By Ben Lafferty LL.B., Queen’s University Belfast<\/p>\n\n\n\n
This brief research piece will gauge the extent of the author\u2019s agreement with the statement that; <\/p>\n\n\n\n
\u201cTestamentary freedom is often regarded as\nthe \u2018first principle of the law of wills\u2019. However, will-makers should not be\nlulled into a false sense of security; successful family provision claims can\nundo the terms of a validly executed will, even when the will-maker\u2019s\nintentions are very clear\u201d<\/em>[1]<\/strong><\/em><\/a><\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n Overall,\nmy agreement with the statement that a will-maker should not have a \u201cfalse\nsense of security\u201d in believing that their intended bequests will be upheld,\ndepends upon which category of claimant attempts to challenge the will. To\ndisplay this, I will assess the most litigious sections of the provision. It\nshould also be noted, at this preliminary stage, that I will primarily utilise\nthe English provision, given that the vast majority of cases to which I refer\nare English, although, the Northern Irish order is an exact equivalent. Beginning\nwith adult children claimants, I will display my agreement with the sentiment\nin the statement that the act presents a threat to testamentary freedom. To develop\nthis argument, I will convey that the test for adult children, based on moral\nobligation, displays a fixation with rewarding praiseworthy action rather than\nrespect for testamentary intention. From here I will then assess a counter to\nthis which holds that the requirement of a moral obligation has been removed\nfrom later case law. However, I will display that upon a proper reading of case\nlaw the moral obligation test is still central. I will then assess the\npurported view that Ilott v Mitson[2]<\/a> has generated renewed focus\nupon testamentary intent in claims by adult children. This will be refuted.\nMoving next to claims under the provisions by cohabitants, I will again display\nthat this is another area in which I fully agree with the statement due to the\nfact that the courts have enhanced the size of provision available under this\nsection and hence further impugned testamentary freedom. Lastly, I will analyse\nclaims by those being maintained by the deceased to display that my agreement\nwith the statement is only partial for such claimants given that the courts\nhave moved to restrain standing in this area which will limit the availability\nof a claim, thus protecting testamentary intention, whist at the same time they\ntake a relaxed approach to assessing substantial contribution. <\/p>\n\n\n\n Section A) Categories which\nDisregard Testamentary Freedom:<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n I) Adult Children\nas Claimants:<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Under\ns 1 (1) (c) of the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975[3]<\/a>, any child of the deceased\ncan make a claim that their deceased parent failed to make reasonable financial\nprovision for them in their will, and the courts will assess this under the\ncriteria found in s 3(1) of the act. Here it will be argued the test which has\nbeen generated for independent children to establish on the facts that reasonable\nfinancial provision had not been made for them, through focusing on the concept\nof morality, displays that the court is not concerned with what the will-maker\nwished to do with their property, but rather with rewarding meritorious conduct.[4]<\/a> Consequently, with regard\nto claims by adult children, I agree with the statement\u2019s view that a would-be\nwill-maker should be under no belief that their bequests will be respected, as\nif the court deems the behaviour of their children to be of a certain moral\nstandard their intentions will be pushed to the wayside. The courts have always\nrecognised that for an independent adult child to receive an award under the\nInheritance order the claim must exhibit an additional something that can push\nit over the finish line, indeed the reason behind this can be found in the\ndicta of Browne Wilkinson J who states that if a person is \u201cis physically\ncapable of earning his [sic] own living \u2026why should anybody else make provision\nfor you?