{"id":449,"date":"2024-07-09T11:52:28","date_gmt":"2024-07-09T10:52:28","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/blogs.qub.ac.uk\/sssj\/?page_id=449"},"modified":"2024-07-09T11:52:28","modified_gmt":"2024-07-09T10:52:28","slug":"sex-and-the-social-model-exploring-the-role-of-the-body-in-the-social-model-of-disability","status":"publish","type":"page","link":"https:\/\/blogs.qub.ac.uk\/sssj\/sex-and-the-social-model-exploring-the-role-of-the-body-in-the-social-model-of-disability\/","title":{"rendered":"Sex and the Social Model: Exploring the Role of the Body in the Social Model of Disability"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

By Maria Grant<\/a><\/h1>\n\n\n\n

 Year 3<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Social Policy and Sociology Undergraduate Student<\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/a>Introduction<\/a><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

In December 2023, British Vogue published an article by editor and journalist Jennifer McShane, discussing her experiences of sex and sexual wellbeing as a disabled woman, and the joys, challenges, and assumptions that come with it (McShane, 2023). This is the first time a major lifestyle publication has covered the topic of sex and disability, which may be, in part, due to the omission of the body from disability studies and activism in the advent of the social model of disability. This omission is evidenced by the statement from leading social model scholar, Mike Oliver (1996, p. 42), that \u201cdisablement has nothing to do with the body.\u201d As the discipline of disability studies and broader social discourse have evolved, however, there have been calls to \u2018bring the body back in\u2019 and redevelop a social understanding of disability that includes, but does not medicalise or individualise, the bodies of disabled people.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This paper, therefore, will consider the argument for excluding the body from disability presented by Oliver in the above statement by examining the social model of disability, and criticisms and defences thereof, particularly in relation to the place of the body in disability studies. Relevant literature will then be examined to explore how the body might best be incorporated into the model, before considering potential practical applications through the example of disabled people\u2019s experiences of sexuality and desirability.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/a>The Social Model of Disability<\/a><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Much of the literature and political activism surrounding disability since the late 20th century has been rooted in the social model of disability, which insists that social structures create disability, not individuals\u2019 bodies. The social model was first put forward in definitions provided by the Union of the Physically Impaired Against Segregation in 1976, and further developed by academics in the 1980s, with Oliver (1990) being one of the foremost academics credited with its development (Cameron, 2016). At the heart of the model is the distinction between impairment, taken to mean a chronic physiological or neurological dysfunction (although cognitive impairments\/disabilities are scarcely mentioned in early literature \u2013 see Owens, 2014), and disability, which is understood as the inability to fully partake in public life because of social structures and organisations that exclude those with impairments (Oliver, 1996). This distinction arose to counter the medical model that took prior dominance, in which disabled people\u2019s bodies were viewed as medical pathologies that must be cured, and people themselves were infantilised and paternalized (Oliver, 1990).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Dissemination of the social model helped to strengthen the disability rights movement in the 1990s and created greater identification across diverse groups of disabled people, as they were now able to unite in the face of common barriers (Cameron, 2016). In turn, then, it contributed to the achievement of rights for disabled people. Thirty years after its creation, Oliver (2013, p. 1025) reflected on how the model and movement \u201cforced the media to change their images of us, transport providers to open up many of their services to us, public buildings to become much more accessible and the legal system changed to make it illegal to discriminate against us.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/a>Critique of the Social Model<\/a><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

The social model has not, however, been without critique. Some criticisms have been in relation to the demographic of early scholars, predominantly white<\/a> male wheelchair users from the United States and United Kingdom, and there have been calls for a more intersectional approach that included a broader range of perspectives within the disability community (Naples et al, 2019). There have also been calls to move on from the Marxist and materialist roots of the social model, that mainly saw<\/a> barriers as resulting from capitalist structures, and instead take on a postmodernist approach that more thoroughly considers cultural and power relations (Goodley, 2013). The combination of these two critiques resulted in the evolution of \u2018critical disability studies,\u2019 a self-reflective and interdisciplinary methodology, wherein disability acts as the base from which a myriad of other topics is studied (Goodley, 2013).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The dominant criticism of the social model, however, pertains to the dichotomy drawn between impairment and disability. Anastasiou and Kauffman (2013, p. 449) referred to the model as an \u201cover socialized analysis,\u201d too deeply steeped in social constructionism. They argue that total ignorance of biology and difference would prove detrimental to disabled people, risking the elimination of important specialised services and their own bodily agency and autonomy. They also argue that, in dichotomising corporeal and social experience, the social model \u2018leaves\u2019 the body to the medical model, and in so doing continues to facilitate that which it aims to eradicate, namely the continued medicalisation and pathologisation of disabled people and their bodies.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

