By Shannon Hale LL.B., Queen’s University Belfast <\/p>\n\n\n\n
<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Introduction<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n The\nInternational Criminal Court\u2019s (\u201cICC\u201d) investigation into alleged war crimes in\nAfghanistan infringes on American sovereignty insofar as the United States has\nnot consented to the Court\u2019s jurisdiction.[1]<\/a> The position of the United States is\nclear. In response to the ICC launching an investigation, the National Security\nAdvisor of the United States, John Bolton, declared, \u201cthe ICC is already dead\nto us.\u201d[2]<\/a> As this paper demonstrates, there\nare measures available to the United States to safeguard against interference\nfrom the ICC. Yet, absent political resolve from the current administration,\nthe ICC investigation will likely proceed with international approval, despite American\nopposition. <\/p>\n\n\n\n Two\nissues are relevant to this discussion. The first issue concerns consent. The\nUnited States is unequivocal that, as a matter of international law, the Rome\nStatute cannot supersede its rights without its consent. Since the United\nStates has not ratified the Rome Statute, the ICC lacks jurisdiction to\nintervene.[3]<\/a> The\nsecond issue pertains to the principle of complementarity enshrined in the Rome\nStatute, which dictates if a state is willing and able to prosecute nationals\nfor serious international crimes, the ICC cannot launch a parallel\ninvestigation.[4]<\/a> The Trump administration stresses\nthis principle should preclude any investigation since \u201cthe U.S. judicial\nsystem is more vigorous, more fair, and more effective than the ICC.\u201d[5]<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n Scholars\ndebate the American position, especially with respect to the issue of consent. One\nschool of thought, led by Michael Newton, asserts states limit the Court\u2019s\njurisdiction because they authorize the ICC to intervene through delegating\npower to the Court. The ICC cannot act beyond the scope of this authority.\nConsequently, the ICC cannot force states to violate international obligations\nthat pre-existed before they signed the Rome Statute.[6]<\/a> <\/p>\n\n\n\n An\nopposing school of thought adopts a more universal, normative approach. Under\nthis perspective, the ICC does not derive its jurisdiction from the delegation\nof states\u2019 authority. Rather, the ICC\u2019s jurisdiction is \u201cgrounded\nin international law.\u201d<\/a>[7]<\/a> As a matter of international law, the\nICC holds individuals accountable for international crimes if states default on\ntheir obligations by refusing to investigate or prosecute individuals \u201con\nbehalf of the international community.\u201d[8]<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n Independent\nof this discussion, the crux of the debate between the United States and the\nICC concerns the principle of complementarity, which precludes an ICC\ninvestigation if the United States is willing and able to investigate and, if\nnecessary, prosecute its nationals.[9]<\/a> Consistent\nwith previous administrations, the Trump administration is reluctant to\ninvestigate the allegations levied against American nationals in Afghanistan. Several\ndomestic and international arrangements reinforce this perception. These\nmeasures include the introduction of the American Service-Members\u2019 Protection\nAct 2002 (\u201cASPA\u201d), the proliferation of Article 98 bilateral agreements, and\nthe threat of imposing economic sanctions or exercising the United States\u2019 veto\npower as a member of the United Nations Security Council (\u201cUNSC\u201d).[10]<\/a> As\nthe paper clarifies, continued obstruction may justify the ICC\u2019s investigation.[11]<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n The\npaper begins with an overview of the ICC\u2019s jurisdiction under the Rome Statute.\nFollowing that, it discusses the role of consent and whether states, by\ndelegating their authority, limit the ICC\u2019s jurisdiction. Next, the paper\nconsiders the principle of complementarity as a form of recourse to protect\nAmerican sovereignty. This section analyses the ability and willingness of the\nUnited States to investigate or prosecute its nationals for alleged war crimes\nin Afghanistan. As part of this analysis, the paper examines measures the\nUnited States has adopted to protect itself from the ICC\u2019s scrutiny and assesses\ntheir merits. The final section concludes the arguments addressed in this\npaper. <\/p>\n\n\n\n A Primer on the International Criminal Court<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n To understand the controversy\nbetween the United States and the ICC, it is necessary to investigate the\nsource and limits of the ICC\u2019s authority. The Rome Statute established the ICC\nin July 1998, although the Court became operational only once the requisite\namount of states ratified the treaty in July 2002. Notably, the United States\ndeclined to ratify the Rome Statute and has remained vocally opposed to the\nmandate of the ICC.