\u201d.[5]<\/a> In finding the \u201csomething\nextra\u201d, which can enable a finding that an independent adult child has not had\nreasonable financial provision from a parental will, the courts have turned to\nthe notion of moral obligation, stemming from their analysis of s 3 (1) (d) of\nthe 1975 Act which requires the court to take account of any obligations the\ndeceased had towards the applicant. The establishment of the requirement of a\nmoral obligation is attributed to the oft cited dictum of Oliver J in Re Coventry<\/em>[6]<\/a> which proclaimed that\n\u201cthere must\u2026be established some sort of moral claim by the applicant\u201d[7]<\/a> in order to prove that\nthey have not been reasonably provided for in the will. This focus on a moral\nobligation can be seen to be a continuity of approach by the judiciary towards\nthe issue of inheritance challenges from the 1938 act,[8]<\/a> as displayed by the\nremarkable similarity between the Oliver J decision noted above, and the\ndecision of Wynn-Pay J in Re Andrews<\/em>\n(Deceased)[9]<\/a> which noted that the \u201cmost\nimportant factor\u201d[10]<\/a> to consider was the\n\u201cextent to which\u2026the testator was under a moral obligation\u201d[11]<\/a> to the claimant. The\nimportance of a moral nexus to ensuring a successful finding that a will did\nnot make reasonable financial provision for an adult child has been noted also\nby several academic scholars, such as Gillian Douglas who highlights that the\nsearch for a moral nexus centres on the courts searching to discover whether\nthe claimant had shown they \u201cfulfilled the obligation of a child to show\nconcern for a parent\u201d[12]<\/a>, evidenced through caring\nfor elderly parents, and Simon Douglas who even goes as far as to say that the\n\u201cone type of case where adult children had tended to succeed under the 1975\nact\u201d[13]<\/a> is one in which the adult\nchild was shown to have cared for the deceased parent. Hence, with regard to\nadult children bringing claims under the 1975 act, I would agree with the\nstatement\u2019s position that \u201cwill-makers should not be lulled into a false sense\nof security\u201d that their intentions will be respected as, when an adult child\nmakes a claim that a will has not made reasonable financial provision for them,\nthe central focus for the court is not the content of these intentions but\nrather whether there exists some form of moral conduct; which conveys the\nattempt to provide reward for \u201chighly commendable\u201d[14]<\/a> behaviour rather than to\nrespect testamentary intention. <\/p>\n\n\n\n However,\nin contravention to the above argument it has been put that the role of\nmorality as a determining factor in a claim by an adult child cannot be used as\na basis upon which to display that the courts are preoccupied with rewarding\nlaudable behaviour, as opposed to focusing on a will-makers intention, as the\nuse of morality as a tool for deciding said cases is far from stable; given\nthat the case law has displayed \u201clittle continuity in terms of legal principle\u201d.[15]<\/a> Such a contention clearly\npresents massive issues for the argument I have fielded above, by disputing the\nrole of morality, and thus challenges my agreement with the statement, given\nthat, as I had pointed out that morality formed the basis of my agreement with\nregard to adult children, if moral obligation can be shown to be unnecessary it\nis surely flawed to base an argument upon it. Indeed, if one looks upon the\ncase law in a narrow light it could be construed that moral obligation has, to\nan extent, faced partial judicial disfavour.