments advanced by the NRHP have been the claims of \u2018insanity\u2019 against the project.[56]<\/a> However, historically, Black people, women, as well as other subordinate groups were once treated as objects rather than living beings. Wise makes the analogy between the mistreatment of animals and slaves historically which today is considered \u2018morally heinous.\u2019[57]<\/a> Max Weber reminds us that \u2018man would not have attained the possible unless\u2026. he had reached out for the impossible.\u2019[58]<\/a> Where legal rights are concerned, it is imperative to highlight these injustices and implement radical measures to eliminate them. Martin Luther King\u2019s words \u2018the day you fail to speak the truth is the day you begin to die,\u2019 serves as a powerful reminder to all of us to speak up for the voiceless.[59]<\/a> <\/p>\n\n\n\n The principle arguments advanced by the NHRP, demonstrated in this essay for the recognition of animal personhood, are an effective means to arrest cruelty towards animals and the destruction of our ecosystem. Growing up on a farm in rural Fermanagh I am aware of the intrinsic connection between human and animal species. During this era of the Anthropocene the imbalance is tilted towards humans who have exploited animals. Radical change through the recognition of animal personhood is needed to address the challenges of the Anthropocene. The Covid-19 pandemic which has destabilized civilizations across the world has demonstrated the fragility of our civilizations and human existence. As a result, there is an increased awareness of the need to protect our animals and the environment. Indeed, radical changes are needed because another pandemic which will have a much higher fatality rate is approaching according to Mike Ryan.[60]<\/a> In the future we will know whether Covid-19 has radically transformed our lives positively to the extent whereby humans and non-human animals are in natural equilibrium. <\/p>\n\n\n\n Conclusion<\/strong> <\/p>\n\n\n\n This paper critically examined the principle arguments advanced by the NHRP for recognition of animal personhood. When the project first mooted their arguments in 2007, animal personhood was a utopian notion, but it is now \u2018a social reality and a necessity,\u2019 in jurisdictions across the world,[61]<\/a> as a result of the groundbreaking litigation model pioneered by the NHRP. Legal systems across the world are on a trajectory towards recognition of animal personhood. Their pragmatic common law approach has optimized their success. However, some of the arguments advanced by the NHRP may need revised such as the overtones of speciesism and Scala naturae associated with their exclusively autonomy focused approach. The NHRP principle arguments have catalyzed the elimination of the binary legal status between things and persons, evidenced by more organisations fighting for legal personhood, increased media coverage and a societal impetus towards radically changing our relationship with non-human animals. There will \u2018soon be a generation of animals roaming the Earth who are the first of their species to have legal rights,\u2019[62]<\/a> a testimony to the success and credibility of the NHRP\u2019s principle arguments for the recognition of animal personhood. <\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n [1]<\/a> A Staker (2017) \u2018Should Chimpanzees Have Standing? The Case for Pursuing Legal Personhood for Non-Human Animals,\u2019 Transnational Environmental Law<\/em>, Vol. 6, Issue 2, 485-508.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [2]<\/a> S Wise (2014) \u2018The Nonhuman Rights Project\u2019 <https:\/\/www.youtube.com\/watch?v=pMQO_bU9Jv8<\/a>> accessed 07 April 2021.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [3]<\/a> P Waldau Animal Rights: What everyone needs to know<\/em> (OUP 2011). <\/p>\n\n\n\n [4]<\/a> (1972) Towards Legal Rights for Natural Objects<\/em>, SCLR, 450-501.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [5]<\/a> EA Roy (2017) \u2018New Zealand river granted same legal rights as human being,\u2019 <https:\/\/www.irishtimes.com\/news\/world\/asia-pacific\/new-zealand-river-granted-same-legal-rights-as-human-being-1.3013060<\/a>> accessed 29 March 2021.