[12]<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n Article 5 of the Rome Statute gives\nthe ICC jurisdiction over \u201cthe most serious crimes of concern to the international\ncommunity as a whole.\u201d[13]<\/a>\nThese crimes fall under four categories: genocide, crimes against humanity, war\ncrimes, and the crime of aggression.[14]<\/a> In\naddition, Article 13 specifies three instances in which the ICC may initiate\ninvestigations into individuals allegedly culpable for these crimes. Either a\nstate party or the UNSC may refer crimes to the ICC Prosecutor. Alternatively,\nthe ICC Prosecutor may launch an investigation.[15]<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n Problematically\nfor the United States, the ICC has jurisdiction over crimes committed on the\nterritory of state parties or if the accused is a national of a party state.[16]<\/a> Afghanistan\nis an ICC state party.[17]<\/a> Per Article 12, the ICC has\njurisdiction over Article 5 crimes committed on Afghanistan\u2019s territory, even\nif the perpetrators are nationals of non-party states. Although the ICC\nProsecutor has initiated an independent investigation, Afghanistan\u2019s referral\nof alleged war crimes, including those implicating the United States, could\nalso authorize an investigation.[18]<\/a>\nWhether American officials actually committed war crimes is not the focus of\nthis paper. Rather, the paper considers whether the ICC\u2019s investigation is\nlegitimate, considering the United States has not ratified the Rome Statute and\nhas already investigated some officials for their conduct in Afghanistan. <\/p>\n\n\n\n Consent as a Shield not a Sword<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n The\nUnited States has adamantly opposed the ICC\u2019s jurisdiction over its nationals. Purely\non the basis of consent, since the United States has not ratified the Rome\nStatute, any interference from the ICC infringes its sovereignty even though Article\n12(2)(a) of the Rome Statute authorizes the ICC to investigate crimes committed\non the territory of state parties.[19]<\/a> The primacy of consent is a\nfundamental principle of international law. In S.S. Lotus<\/em>, the court explained any obligations imposed on states\nmust \u201cemanate from their own free will\u201d expressed in customary or conventional\ninternational law.[20]<\/a> Newton insists the ICC does not have\n\u201cindependent or omnipotent\u201d authority since it derives its jurisdiction\nexclusively from the delegation of states\u2019 sovereign power.[21]<\/a> Considering\nthe legitimacy of the ICC\u2019s investigation solely through the lens of consent\nprecludes further analysis. The United States does not accept the Court\u2019s\njurisdiction. Therefore, any action on the part of the ICC affecting American\nnationals infringes American sovereignty. <\/p>\n\n\n\n However,\naccepting the premise the ICC has a broader mandate to hold individuals\naccountable when states default on their international obligations, the question\nbecomes whether Afghanistan, as an ICC state party, could restrict the ICC\u2019s\njurisdiction by concluding non-surrender agreements with the United States. If\nthe answer to this question is affirmative, these agreements prevent the ICC\nfrom exercising jurisdiction over American nationals for allegedly committing\nArticle 5 crimes. Otherwise, the United States has lost an important safeguard\nand cannot prevent the ICC from investigating its nationals, even though it is\na non-party state.[22]<\/a> <\/p>\n\n\n\n To\nretain exclusive jurisdiction over American personnel, the United States\nnegotiated non-surrender agreements with Afghanistan pursuant to Article 98 of\nthe Rome Statute. Article 98(1) prohibits state parties from surrendering\nAmericans to the ICC if non-surrender agreements are in effect. As Monique\nCormier argues, Afghanistan will breach these agreements if the ICC proceeds\nwith its investigation.[23]<\/a> <\/p>\n\n\n\n Scholars\ndebate whether the non-surrender agreements prevent the ICC from investigating\nsubstantive matters of law regarding the allegations against American\npersonnel. Cormier suggests the non-surrender agreements prohibit the ICC from\nasking Afghanistan to surrender American nationals and \u201chave [no] bearing over\nwhether the ICC may lawfully exercise [its] jurisdiction.\u201d[24]<\/a> The\nICC agrees. In the decision considering the Prosecutor\u2019s request to authorize\nthe investigation, the ICC declared non-surrender agreements \u201c[do] not impact\non the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court.\u201d[25]<\/a> Notwithstanding concerns the ICC\npronounced on the limits of its jurisdiction, opponents of Cormier\u2019s argument challenge\nthese assumptions on the basis states delegate their authority to the ICC\nthrough consent, which they may revoke at any time.[26]<\/a> <\/p>\n\n\n\n For\ninstance, Newton accepts the premise of state-delegated authority to argue the\nRome Statute co-exists with states\u2019 treaty obligations.[27]<\/a>\nAccording to this view, the ICC does not possess universal jurisdiction to\nprosecute \u201call potential perpetrators in all circumstances.