[16]<\/a> For example, in the Court\nof appeal decision in Re Coventry<\/em>[17]<\/a> where Goff L.J. noted\nthat, with regard to Oliver J\u2019s quotation noted above on moral obligation,\n\u201cOliver J nowhere said that a moral obligation was a prerequisite\u201d[18]<\/a> of a claim by an adult\nchild. Similarly, through a limited\nreading of the decision of Butler-Sloss LJ in Re Hancock,[19]<\/a> the purported departure\nwith the need for moral obligation can be noticed when the learned judge states\n\u201cit is clear to me that the 1975 act does not require, in an application under\ns 1 (1) (3), that an adult child has in all cases to show moral obligation\u201d.[20]<\/a> Thus, clearly such\nquotation would appear to undermine the presence of the moral obligation, and\nin consequence the validity of my above argument. However, it can be shown that\nin subsequent case law the purported retreat from moral obligation has been\nreversed, as displayed by, following the Court of Appeal decision in Re Coventry<\/em>, the position taken in Re Jennings<\/em>[21]<\/a> which stated that \u201cit was\nestablished by the decision of Oliver J\u2026that, on an application by an adult son\nof the deceased who is able to earn\u2026his own living there must be some\u2026moral\nobligation.\u201d[22]<\/a>\nSimilarly, in Espinosa v Bourke<\/em>[23]<\/a> the court reemphasised\nthe importance of moral obligation in proving reasonable financial provision\nhad not been made highlighting that \u201cthe most weighty factor[s] to be put on\nthe scales in favour of the applicant\u201d[24]<\/a> were the moral obligations\nthe deceased father had towards his daughter arising from a promise the\ndeceased made to his wife that he would look after the daughter[25]<\/a>, and the fact that \u201cthe\nappellant had taken her father into her house and cared for him.\u201d[26]<\/a> Additionally, the ingrained\nnature of the morality test further apparent in academic opinion, displayed\nthrough a 2005 Wilson and Bailey-Harris article[27]<\/a>, which argues that the\ntest is all too present and should discarded given that it pays no adherence to\nthe wishes of the testator. Consequently, this analysation of the case law\ndisplays that, despite an extent of judicial distaste towards the moral\nobligation requirement, the courts have, in later case law, reverted back to\nplacing central focus on the moral nexus. This then dispels the critique to my\nabove argument by showing that moral obligation is clearly central to an adult\nchild\u2019s claim, thus, reaffirming that it is on grounds of morality that the\ncourts assess such claims, not grounds which aim to protect testamentary intention.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Furthermore, my agreement, for\nclaims brought by adult children, with the statement\u2019s holding that a\nwill-maker should not believe that their intentions will be upheld, is not\nimpacted by the recent decision of the Supreme Court in Ilott v Mitson<\/em>. It has been argued that the supreme court\n\u201cbolstered the principle of testamentary freedom\u201d,[28]<\/a> given that Lord Hughes\nstated that, in regard to claims by adult children, it is not the case that\nonce there is a qualified claimant and a demonstrated need to maintain them\nthat \u201cthe testator\u2019s wishes cease to be of any weight\u201d.[29]<\/a> Similarly it is argued\nthat through the court adopting a narrow perception of what may be termed\nmaintenance under s 1 (2) (b) of the 1975 act, in stating that it will only\ncover \u201cprovision to meet the everyday expenses of living\u201d[30]<\/a>, has protected the\ntestators intention through ensuring that any award given out of an estate will\nbe small, thus diminishing the impact of the award in respect to original\nintent of the will-maker.[31]<\/a> However, despite this,\nany purported respect for testamentary freedom contained within Mitson<\/em> is clearly superficial. This is\nevident given that the testator explicitly highlighted that she did not want\nher only daughter to benefit from her estate, thus displaying that the award,\nhowever big or small, ran counter to those intentions.