According to Hughes and Patterson (1997), the social model creates these problems by not allowing for a complete and holistic analysis of disabled people\u2019s experiences. They argue that because physical experiences (of pain, for example) and perception are intrinsic to disabled people\u2019s day-to-day lives, a considerable analytical gap is left when they are omitted.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/a>Defence of the Social Model<\/a><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Some academics, including (if not especially) Oliver (1996, 2013), have come to the social model\u2019s defence. In fact, the statement \u201cdisablement has nothing to do with the body,\u201d comes from a chapter in which Oliver (1996, p. 42) defends the social model\u2019s definitions of disability and impairment in response to (then new) discourse arising about chronic illness and where \u2013 or if \u2013 it fits into the model.<\/a> In this chapter, Oliver (1996, p. 48) directly addresses criticisms related to the dismissal of impairment, saying that \u201cup to now and for very important reasons, the social model has insisted that there is no causal relationship between impairment and disability.\u201d The distinction is important, he argues, because internal arguments about pain and physical difference would only fuel justification by those in positions of power for the continuation of the medical model and apathetic, oppressive intervention.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Much of the discourse related to the model, Oliver argues, boils down to differing conceptualisations. The social model, he says, \u201cis not a social theory of disability and it cannot do the work of social theory,\u201d (Oliver, 1996, p. 52), and he denies that the model was ever meant to be \u201can all-encompassing framework within which everything that happens to disabled people could be understood or explained,\u201d (Oliver, 2013, p. 1024). The social model, he says, is merely one of many tools that can be used to improve the lives of disabled people. He also believes that \u201cthe talking to has to stop,\u201d as protracted discussion over what the social model does and does not incorporate detracts from time that could be spent engaged in collective action that would bring about effective change (Oliver, 2013, p. 1026). Christopher Riddle (2020) puts forward a similar argument, stating that discourse over how disability should be conceptualised should not be engaged in until proper equality has been achieved under the social model, and current conversations of the sort are therefore overly prefigurative.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/a>Analysis of Social Model Arguments<\/a><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

In examining these critiques and defences it must first be acknowledged that, despite Oliver\u2019s claims to the contrary, the place of the social model as the guiding perspective of contemporary social theory on disability is undeniable. This has led to significant advances for the disabled community in the last forty years, but as Levitt (2017) argues, its scope does not need to be and, in fact, has not been, limited to its immediate practical applications or the geo- and socio-political context in which it originated. Moreover, because of the guiding role the model and its definitions have played, the model and its theorists do, in turn, bear some responsibility for the consequences of omitting the body from disability studies. It may, at the time, have been a strategic choice to \u201cleave an overanalysed entity mercifully alone,\u201d (Snyder and Mitchell, 2001, p. 374) but arrogant insistence of the model\u2019s rigidity will not serve the movement going forward. It should also be acknowledged that evolving conceptualisation is not putting \u201cthe cart before the horse,\u201d (Riddle, 2020, p. 1510) and that there is no reason for ontological conversation and political action not to take place concurrently.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