\u201d[28]<\/a> Rather,\nAfghanistan ratified the Rome Statute \u201climited by [its] pre-existing treaty\nconstraints.\u201d[29]<\/a> As a result, Newton\nconcludes that under the non-surrender agreements Afghanistan granted American\npersonnel \u201cfull immunity\u201d for crimes committed on its territory and could not\ndelegate this jurisdiction to the ICC.[30]<\/a> Yet,\ncritics of this view cite Article 120, which forbids reservations to the Rome\nStatute, to argue non-surrender agreements do not curtail the ICC\u2019s\njurisdiction.[31]<\/a> <\/p>\n\n\n\n Notwithstanding\nthe primacy of consent, interpreting the ICC\u2019s jurisdiction through a\nuniversalist perspective is more persuasive than Newton\u2019s state-delegated\nauthority approach in light of the Court\u2019s overarching mandate to prevent\nimpunity. The underlying assumption of the universalist theory is punishment\nfor international crimes does not depend on the will of sovereign states. As\nCarsten Stahn explains, when states prosecute individuals for international\ncrimes, they do so \u201con behalf of the international community.\u201d[32]<\/a>\nHans-Peter Kaul agrees states have universal jurisdiction over \u201cinternational\ncore crimes\u201d and are free to do \u201ccollectively what they have the power to do\nindividually.\u201d[33]<\/a> In this respect, the Rome\nStatute does not impose obligations on non-party states, although it may impact\ntheir interests.[34]<\/a> According to this perspective, if states\nrenege on their obligations to prosecute their nationals for atrocity crimes,\nthe ICC has authority to intervene.[35]<\/a> <\/p>\n\n\n\n This\nview has merits. For instance, a consent-based perspective frustrates the ICC\u2019s\nmandate to prosecute the most serious crimes.[36]<\/a> As\nCormier hypothesizes, bilateral non-surrender agreements could lead to the\n\u201cinconsistent and potentially unfair\u201d application of the ICC\u2019s jurisdiction, resulting\nin \u201cimpunity for some individuals\u201d but not others based on their type of\nemployment.[37]<\/a> This outcome contradicts\nArticle 27(1), which states the Rome Statute applies \u201cequally to all persons\nwithout distinction based on official capacity.\u201d[38]<\/a> <\/p>\n\n\n\n More\nproblematically, consent-based theories risk creating perverse incentives for\nstates to withdraw from, or refuse to ratify, the Rome Statute to protect their\nnationals from prosecution. Nationals from countries, such as Sudan or Libya,\ncould have evaded responsibility for atrocities under this rationale.[39]<\/a>\nThis outcome offends states\u2019 international obligations to prevent impunity for\nthe most serious crimes. As David Scheffer emphasizes, \u201cno democratic\ngovernment \u2013 certainly not the United States of America \u2013 could champion such\nimpunity.\u201d[40]<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n Although\na universalist approach requires states\u2019 consent to justify ICC intervention,\nfor instance by ratifying the Rome Statute, interpreting the ICC\u2019s mandate in a\nbroader sense legitimizes the Court\u2019s authority to decide matters of\nsubstantive law, even for non-party states.[41]<\/a> From\nthis perspective, non-surrender agreements cannot preclude the ICC from\ninvestigating allegations of war crimes. As the International Court of Justice\nheld, \u201cimmunity<\/em> from jurisdiction \u2026\ndoes not mean \u2026 impunity<\/em> in respect\nof any crimes\u2026.\u201d[42]<\/a> Adopting the court\u2019s\nreasoning, immunity from prosecution under Afghani courts does not prevent the\nICC from ruling on whether American officials committed offences in Afghanistan.[43]<\/a>\nConsequently, while non-surrender agreements preclude Afghanistan\u2019s assistance with\nthis investigation, they do not prevent the ICC from proceeding with an\ninvestigation, even though this outcome technically infringes American\nsovereignty as a non-party state.[44]<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n The Principle of Complementarity Protects American Interests<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Apart from the primacy of consent, the\nprinciple of complementarity is the strongest safeguard of American sovereignty\nbecause it prioritizes the United States\u2019 jurisdiction over its nationals. According\nto the classical position, complementarity ensures the primacy of states\u2019\njurisdiction.[45]<\/a> Mark Ellis observes this principle\noperates as a \u201cprocedural and substantial\u201d defence against perceived\ninfringements of state sovereignty.[46]<\/a>\nYet, the classical view prevents the ICC from taking \u201can active role in crisis\nmanagement and conflict resolution\u201d because it relegates the ICC to passively\noperate as a \u201cbackstop\u201d to states\u2019 jurisdiction.[47]<\/a> <\/p>\n\n\n\n Article\n1 of the Rome Statute gives the ICC jurisdiction to prosecute Article 5 crimes.[48]<\/a> Complementarity\ngives the ICC concurrent jurisdiction over these crimes when states fail to\ntake any action. Using Colombia, Kenya, and Darfur as examples, Stahn argues\ncomplementarity cannot achieve its objectives when states defy their international\nobligations and the ICC \u201cis forced to stand still.