[32]<\/a> Hence, given this\nsuperficial consideration of testamentary intentions in Mitson<\/em>, the decision leaves unchanged my agreement with the\nstatement\u2019s notion that a will-maker\u2019s intention should not be regarded by the\nwill-makers as irrevocable. <\/p>\n\n\n\n II) Cohabitants as\nclaimants: <\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n A\ncohabitant can, by virtue of s 1 (1) (ba) contend that a will did not make\nreasonable financial provision for them. This category of claimant is one in\nwhich I again agree with the statement in relation to the sentiment that a\nwill-maker\u2019s intent means little in the face of the 1975 act. I agree with the\nstatement, in relation to cohabitants, as the courts have been too generous\nwhen determining what award should be given to a successful cohabitant claimant;\ndespite the fact that the 1975 act restricts any award to what is reasonable for\nthe applicant\u2019s maintenance under s 1 (2) (b). by expanding the level of award\nthe court is willing to give a cohabitant, beyond that which the legislation\nindicates, the courts leave a testator in a position of uncertainty as just how\nfar a claim under the 1975 act will encroach the will-maker\u2019s intended bequests,\nthus reinforcing the statement\u2019s claim that will makers should have no \u201cfalse\nsecurity\u201d that their intentions will be respected. The inflated nature of the\nawards is presented through Musa v\nHolliday<\/em>[33]<\/a>\nwhich saw a claim by a cohabitant who had lived with the deceased for seven\nyears and had a child with him.[34]<\/a> The deceased died\nintestate and his cohabiting partner made a claim that reasonable financial\nprovision was not made for her. She received a substantial award, which\nincluded the home she and the deceased had shared, even though it was\nrecognised that this was \u201cprobably a larger property than absolutely essential,\u201d[35]<\/a> and she also received the\ndeceased\u2019s shares in the family cemetery business (which had a minimum\nvaluation of \u00a3700,000).[36]<\/a> This substantial award clearly\ndisplays that, with regard to cohabitants, the courts are liberal with their\nnotion of maintenance. This is evidenced not only through the fact that, as\nnoted above, the court recognised that the award it was making was beyond what\nwas absolutely essential, but also through the sensational assessment of the\nclaimant\u2019s needs by the court which included a reliable vehicle which reflected\nher lifestyle, holidays abroad once a year, the ability to entertain friends,\nand the ability to dress to a reasonable standard.[37]<\/a> Due to this clear stray\nbeyond mere maintenance, it has been commented that \u201cin some circumstances\ncohabitants can expect to be in as good a position as a spouse\u201d[38]<\/a> and that this is can be\nexplained through the court recognising the growth of cohabiting in society.[39]<\/a> The argument that the\ncourts in some instances treat a cohabitant as favourably as a spouse is an\nappealing one when one contrasts the ruling for Musa<\/em> with the decision from Lilleyman\nv Lilleyman<\/em>.[40]<\/a>\nIn Musa<\/em> a cohabitant was given access\nto deceased share of a family business, whereas in Lilleyman<\/em>, the claimant was denied access to shares in a family\nbusiness, even though a half of the growth of the business across the period of\nthe marriage was found to fall within matrimonial property,[41]<\/a> on the grounds that it\nwas unfair to share a family business with a spouse who had only been married\nfor slightly over 2 years to the deceased.[42]<\/a> Thus, it is clear that the courts have\nstrayed beyond assessment of claims for cohabitants based only on providing for\nthem what is reasonable as maintenance, as the legislation dictates, by pushing\nclaims closer to the perception of what is reasonable in all the circumstances\nper s 1 (2) (a) to treat a cohabitant more like a spouse, and in some cases\narguably better than certain spousal claims. This reality is the basis of why I\nagree with the statement, on claims by cohabitants, given that by awarding\ngreater amounts than the legislation dictates is possible the courts induce\ngreater uncertainty as to the level of award