It is for this reason that a socially grounded incorporation of the body into disability studies, and a congruent collapse of the disability\/impairment dichotomy, should be adopted going forward. Anastasiou and Kauffman (2013, p. 454) illustrate an understanding that both disability and impairment bear socially constructed and constituted aspects, and advocate for “a unified and multidimensional understanding of disabilities,\u201d incorporating social, biological, psychological, and behavioural \u201cfacts,\u201d among others. However, they do not provide any substantial explanation as to how this multidimensional understanding might best be approached, and do not give much consideration to the merits of incorporating an interpretative approach. Their argument, unfortunately, is ultimately quite<\/a> divisive and dismissive of the social model, and in referring to theories based off the model as \u201cfalse arguments that ignore realities,\u201d and instead calling for \u201cscientific truths,\u201d (p. 456) their argument \u2013 quite hypocritically \u2013 all but returns to the biological determinism that it warns against. Instead, this paper will mainly turn<\/a> to Hughes and Patterson\u2019s account (1997), which explores existing social theories that can be drawn upon to engage with the body more adequately in disability studies.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/a>\u2018Bringing the Body Back In\u2019: Approaches in Social Theory<\/a><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Hughes and Patterson (1997) put forward two theoretical approaches that they deem best suited to understanding the social place of the body in disability studies. The first is a postmodernist Foucauldian approach, which sees the body as a point of discourse, \u201can object of knowledge and a target for the exercise of power,\u201d (Hughes and Patterson, 1997, p. 332). This approach can most easily tie in with the social model, for when we consider that many of the barriers the model addresses are tangible, physical barriers (i.e., the built environment), we can observe them as tools deployed by social organisations and structures to exert control over disabled people by way of their bodies.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Exploration of the body as an object of knowledge and discourse, then, challenges the social model to a certain degree, and<\/a> has been most successfully carried out by feminist scholars of disability. Shildrick<\/a> (2005, 2009), for example, has described how depictions of the impaired\/disabled body create a \u2018self\u2019 and \u2018other\u2019 distinction. This distinction is symptomatic of athletic and aesthetic hierarchies, but \u201ccan be contained only by the strict imposition of normative categories that separate out and hold apart the supposedly oppositional groups,\u201d (Shildrick, 2005, p. 757). What such categories and perceived distinctions have been created to mask, then, is an underlying anxiety borne from the more evident similarity of disabled and non-disabled bodies. This similarity, she says, serves as an unwelcome reminder of the fragility and ultimate lack of control individuals bear over their own bodies, and is therefore denied or avoided. Shildrick also identifies eugenics and forced sterilisation of disabled people in the 20th<\/sup> century as a prime example of control being directly imposed on disabled people\u2019s bodies by those in positions of power (Shildrick, 2005).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Hughes and Patterson (1997) see the Foucauldian approach as useful to a certain extent but point out one major flaw: it only views disabled bodies as objects<\/em>, not subjects <\/em>of knowledge and discourse, and in so doing \u201crobs the body of agency and renders it biologically barren,\u201d (1997, p. 334). To supplement this gap, therefore, they put forward a phenomenological sociology of the body, applied to disability. This approach understands the body as \u201can experiencing agent, itself a subject [\u2026] and therefore a site of meaning and source of knowledge about the world,\u201d (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, cited in Hughes and Patterson, 1997, p. 334). Phenomenology, in many ways, hearkens back to the philosophy of Aristotle in marking the body as the starting point of all perception, but when applied sociologically, highlights the importance of non-discursive, embodied perception in social interactions. The approach has been utilised very successfully in other fields of social research (see, for example, the work of Vandebroeck<\/a>, 2016, on the relations between body size and social class) but is of particular importance in disability studies, as impairment and different physiologies not only account for differing means of corporeal perception, but differing, socially influenced, perceptions of the corporeal by others.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Through this combined approach, Huges and Patterson (1997, p. 335-336) truly bridge the gap between impairment and disability by concluding that \u201cdisability is experienced in, on and through the body, just as impairment is experienced in terms of the personal and cultural narratives that help to constitute its meaning,\u201d or, more succinctly \u201cdisability is embodied, and impairment is social.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

 <\/h2>\n\n\n\n

<\/a>Practical Implications: Disability & Sexuality<\/a><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