\u201d[49]<\/a>\nOn this basis, the ICC must have concurrent jurisdiction to intervene if states\ndefault on their international obligations.[50]<\/a> Moreover,\nconcurrent jurisdiction recognizes the \u201cbalance between safeguarding the\nprimacy of domestic proceedings vis-\u00e0-vis the International Criminal Court \u2026\nand the goal of the Rome Statute to \u2018put an end to impunity.\u2019\u201d[51]<\/a> <\/p>\n\n\n\n In\nthis case, the ICC\u2019s intervention is controversial because the United States\nhas taken measures to review the actions of its personnel in Afghanistan and\ndoes not agree further action from the ICC is justified.[52]<\/a>\nMoreover, the Rome Statute codified the principle of complementarity, yet the\nUnited States is not an ICC state party. Nevertheless, there is an argument the\nprinciple of complementarity is a widely accepted international norm. Despite\nnot ratifying the Rome Statute, the United States negotiated for the inclusion\nof this principle in the Treaty, arguably to protect its sovereignty interests.[53]<\/a>\nMoreover, the signatories of the Rome Statute represent nearly two-thirds of\nthe countries in the world.[54]<\/a>\nAs state parties, they have endorsed this principle codified in Article 17.\nViewed as a matter of customary international law, the principle of\ncomplementarity applies in this instance even though the United States does not\nrecognize the ICC\u2019s authority or that of the Rome Statute.[55]<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n Adopting\na dynamic view of the ICC\u2019s mandate, the United States\u2019 reluctance to act\ninvites the ICC to intervene. The United States has unequivocally denounced the\nICC\u2019s investigation as \u201cutterly unfounded [and] unjustifiable.\u201d[56]<\/a>\nIn Katanga<\/em>, the Court explained the\nICC \u201cmust be able to step in\u201d if states fail to investigate or prosecute\nnationals responsible for Article 5 crimes.[57]<\/a>\nArticle 17 of the Rome Statute authorizes the ICC to proceed with an\ninvestigation if the United States cannot or will not investigate or prosecute\nits nationals.[58]<\/a> Although the United\nStates has an incentive to initiate proceedings in domestic courts to deter the\nICC\u2019s interference, it seems unlikely this outcome will materialize.[59]<\/a> <\/p>\n\n\n\n At\nissue is whether the United States is willing and able to investigate or\nprosecute its nationals for allegedly committing Article 5 crimes in\nAfghanistan. Article 17 of the Rome Statute creates a disjunctive test where\nthe ICC may intervene if the United States is either unwilling or unable to\nconduct an investigation. States and scholars contest the definitions of\n\u201cwilling\u201d and \u201cable,\u201d especially because the ICC retains discretion over\nwhether states meet the criteria.[60]<\/a>\nThis paper uses the common definition of these terms applied in the\ninternational humanitarian law context to analyze the United States\u2019 position.\nBased on these interpretations, the ICC argues the United States has not\nsufficiently demonstrated the case is inadmissible before the Court.[61]<\/a>\nConsequently, the ICC believes the principle of complementarity necessitates an\ninvestigation. Notably, the ICC\u2019s investigation does not conflict with\nAfghanistan\u2019s jurisdiction, since Afghanistan has not initiated investigations\nagainst international forces.[62]<\/a> <\/p>\n\n\n\n The United States is able but\nunwilling to prosecute its nationals for alleged war crimes. On the surface, the\nUnited States does not meet the criteria for inability. The Rome Statute\ncharacterizes inability as a state being \u201cunable to obtain the accused or the\nnecessary evidence and testimony or otherwise unable to carry out its\nproceedings\u201d as a result of the \u201ctotal or substantial collapse or\nunavailability of its national judicial system.\u201d[63]<\/a> Ellis\ncategorizes inability according to four broad areas consisting of states\nexperiencing conflict, political unrest or economic crisis, transition, or the\nabsence of an independent and impartial judiciary.[64]<\/a> The\nUnited States does not fall under any of these categories.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Crucially,\nthe United States has a longstanding commitment to the rule of law, is not\nsuffering from domestic conflict or a military coup, and has a functioning,\nindependent, and impartial legal system that respects due process.[65]<\/a> Moreover,\nconstitutional limits placed on the three branches of government serve as\nfurther oversight mechanisms.[66]<\/a> Several\navenues are available through which the United States could investigate its\nnationals, including the court-martial process, Department of the Army\nInspector General reviews, and Congressional investigations. Clearly, American\ncourts are not suffering from the structural challenges inviting the ICC\u2019s\nintervention in other post-conflict regions, such as Sudan.