they will grant a claimant, and in\ndoing should leave the will-maker with even less hope that their intentions will\nbe respected. <\/p>\n\n\n\n Admittedly, it\ncould be argued that it is dangerous to draw an inference of a general trend\nfrom Musa<\/em> given that it displays a\nnumber of factors that could point towards it being an exception to any rule;\nrather than the rule itself. These include the fact that firstly the estate was\nextremely large, secondly that there were issues of ambiguous tax liabilities\non the company thus meaning that to be safe the courts had to lean towards a\nmaximum award[43]<\/a>,\nand the need for a clean break as there was evidence that one of the relatives\nof the will had to procure the murder of the claimant.[44]<\/a> However, despite this, a\ntrend can be found given the case of Negus\nv Bahouse<\/em>,[45]<\/a>\nin which the claimant had cohabited with a wealthy man for 7 years before his\ndeath. In this case the courts defined maintenance as provision which matches\n\u201cher lifestyle as it way with him, not as it was immediately before\u201d which\nportrays an expansion in the notion of maintenance given that the court is not\nseeking to simply maintain<\/em> the\nclaimant, but rather conserve her now luxurious life style which was \u201can\nundoubted improvement on her lifestyle before\u201d[46]<\/a> by affording her\n\u201cfinancial security and a degree of comfort for the rest of her life\u201d. [47]<\/a>Thus, the argument above\ncan be safely founded on Musa, <\/em>as\nthis case analysis displays that a general trend of expansion in maintenance\nfor cohabitants exists elsewhere from that case. <\/p>\n\n\n\n Section B) Areas which display more\nPromise for Testamentary Freedom:<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n I) Person Being\nmaintained by the deceased: <\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Claims\nbrought under s 1 (1) (e) have been described as the section which \u201cmost\nclearly raise[s] the issue of freedom of testation\u201d[48]<\/a> given that it is the only\nsection which steps beyond immediate personal relationships (such as family or\npartner). Unlike the last two areas analysed, my agreement with the statement\nhere is more partial than concrete. This partial position comes through the\nfact that the courts have both demonstrated action which shows respect for\ntestamentary freedom, by enabling a restrictive approach to standing, and\naction which has the effect of expanding standing. Thus, given that the two\nhave occurred simultaneously, my agreement with the statement is only partial\nfor this category. <\/p>\n\n\n\n Evidence of the\ncourts protecting testamentary freedom, and hence disproving the statement\nwhich places emphasis on how the 1975 act can infringe testamentary freedom, is\npresented through how the courts have renewed emphasis on the requirement of\nassumption of responsibility, under s 3 (4) (b) of the 1975 act, in the Court\nof Appeal\u2019s decision in Baynes v Hedger<\/em>[49]<\/a> where it was stated that\na demonstration that the deceased had assumed responsibility for the claimant\u2019s\nmaintenance \u201cis a necessary ingredient of a person entitled to claim un s 1 (1)\n(e).[50]<\/a> Such requirements for\nstanding will greatly limit the usage of this classification of claimant given\nthat in day-to-day personal relations it may be hard to delineate what actually\nstands as an example of assumption of responsibility, especially because \u201cit is\nhighly unlikely that any formal arrangements will have been made\u201d[51]<\/a> between the deceased and\nthe person claiming under the section. Thus, as regards the idea of assumption\nof responsibility, the courts have developed a high-bar to standing which will\nactively constrain the operation of this section thus meaning, in contrast to\nthe opinion contained in the statement, the 1975 act presents little threat to\ntestamentary intention. It should be noted that the courts had not always\nplaced assumption of responsibility as key to establishing standing,[52]<\/a> as in Jelley v Iliffe<\/em>[53]<\/a> it was stated that the\n\u201cbare fact of maintenance\u2026raises\u2026presumption that responsibility for it has\nbeen assumed.