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [6]<\/a> D Attenborough (2021) \u2018Extinction: The Facts\u2019 <https:\/\/www.bbc.co.uk\/programmes\/m000mn4n<\/a>> accessed 02 April 2021. <\/p>\n\n\n\n [7]<\/a> JC Gellers (2020) Earth System law and the legal status of non-humans in the Anthropocene,In Earth System Governance<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n <\/p>\n\n\n\n [8]<\/a> ibid n6.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [9]<\/a> P Singer Animal Liberation<\/em> (Pimlico 1995).<\/p>\n\n\n\n [10]<\/a> [1772] 98 ER 499.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [11]<\/a> ibid n1.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [12]<\/a> NHRP Inc., on behalf of Tommy v. Patrick C. Lavery, N.Y Supp. Ct., Appellate Division, Third Judicial Dept, 4 Dec. 2014 (Tommy v. Lavery<\/em>).<\/p>\n\n\n\n <\/p>\n\n\n\n [13]<\/a> L Roland Danil \u2018Legal Personhood for non-human animals? The case of the non-human rights project,\u2019 <https:\/\/ukhumanrightsblog.com\/2018\/04\/26\/legal-personhood-for-non-human-animals-the-case-of-the-non-human-rights-project-dr-linda-roland-danil\/<\/a>> accessed 13 March 2021.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [14]<\/a> T Zimmermann (2013) Why the Non-Human Rights Project could be huge, <https:\/\/timzimmermann.com\/2013\/04\/01\/why-the-nonhuman-rights-project-could-be-huge\/<\/a>> accessed 12 March 2021.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [15]<\/a> K Schneider (2020) \u2018Annual Report\u2019 <https:\/\/www.nonhumanrights.org\/blog\/author\/kevin-schneider\/<\/a>> accessed 05 April 2021.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [16]<\/a> Kris Coronado (2020) \u2018Jane Goodall has lived her dream: Saving wild chimps\u2019 The Washington Post.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [17]<\/a> R Barlow (2021) \u2018Nonhuman Rights: Is it time to unlock the cage?\u2019 <https:\/\/www.bu.edu\/bostonia\/static-assets\/issues\/summer17\/nonhuman-rights-project.pdf<\/a>> accessed 05 March 2021.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [18]<\/a> ibid n12.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [19]<\/a> A Peters (2016) \u2018Libert\u00e9, Egalit\u00e9, Animalit\u00e9: Human\u2013Animal Comparisons in Law\u2019 (2016) 5(1) Transnational Environmental Law, <\/em>25\u201353.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [20]<\/a> Happy v Brehony<\/em> [2020] Case No 2020-02581.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [21]<\/a> \u2018Challenging the legal thinghood of autonomous nonhuman animals,\u2019 <https:\/\/www.nonhumanrights.org\/litigation\/<\/a>> accessed 14 March 2021.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [22]<\/a> D Bourke (2009) \u2018The Use and Misuse of Rights Talk\u2019 The use and misuse of \u2018rights talk\u2019 by the animal rights movement. In P. Sankoff & S. White (Eds.), Animal law in Australasia: A new dialogue<\/em> pp. 128\u2013152.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [23]<\/a> MC Nussbaum (2018) \u2018Working with and For Animals \u2013 Getting the Theoretical Framework Right,\u2019 Journal of Human Development and Capabilities<\/em>, Volume 19 Issue 1.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [24]<\/a> ibid n20.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [25]<\/a> G Orwell Animal Farm <\/em>(Everyman’s Library 1993).<\/p>\n\n\n\n [26]<\/a> ibid n22.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [27]<\/a> \u2018Steve Wise of the Non-Human Rights Project\u2019 (2021) <https:\/\/mydreamforanimals.com\/interviews\/steve-wise-of-the-nonhuman-rights-project\/<\/a>> accessed 30 March 2021.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [28]<\/a> Steven Wise (2018) \u2018The Struggle of the Nonhuman Rights Project for the Legal Personhood of Nonhuman Animals,\u2019 <https:\/\/www.youtube.com\/watch?v=3dtGejmsg7A<\/a>> accessed 07 April 2021.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [29]<\/a> Animal Charity Evaluators (2021) <https:\/\/animalcharityevaluators.org\/charity-review\/the-nonhuman-rights-project \/<\/a>> accessed 20 April 2021.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [30]<\/a> Hercules & Leo, 49 Misc. 3D 746 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2015).<\/p>\n\n\n\n [31]<\/a> ibid n9.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [32]<\/a> ibid n15.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [33]<\/a> K Andrews (2017) \u2018The rise of smart machines puts spotlight on robot rights\u2019 < https:\/\/www.technocracy.news\/rise-smart-machines-puts-spotlight-robot-rights\/<\/a>> accessed 22 April 2021.