[67]<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n Nonetheless,\nfrom a technical perspective, American courts cannot investigate or prosecute nationals\nfor alleged war crimes without amendments to domestic laws. Scheffer explains\nthe United States should amend federal criminal laws under Title 18 of the United\nStates Code 2012 and Title 10 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice 1950 to reflect\nthe elements of Article 5 crimes enumerated in the Rome Statute. Otherwise,\nAmerican civil and military courts lack the jurisdiction to initiate\nproceedings.[68]<\/a> It seems unlikely the ICC\nwould decide inability on this basis alone. Yet, the Court retains discretion\nto make case-by-case decisions.[69]<\/a>\nThis issue could serve as an aggravating though not determinative factor in the\nICC\u2019s admissibility analysis.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In\ncontrast, the United States demonstrates a persistent unwillingness to\ninvestigate or prosecute its nationals for committing alleged war crimes in\nAfghanistan. Article 17(2) of the Rome Statute defines unwillingness according\nto three categories: investigations conducted in a manner that \u201cshield[s] the\nperson concerned from criminal responsibility\u201d for Article 5 crimes;\n\u201cunjustified delay[s] in the proceedings\u201d that obstruct justice; or,\ninvestigations conducted in a non-independent or non-impartial manner.[70]<\/a> <\/p>\n\n\n\n The\nUnited States is most susceptible to the ICC\u2019s intervention on the basis of\nundue delay. In Katanga<\/em>, the Court\nheld Article 17 applies to states\u2019 inaction. Otherwise, individuals would evade\npunishment on the basis states were \u201ctheoretically willing and able to\ninvestigate and to prosecute the case\u201d but had \u201cno intention of doing so.\u201d[71]<\/a> The\nICC found the United States\u2019 investigations were inadequate because they\nconsidered only individuals who acted outside the scope of their authorization\nand excluded those who acted in good faith. Moreover, the ICC lacked sufficient\ninformation to determine if the United States properly conducted these reviews.[72]<\/a>\nMost problematically, the United States has not investigated \u201cthe criminal\nresponsibility of those who developed, authorised or bore oversight\nresponsibility\u201d for the alleged activities committed in Afghanistan, such as\nhigh-level Central Intelligence Agency (\u201cCIA\u201d) officials.[73]<\/a> <\/p>\n\n\n\n Concerns\npersist over the limited prosecutions resulting from the reports commissioned by\nthe United States investigating detainee abuse.[74]<\/a> For\ninstance, the Schlesinger Report was the only report that reviewed \u201cthe chain\nof command extending to Secretary Rumsfeld.\u201d[75]<\/a>\nAlthough the Schlesinger Report found \u201cinstitutional and personal responsibility\nat higher levels\u201d for detainee abuse, the United States took limited action in\nresponse.[76]<\/a> Yet, the assertion of\nsome scholars like Julie Martin that the \u201clack of independent and impartial\ninquiry into responsibility\u201d equates similar concerns surrounding the Sudanese\ngovernment\u2019s investigation into Darfur is dubious.[77]<\/a> Moreover,\nlimited prosecutions resulting from these investigations do not necessarily\nwarrant the ICC\u2019s intervention. The chief concern of Article 17 is procedural\nnot substantive.[78]<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n The\nUnited States\u2019 investigations demonstrate some willingness to examine\nallegations of abuse. For instance, the United States provided details of\ninvestigations and subsequent prosecutions in several reports, including the\nSchlesinger Report, a 2006 report on Department of Defense Directed\nInvestigations of Detainee Abuse, the United States\u2019 periodic report to the\nCommittee Against Torture, and the United States\u2019 2015 update for the Human\nRights Committee.[79]<\/a> In\nthis respect, the investigations could serve a valuable \u201ctruth-finding\u201d\npurpose.[80]<\/a> Arguably, these measures suggest a\nhigher degree of willingness to investigate than that exhibited by the Sudanese\ngovernment.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Despite\nthese actions, the United States has not demonstrated good faith efforts to\ninvestigate all of the allegations against its personnel. For instance, the\nUnited States reviewed incidents where CIA activities directly resulted in\ndetainee abuse, but did not consider situations where officials acted within\nthe scope of their authorization. Moreover, prosecutions resulted only \u201cwhere\nCIA interrogations actually resulted in death in custody.\u201d[81]<\/a> The\ninvestigations focused on lower ranking officials and did not evaluate the\nactions of individuals with oversight responsibility for the CIA\u2019s activities.[82]<\/a> The\ninvestigations also failed to pinpoint individual responsibility for these\nallegations. Attributing responsibility to \u201cunclear policy guidance,\ninsufficient training, and command failures\u201d suggests a general unwillingness\non the part of the United States to hold individual Americans criminally\nresponsible.