\u201d[54]<\/a>\nThis had the effect of subverting the assessment of assumption of\nresponsibility in relation to standing, as displayed through the fact that in Bouette v Rose<\/em>[55]<\/a> in which it was noted\nthat the court was unsure as to the role that assumption of responsibility\nplayed in relation to standing, given that it can be assumed from fact of\nmaintained based on Jelley<\/em>. This is\nalso displayed by the High Court decision in Baynes v Hedger<\/em>[56]<\/a>, in which assumption of\nresponsibility was not used to determine standing. This, thus displays that the\ncourts have undertaken a newly restrictive approach to establishing standing\nunder the assumption of responsibility which will restrain the usage of this\nsection, and consequently protect testamentary freedom, contrary to the content\nof the statement.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In\ncontrast to the above, under the assessment for standing dictated in s 1 (3) of\nthe 1975 Act which holds that an applicant must show that they were being\nmaintained to such a level that the deceased \u201cwas making a substantial\ncontribution in money or money\u2019s worth towards the reasonable needs of that\nperson\u201d, the courts have had a more relaxed approach. This more relaxed\napproach may thus threaten to widen the availability of the section and thus\nincrease the threat it poses to testamentary freedom, thus reaffirming the\nstatement. This is displayed through the courts embarking on their balancing\nexercise to see how the contributions of the two parties compare. In Bishop v Plumley<\/em>[57]<\/a> the Court of Appeal, in\nconducting its balancing exercise to examine the requirement of s 1 (3), only\nlooked for an \u201cimbalance\u201d[58]<\/a> in terms of the\ndifference in contributions between the deceased and the claimant, and they were\nwilling to ignore the care the claimant gave the deceased which was \u201cout of the\nordinary\u2026and exceptional\u201d[59]<\/a> in deciding that the\ndeceased\u2019s contributions had outweighed the claimant\u2019s. Thus, under s 1 (3) the\ncourts have a more relaxed approach and will find that substantial contribution\nhas been made to the claimant even when the claimant has provided considerable\nservice towards the deceased.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Thus, with\nregards to claims made by those claiming to be maintained by the deceased I\nonly partially agree with the sentiment in the statement that the act presents\na threat to testamentary freedom, as under this section the courts have shown\nboth restrictive and more relaxed tests for standing to be established, thus\nmeaning that the category is partially closed yet partially open, which in turn\nslightly reduces its impact as a threat to will-maker\u2019s intent. <\/p>\n\n\n\n Conclusion<\/strong>: <\/p>\n\n\n\n In\nConclusion, I entirely agree with the statement, referenced at the beginning of\nthis article, in relation to both claims by adult children and claims by\ncohabitants. I have displayed how both of these represent a strong threat to\ntestamentary freedom through, in the case of cohabitants, overly generous\nawards, and, in the case of adult children, a test which pays no attention to\nthe intentions of the will-maker. Lastly, with regard to claims emerging from\nthose asserting to have been maintained by the deceased, this piece argues the author\u2019s\nqualified, partial agreement with the statement – through a display of the\ncourts taking a much less clear-cut approach towards the total disregard of the\nnotion of testamentary freedom for this category of claimant. [1]<\/a> Prof\nRosalind Croucher \u201cA Lament for Family Provision \u2013 Good Idea Gone Wrong?\nAustralian Reflections\u201d, Colloquium on 40 Years of the PRA: Reflection and\nReform. <\/p>\n\n\n\n [2]<\/a> [2017] UKSC 19;\n[2017] 2 W.L.R 979.