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [34]<\/a> R Kagan, Adversarial Legalism: The American Way of Live<\/em> (Harvard University Press 2001) 9.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [35]<\/a> ibid n5.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [36]<\/a> Ibid.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [37]<\/a> RA Posner (2000) Animal Rights, YaleLJ<\/em> 110.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [38]<\/a> ibid n29.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [39]<\/a> J Goldsworthy Parliamentary Sovereignty Contemporary Debates<\/em>, (CUP 2010).<\/p>\n\n\n\n [40]<\/a> ibid n15.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [41]<\/a> ibid n28.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [42]<\/a> S Wise (2010) \u2018Legal Personhood and the NHRP\u2019 17 Animal Law, 1-11.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [43]<\/a> ibid.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [44]<\/a> S Wise (2000) \u2018Rattling the Cage: Towards Legal Rights for Animals,\u2019 Perseus Books: Cambridge MA.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [45]<\/a> L Choplin (2017) \u2018Chimpanzee Recognized as Legal Person,\u2019 <https:\/\/www.nonhumanrights.org\/blog\/cecilia-chimpanzee-legal-person\/<\/a>> accessed 10 April 2021.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [46]<\/a> ibid n6.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [47]<\/a> M McCann, H Silverstein (1998) “Rethinking Law’s “Allurements”: A Relational Analysis of Social Movement Lawyers in the United States.” In Cause Lawyering: Political Commitments and Professional Responsibilities, A Sarat, S Scheingold. OUP, 261\u201392.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [48]<\/a> The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2018) <https:\/\/www.ipcc.ch\/sr15\/<\/a>> accessed 14 April 2021.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [49]<\/a> J Gorman (2013) \u2018Considering the Humanity of Nonhumans,\u2019 <https:\/\/www.nytimes.com\/2013\/12\/10\/science\/considering-the-humanity-of-nonhumans.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0<\/a>> accessed 20 March 2021.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [50]<\/a> M Radford Animal welfare law in Britain: regulation and responsibility<\/em> (OUP 2001).<\/p>\n\n\n\n [51]<\/a> A Preston (2020) \u2018Coronavirus lockdown behind a spike in demand for adoptions at Northern Ireland animal shelters\u2019 <https:\/\/www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk\/news\/health\/coronavirus\/coronavirus-lockdown-behind-a-spike-in-demand-for-adoptions-at-northern-ireland-animal-shelters-39073877.html<\/a>> accessed 24 March 2021.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [52]<\/a> ibid n36.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [53]<\/a> ibid n14.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [54]<\/a> D Sztybel \u2018Can the Treatment of Animals Be Compared to the Holocaust, Ethics & the Environment (Indiana University Press 2006) 11(1):97-132.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [55]<\/a> G Francione \u2018Animals as Persons: Essays on the Abolition of Animal Exploitation (<\/em>Columbia University Press 2008) 91.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [56]<\/a> People of the State of New York, ex rel The Nonhuman Rights Project, on behalf of Tommy v Thomas C Lavery, [2014] 124 AD 3d 148 [Tommy].<\/p>\n\n\n\n [57]<\/a> ibid n22.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [58]<\/a> F Parkin (1988) Max Weber<\/em>, London: Routledge.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [59]<\/a> M O\u2019Callaghan (2018) \u2018The Long March: RT\u00c9’s unmissable civil rights doc airs tonight\u2019 <https:\/\/www.rte.ie\/lifestyle\/living\/2018\/0814\/984970-the-long-march-rtes-unmissable-civil-rights-doc-airs-tonight\/<\/a>> accessed 02 April 2021.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [60]<\/a> M Ryan (2021) \u2018Reopening society will need to be managed carefully\u2019 <https:\/\/www.rte.ie\/news\/2021\/0217\/1197553-trocaire-mike-ryan\/<\/a>> accessed 19 March 2021.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [61]<\/a> A Fischer-Lescano (2020) \u2018Nature as a Legal Person: Proxy Constellations in Law,\u2019 Law & Literature<\/em> 32:2, 237-262. 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