[83]<\/a> <\/p>\n\n\n\n Arguably,\nthe scope and outcome of the investigations are consistent with the American\nview that the ICC does not have jurisdiction over its government or its\nnationals. Nevertheless, it is evident the United States is unwilling to\nconduct investigations beyond the measures already taken. The United States\u2019\nreliance on non-surrender agreements and the ASPA demonstrate concentrated\nefforts to thwart cooperation with the ICC.[84]<\/a> The\nASPA forbids cooperation with the ICC and section 2008 authorizes the President\nto \u201cuse all means necessary and appropriate\u201d to secure the release of Americans\n\u201cdetained or imprisoned by, on behalf of, or at the request of the\nInternational Criminal Court.\u201d[85]<\/a> Furthermore,\nthe Trump administration continues to denounce the ICC\u2019s legitimacy, which\nfurther frustrates the overarching mandate of the Court to prevent impunity.[86]<\/a> <\/p>\n\n\n\n Technically,\nthe alleged war crimes are admissible before the ICC because the United States\nhas not investigated, nor has plans to investigate, most individuals connected\nto the allegations. Moreover, the investigations already carried out do not\nsatisfy the complementarity requirements under Article 17.[87]<\/a> Although\nthe ICC\u2019s intervention infringes American sovereignty, since the United States\nhas not consented to this course of action, it is justified in the international\ncommunity\u2019s broader pursuit of bringing perpetrators of the worst crimes to\njustice. Whether the ICC should devote its limited resources to these\ninvestigations, considering the gravity of atrocities being committed in other\ntheatres of conflict, is another matter.[88]<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n Conclusion<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n The\nUnited States is able yet unwilling to investigate its nationals for allegedly\ncommitting war crimes in Afghanistan. Interpreting the United States\u2019 actions\nthrough a consent-based lens dismisses the possibility of intervention by the\nICC because the nature of the investigations is left to the government\u2019s\ndiscretion. However, adopting a more universal view of the ICC\u2019s mandate to act\nwhen states default on their international obligations sanctions the ICC\u2019s\nintervention under the principle of complementarity.[89]<\/a> The\nTrump administration\u2019s reliance on non-surrender agreements and the ASPA\nreinforce the perception the United States will not cooperate with the ICC or\nreview the conduct of its personnel beyond those who acted outside the scope of\ntheir authority.[90]<\/a> In view of these\nconsiderations, the ICC has concurrent jurisdiction to intervene. Arguably, a\nfailure to act in this instance could frustrate the broader aim of the Rome\nStatute to \u201cput an end to impunity.\u201d[91]<\/a> Although\nthe ICC could intervene in this case without infringing American sovereignty,\nnotwithstanding the issue of consent, whether the Court should intervene or\nallocate its limited resources to more pressing priorities is subject to\ndebate. <\/p>\n\n\n\n Bibliography<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Table of Cases<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Prosecutor\nv Katanga<\/em>, Judgment on the Appeal of Mr Katanga\nagainst the Oral Decision of Trial Chamber 11 of 12 June 2009 on the\nAdmissibility of the Case, Appeals Chamber, Case No ICC-01\/04-01\/07-1497, 25\nSeptember 2009<\/p>\n\n\n\n Request for Authorization of an\nInvestigation Pursuant to Article 15, Situation in the Islamic Republic of\nAfghanistan (ICC-02\/17-7-Red), Pre-Trial Chamber III, 20 November 2017<\/p>\n\n\n\n S.S. Lotus (Fr v Turk), 1927 PCIJ (ser A)\nNo 10 <\/p>\n\n\n\n The Prosecutor v Uhuru Muigai\nKenyatta<\/em>, Judgment on the appeal of the Republic of Kenya against the decision\nof Pre-Trial Chamber II of 30 May 2011 entitled \u201cDecision on the Application by\nthe Government of Kenya Challenging the Admissibility of the Case Pursuant to\nArticle 19(2)(b) of the Statute,\u201dCase\nNo ICC-01\/09-02\/11-274, ICC Appeals Chamber, 30\nAugust 2011<\/p>\n\n\n\n Table of Legislation<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Rome Statute of the International Criminal\nCourt, (adopted 17 July 1998, entered into force 1 July 2002, ISBN No\n92-9227-2276)<\/p>\n\n\n\n The American Service-Members Protection Act\n2002 (USA)<\/p>\n\n\n\n Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,\n(adopted 23 May 1969, entered into force 27 January 1980, 1155 UNTS 331)<\/p>\n\n\n\n Secondary Sources<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Akande, D, \u2018The Jurisdiction of the\nInternational Criminal Court over Nationals of Non-Parties: Legal Basis and\nLimits\u2019 (2003) J Intl Crim Just 618<\/p>\n\n\n\n Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem Rep\nCongo v Belg), Judgment, 2002 ICJ Rep 1<\/p>\n\n\n\n Cassese, A, \u2018The Statute of the\nInternational Criminal Court: Some Preliminary Reflections\u2019 (1999) Eur J Intl L\n144<\/p>\n\n\n\n Coalition for the International Criminal\nCourt, \u2018Factsheet: Status of US Bilateral Immunity Agreements (BIAs)\u2019 (11\nDecember 2006)<\/p>\n\n\n\n Cormier, M, \u2018Can the ICC Exercise Jurisdiction over US\nNationals for Crimes Committed in the Afghanistan Situation?