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [3]<\/a> Herein the \u201c1975\nAct.\u201d <\/p>\n\n\n\n [4]<\/a> Sheena Grattan Succession Law in Northern Ireland <\/em>(Belfast,\nSLS Legal Publications, 1996) 198. <\/p>\n\n\n\n [5]<\/a> Re Dennis<\/em> [1981] 2 All ER 140, 145. <\/p>\n\n\n\n [6]<\/a> [1979] 2 WLR 853. <\/p>\n\n\n\n [7]<\/a> Ibid, 865. <\/p>\n\n\n\n [8]<\/a> Andrew Borowski \u201cRe Hancock (Deceased)<\/em> and Espinosa v Bourke<\/em>: Moral obligation and\nfamily provision\u201d (1999) 11 Child and Family Law Quarterly 305, 306. <\/p>\n\n\n\n [9]<\/a> [1955] 1 WLR 1105.\n<\/p>\n\n\n\n [10]<\/a> Ibid, 1106.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [11]<\/a> Ibid. <\/p>\n\n\n\n [12]<\/a> Gillian Douglas\n\u201cFamily Provision and Family Practices \u2013 The Discretionary Regime of the\nInheritance Act of England and Wales\u201d (2014) 4 \u014cnati Socio-legal series 222,\n241.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [13]<\/a> Simon Douglas\n\u201cEstranged Children and their Inheritance\u201d (2016) 132 LQR 20, 24. <\/p>\n\n\n\n [14]<\/a> Grattan (n3). <\/p>\n\n\n\n [15]<\/a> Heather Conway \u201cDo\nParents Always Know Best? Posthumous Provision and Adult Children\u201d (2015) 8\nModern Studies in Property Law 117, 121. <\/p>\n\n\n\n [16]<\/a> Borowski (n7) 305.\n<\/p>\n\n\n\n [17]<\/a> [1980] Ch 461.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [18]<\/a> Ibid 487. <\/p>\n\n\n\n [19]<\/a> [1998] 2 FLR 346. <\/p>\n\n\n\n [20]<\/a> Ibid 351. <\/p>\n\n\n\n [21]<\/a> [1994] ch 286. <\/p>\n\n\n\n [22]<\/a> Ibid 295, Nourse\nLJ. <\/p>\n\n\n\n [23]<\/a> [1999] 1 FLR 747. <\/p>\n\n\n\n [24]<\/a> Ibid 757. <\/p>\n\n\n\n [25]<\/a> Espinosa<\/em> (n22) 756. <\/p>\n\n\n\n [26]<\/a> Ibid 757. <\/p>\n\n\n\n [27]<\/a> John Wilson and\nRebecca Bailey-Harris \u201cFamily Provision: The Adult Child and Moral Obligation\u201d\n(2005) 35 Fam Law 555, 558. <\/p>\n\n\n\n [28]<\/a> Gwyn Evans \u201cYou\u2019re\nno son (or daughter) of mine! The inheritance act \u2013 a charter for \u2018spend\nthrifts and wastrels\u2019?\u201d (2017) Dec Fam Law 1346, 1352. <\/p>\n\n\n\n [29]<\/a> Mitson<\/em> (n1), [47]. <\/p>\n\n\n\n [30]<\/a> Ibid [14].<\/p>\n\n\n\n [31]<\/a> Brian Sloan\n\u201cTestamentary Freedom Reaffirmed in the Supreme Court\u201d (2017) 76 CLJ 499, 500. <\/p>\n\n\n\n [32]<\/a> Steve Evans\n\u201cDrafting Matters Post-Ilott\u201d (2017) 167 NLJ 15. <\/p>\n\n\n\n [33]<\/a> [2012] EWCA Civ\n1268. <\/p>\n\n\n\n [34]<\/a> Ibid, [2].<\/p>\n\n\n\n [35]<\/a> Musa<\/em> (n32) [14]. <\/p>\n\n\n\n [36]<\/a> Ibid [23]. <\/p>\n\n\n\n [37]<\/a> Musa<\/em> (n32) [16]. <\/p>\n\n\n\n [38]<\/a> Ruth Hughes \u201cSpouse\nand Cohabitee Claimants Under the 1975 Act: Meeting in the Middle\u201d (2013) 43\nFam Law 826.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [39]<\/a> Gillian Douglas \u201cFamily\nProvision: Lindop v Agus, Bass and Hedley<\/em>\n[2009] EWHC B 14 (CH)\u201d (2009) 39 Family law 808, 809. <\/p>\n\n\n\n [40]<\/a> [2012] EWHC 821\n(ch). <\/p>\n\n\n\n [41]<\/a> Ibid [78]. <\/p>\n\n\n\n [42]<\/a> Lilleyman<\/em> (n39)\n[88]. <\/p>\n\n\n\n [43]<\/a> Musa<\/em> (n32) [29]. <\/p>\n\n\n\n [44]<\/a> Ibid [21]. <\/p>\n\n\n\n [45]<\/a> [2007] EWHC 2628\n(ch). <\/p>\n\n\n\n [46]<\/a> Ibid [68]. <\/p>\n\n\n\n [47]<\/a> Negus<\/em> (n42) [87].<\/p>\n\n\n\n [48]<\/a> Kate Green \u201cThe\nEnglish Woman\u2019s Castle \u2013 Inheritance and Private Property Today\u201d (1988) 51 MLR\n187, 196.<\/p>\n\n\n\n [49]<\/a>[2009] EWCA Civ\n374. <\/p>\n\n\n\n [50]<\/a> Ibid [45]. <\/p>\n\n\n\n [51]<\/a> Frank Bates \u201cHouse\nKeeps, Companions and Family Provision \u2013 a Comparative Interlude\u201d (1993) Conv\n270, 273. <\/p>\n\n\n\n [52]<\/a> Sidney Ross\n\u201cInheritance Act Claims by Dependents\u201d (2010) 40 Fam Law 490, 498. <\/p>\n\n\n\n [53]<\/a> [1981] fam 128. <\/p>\n\n\n\n [54]<\/a> Ibid, 136. <\/p>\n\n\n\n [55]<\/a> [2000] 1 FLR 363. <\/p>\n\n\n\n [56]<\/a> [2008] EWHC 1587, [163]-\n[166].<\/p>\n\n\n\n [57]<\/a> [1991] 1 FLR 121. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
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