\u2019 (2018) JICJ 1<\/p>\n\n\n\n Dahlman, C, \u2018The Function of Opinio Juris<\/em> in Customary International\nLaw\u2019 (2012) Nordic J of Intl L 327<\/p>\n\n\n\n Dickerson, A, \u2018Who\u2019s in Charge Here \u2013\nInternational Criminal Court Complementarity and the Commanders\u2019 Role in\nCourts-Martial\u2019 (2007) Naval L Rev 141<\/p>\n\n\n\n Ellis, M, \u2018The International Criminal Court\nand its Implication for Domestic Law and National Capacity Building\u2019 (2002)\nFlorida J Intl L 215<\/p>\n\n\n\n Gannon, K, \u2018Afghans submit 1.17 million war\ncrimes claims to international court\u2019 Independent<\/em>\n(17 February 2018) https:\/\/www.independent.co.uk\/news\/world\/middle-east\/afghanistan-war-crimes-claims-victims-millions-submitted-court-isis-taliban-a8214301.html<\/a>\naccessed 22 November 2018<\/p>\n\n\n\n Hon James Schlesginer, \u2018Final Report of the\nIndependent Panel to Review DoD Detention Operations\u2019 24 August 2004<\/p>\n\n\n\n ICC, \u2018Situations under investigation\u2019 https:\/\/www.icc-cpi.int\/Pages\/Situations.aspx<\/a>\naccessed 22 November 2018 <\/p>\n\n\n\n ICC, \u2018The States Parties to the Rome\nStatute\u2019 https:\/\/www.asp.icc-cpi.int<\/a>\naccessed 22 November 2018<\/p>\n\n\n\n Kaul, H P \u2018Preconditions to the\nExercise of Jurisdiction\u2019 in Antonio Cassese, Paola Gaeta and John RWD Jones\n(eds), The Rome Statute of the\nInternational Criminal Court: A Commentary<\/em> (Oxford University Press 2002)<\/p>\n\n\n\n Lederer, E, \u2018UN chief asks security council\nto refer Syria to International Criminal Court\u2019 CTV<\/em> (26 January 2018) https:\/\/www.ctvnews.ca\/world\/un-chief-asks-security-council-to-refer-syria-to-international-criminal-court-1.3778007<\/a>\naccessed 17 January 2019 <\/p>\n\n\n\n Martin, J, \u2018The International Criminal\nCourt: Defining Complementarity and Diving Implications for the United States\u2019\n(2006) Loyola U Chi Intl L Rev 107<\/p>\n\n\n\n Newton, M, \u2018How the International Criminal\nCourt Threatens Treaty Norms\u2019 (2016) Vand J Transntl L 371<\/p>\n\n\n\n Scheffer, D, \u2018Staying the Course with\nthe International Criminal Court\u2019 (2001) Cornell Intl L J 47<\/p>\n\n\n\n Sekulow, J A and Robert Weston Ash, \u2018An\nUnlawful Overreach: Trying Nationals of Non-Consenting, Non-Party States before\nthe International Criminal Court\u2019 (2014) Florida J Intl L 1<\/p>\n\n\n\n Stahn, C, \u2018Taking Complementarity Seriously\u2019\nin Carsten Stahn and Mohamed El Zeidy (eds), The International Criminal Court and Complementarity: From Theory to\nPractice<\/em> (Cambridge University Press 2014) <\/p>\n\n\n\n Stahn, C, \u2018The ICC, Pre-Existing Jurisdictional\nTreaty Regimes, and the Limits of the Nemo Dat Quod Non Habet Doctrine \u2013 A\nReply to Michael Newton\u2019 (2016) Vand J Transntl J 443<\/p>\n\n\n\n The Epoch Times, \u2018Speech Transcript: John\nBolton on US Policy Toward the International Criminal Court\u2019 (10 September\n2018) https:\/\/www.theepochtimes.com\/speech-transcript-john-bolton-on-u-s-policy-toward-the-international-criminal-court_2656808.html<\/a>\naccessed 21 November 2018 <\/p>\n\n\n\n Thomas, D, \u2018Rejecting the US challenge to\nthe International Criminal Court: Normative entrapment and compromise in EU\npolicy-making\u2019 (2009) Intl Polt 376<\/p>\n\n\n\n United States Courts, \u2018Court Role and\nStructure\u2019 www.uscourts.gov\/about-federal-courts\/court-role-and-structure<\/a>\naccessed 27 November 2018<\/p>\n\n\n\n United States Courts, \u2018Overview \u2013\nRule of Law\u2019 www.uscourts.gov\/educational-resources\/educational-activities\/overview-rule-law<\/a>\naccessed 27 November 2018 <\/p>\n\n\n\n White House, \u2018Protecting American\nConstitutionalism and Sovereignty from the International Criminal Court,\u2019 National Security & Defense Fact Sheet<\/em>\n(10 September 2018) [1]<\/a> White House, \u2018Protecting\nAmerican Constitutionalism and Sovereignty from the International Criminal\nCourt,\u2019 National Security & Defense\nFact Sheet<\/em> (10 September 2018)<\/p>\n\n\n\n [2]<\/a> \u2018Speech Transcript: John\nBolton on US Policy Toward the International Criminal Court\u2019 The Epoch Times<\/em> (10 September 2018) https:\/\/www.theepochtimes.com\/speech-transcript-john-bolton-on-u-s-policy-toward-the-international-criminal-court_2656808.html<\/a>\naccessed 21 November 2018 <\/p>\n\n\n\n [3]<\/a> White House Fact Sheet (n 1)<\/p>\n\n\n\n [4]<\/a> Rome Statute of the\nInternational Criminal Court (adopted 17 July 1998, entered into force 1 July\n2002, ISBN No 92-9227-2276), art 17<\/p>\n\n\n\n [5]<\/a> Transcript (n 2)<\/p>\n\n\n\n [6]<\/a> Michael Newton, \u2018How the\nInternational Criminal Court Threatens Treaty Norms\u2019 (2016) Vand J Transntl L\n371, 374-375<\/p>\n\n\n\n [7]<\/a> Carsten Stahn, \u2018The ICC,\nPre-Existing Jurisdictional Treaty Regimes, and the Limits of the Nemo Dat Quod\nNon Habet Doctrine \u2013 A Reply to Michael Newton\u2019 (2016) Vand J Transntl J 443,\n448<\/p>\n\n\n\n [8]<\/a> Ibid<\/p>\n\n\n\n [9]<\/a> Rome Statute (n 4), art 17<\/p>\n\n\n\n [10]<\/a> White House Fact Sheet (n 1) <\/p>\n\n\n\n [11]<\/a> Julie Martin, \u2018The\nInternational Criminal Court: Defining Complementarity and Diving Implications\nfor the United States\u2019 (2006) Loyola U Chi Intl L Rev 107, 125<\/p>\n\n\n\n [12]<\/a> Mark Ellis, \u2018The\nInternational Criminal Court and its Implication for Domestic Law and National\nCapacity Building\u2019 (2002) Florida J Intl L 215, 215-216<\/p>\n\n\n\n [13]<\/a> Rome Statute (n 4), art 5<\/p>\n\n\n\n [14]<\/a> ibid<\/p>\n\n\n\n [15]<\/a> ibid, art 13<\/p>\n\n\n\n [16]<\/a> ibid, art 12<\/p>\n\n\n\n [17]<\/a> ICC, \u2018The States Parties to\nthe Rome Statute\u2019 https:\/\/www.asp.icc-cpi.int<\/a>\naccessed 22 November 2018 <\/p>\n\n\n\n [18]<\/a> Kathy Gannon, \u2018Afghans\nsubmit 1.17 million war crimes claims to international court\u2019 Independent<\/em> (17 February 2018) https:\/\/www.independent.co.uk\/news\/world\/middle-east\/afghanistan-war-crimes-claims-victims-millions-submitted-court-isis-taliban-a8214301.html<\/a>\naccessed 22 November 2018; Rome Statute (n 4), arts 8(2), 13<\/p>\n\n\n\n [19]<\/a> Jay Alan Sekulow and Robert\nWeston Ash, \u2018An Unlawful Overreach: Trying Nationals of Non-Consenting,\nNon-Party States before the International Criminal Court\u2019 (2014) Florida J Intl\nL 1, 4<\/p>\n\n\n\n [20]<\/a> S.S. Lotus (Fr v Turk),\n1927 PCIJ (ser A) No 10, para 44<\/p>\n\n\n\n [21]<\/a> Newton (n 6) 374-375<\/p>\n\n\n\n [22]<\/a> Rome Statute (n 4), arts 1, 12<\/p>\n\n\n\n [23]<\/a> Monique Cormier, \u2018Can the\nICC Exercise Jurisdiction over US Nationals for Crimes Committed in the\nAfghanistan Situation?\u2019 (2018) JICJ 1, 12<\/p>\n\n\n\n [24]<\/a> Cormier (n 23) 13<\/p>\n\n\n\n [25]<\/a> Request for Authorization of an Investigation Pursuant\nto Article 15, Situation in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan\n(ICC-02\/17-7-Red), Pre-Trial Chamber III, 20 November 2017, para 46<\/p>\n\n\n\n [26]<\/a> Sekulow (n 19) 4; Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,\n(adopted 23 May 1969, entered into force 27 January 1980, 1155 UNTS 331), art\n34<\/p>\n\n\n\n [27]<\/a> Newton (n 6) 396<\/p>\n\n\n\n [28]<\/a> ibid 398<\/p>\n\n\n\n [29]<\/a> ibid 404<\/p>\n\n\n\n [30]<\/a> ibid 408<\/p>\n\n\n\n [31]<\/a> Cormier (n 23) 15<\/p>\n\n\n\n [32]<\/a> Stahn (n 7) 447-448<\/p>\n\n\n\n [33]<\/a> Hans-Peter Kaul,\n\u2018Preconditions to the Exercise of Jurisdiction\u2019 in Antonio Cassese, Paola Gaeta\nand John RWD Jones (eds), The Rome\nStatute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary<\/em> (Oxford\nUniversity Press 2002) 583, 587<\/p>\n\n\n\n [34]<\/a> Dapo Akande, \u2018The\nJurisdiction of the International Criminal Court over Nationals of Non-Parties:\nLegal Basis and Limits\u2019 (2003) J Intl Crim Just 618, 620<\/p>\n\n\n\n [35]<\/a> Stahn (n 7) 448<\/p>\n\n\n\n [36]<\/a> Rome Statute (n 4), art 1<\/p>\n\n\n\n [37]<\/a> Cormier (n 23) 18<\/p>\n\n\n\n [38]<\/a> Rome Statute (n 4), art 27(1)<\/p>\n\n\n\n [39]<\/a> ICC, \u2018Situations under\ninvestigation\u2019 https:\/\/www.icc-cpi.int\/Pages\/Situations.aspx<\/a>\naccessed 22 November 2018 <\/p>\n\n\n\n [40]<\/a> David Scheffer, \u2018Staying\nthe Course with the International Criminal Court\u2019 (2001) Cornell Intl L J 47,\n52-53<\/p>\n\n\n\n [41]<\/a> Antonio Cassese, \u2018The\nStatute of the International Criminal Court: Some Preliminary Reflections\u2019\n(1999) Eur J Intl L 144, 160<\/p>\n\n\n\n [42]<\/a> Arrest Warrant of 11 April\n2000 (Dem Rep Congo v Belg), Judgment, 2002 ICJ Rep 1, para 60<\/p>\n\n\n\n [43]<\/a> ibid<\/p>\n\n\n\n [44]<\/a> Cormier (n 23) 13<\/p>\n\n\n\n [45]<\/a> Carsten Stahn, \u2018Taking\nComplementarity Seriously\u2019 in Carsten Stahn and Mohamed El Zeidy (eds), The International Criminal Court and\nComplementarity: From Theory to Practice<\/em> (Cambridge University Press 2014)\n252; Martin (n 11) 108<\/p>\n\n\n\n [46]<\/a> Ellis (n 12) 219<\/p>\n\n\n\n [47]<\/a> Stahn (n 45) 255<\/p>\n\n\n\n [48]<\/a> Rome Statute (n 4), art 1<\/p>\n\n\n\n [49]<\/a> Stahn (n 45) 255<\/p>\n\n\n\n [50]<\/a> ibid 234<\/p>\n\n\n\n [52]<\/a> Ellis (n 12) 222<\/p>\n\n\n\n [53]<\/a> Daniel Thomas, \u2018Rejecting\nthe US challenge to the International Criminal Court: Normative entrapment and\ncompromise in EU policy-making\u2019 (2009) Intl Polt 376, 379-380 <\/p>\n\n\n\n [54]<\/a> ICC State Parties (n 17)<\/p>\n\n\n\n [55]<\/a> Christian Dahlman, \u2018The\nFunction of Opinio Juris<\/em> in Customary\nInternational Law\u2019 (2012) Nordic J of Intl L 327, 336<\/p>\n\n\n\n [56]<\/a> Transcript (n 2)<\/p>\n\n\n\n [57]<\/a> Katanga<\/em> (n 51), para 85<\/p>\n\n\n\n [58]<\/a> Rome Statute (n 4), art 17(1)(a)<\/p>\n\n\n\n [59]<\/a> Stahn (n 7) 447<\/p>\n\n\n\n [60]<\/a> Rome Statute (n 4), arts 17(2), (3)<\/p>\n\n\n\n [61]<\/a> Request for Authorization\n(n 25), para 295<\/p>\n\n\n\n
<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\n\n\n\n[51]<\/a> Prosecutor v Katanga<\/em>, Judgment on the Appeal of Mr Katanga against the\nOral Decision of Trial Chamber 11 of 12 June 2009 on the Admissibility of the\nCase, Appeals Chamber, Case No ICC-01\/04-01\/07-1497, 25 September 2009, para 85<\/h5>\n\n\n\n