The implications of the theories put forward by Hughes and Patterson can be particularly well demonstrated in the arena of disability and sexuality. It is an area with limited yet influential literature (though worth noting that the one \u2018Sexuality and Disability\u2019 academic journal is for medical and psychological works, suggesting that the topic is still quite stuck in the medical model).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Indeed, Shildrick<\/a> (2016, p. 136) has applied her theories to the topic, saying that \u201cthe breaching of any normative boundary always causes anxiety, so when sexuality and disability come together the effect is greatly heightened to an extent that severely limits possibilities for people with disabilities.\u201d Sex is already a topic that is culturally \u2018taboo\u2019 to openly discuss, but there are also normative assumptions regarding sexual acts and how they should look or be carried out (Attwood, 2011). As a carnal and embodied act, then, sex is partly dictated by the physiology and capacity of one\u2019s body, so the sexual acts that disabled people engage in will likely differ<\/a> to those of non-disabled people, creating the \u2018heightened anxiety\u2019 Shildrick (2009) describes. The result of this is that disabled people expressing their sexuality is often either met with derision or simply denied, and disabled people are therefore frequently portrayed as asexual individuals (in the media, for example) to minimise this \u2018social anxiety\u2019 (Pepper, 2016). Here, then, we can clearly see the imposition of cultural narratives on disabled people\u2019s bodies, as well as an unwillingness to engage with or acknowledge a different form of corporeal experience.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

We can see these ideas and their consequences reflected in Jennifer McShane\u2019s British Vogue article as well. Speaking of her own experiences McShane describes how, because of her disability, it is typically assumed that sexual desire plays no part in her life, to the point that a nurse \u2018scoffed away\u2019 the idea of her needing a cervical smear. Such assumptions have been relentlessly reinforced throughout her life, both from the attitudes of friends, family, and potential partners, and a lack of educational or representational media about sex as a disabled person. Now, McShane says, \u201cnothing about [my] pursuit of desire feels natural,\u201d and \u201cit always feels slightly forced, timid, like I shouldn\u2019t really be doing it (pun intended),\u201d (McShane, 2023). In these statements, we can see a clear example of the impact of social norms and structures on a disabled person\u2019s corporeal experiences, and on their perception of their own physiological mechanisms (i.e. sexual desire).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/a>Conclusion<\/a><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

This paper has critically examined the statement put forward by Oliver (1996, p. 42) that \u201cdisablement has nothing to do with the body,\u201d by analysing arguments both criticising and defending the social model of disability. It has argued that what is needed is not a separate \u2018social model of impairment,\u2019 as Oliver (1996) alluded to, but a re-incorporation of the body into disability studies and the social model that is grounded in suitable, pre-existing, and already clearly applicable social theory. It then outlined some of the theories that are best fit for conducting this incorporation, and used the example of disability and sexuality to consider how they can be practically applied in contemporary social discourse.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

To conclude, it must be said that we have certainly not transcended the need for the social model of disability, as the inequalities and injustices it seeks to address have by no means been eradicated. However, the conversations around disability are advancing regardless and it may, therefore, be time to allow for a more nuanced, embodied iteration of the model that would, in turn, provide for increasingly comprehensive social studies on a wider scale.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/a>References<\/a><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Anastasiou, D., Kauffman, J.M., (2013), \u2018The Social Model of Disability: Dichotomy between Impairment and Disability,\u2019 The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy: A Forum for Bioethics and Philosophy of Medicine<\/em>, 38(4), pp. 441- 459.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Attwood, F., (2011) \u2018Sex and the Media,\u2019 in Ross, K.(ed.), The Handbook of Gender, Sex, and Media<\/em>, Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, Incorporated, pp. 457-469<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Cameron, C., (2016), \u2018The Social Model,\u2019 in Cameron, C. (ed.), Disability Studies: A Student’s Guide<\/em>, London: SAGE Publications Ltd., pp. 137-140.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Goodley, D., (2013), \u2018Dis\/entangling Critical Disability Studies,\u2019 in Disability & Society<\/em>, 28(5), pp. 631-644.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Hughes, B., Patterson, K., (1997), \u2018The Social Model of Disability and the Disappearing Body: Towards a Sociology of Impairment,\u2019 Disability & Society<\/em>, 12(3), pp. 325-340.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Levitt, J.M., (2017), \u2018Exploring How the Social Model of Disability Can Be Re-invigorated: In Response to Mike Oliver,\u2019 in Disability & Society<\/em>, 32(4), pp. 589-594.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

McShane, J., (2023), \u2018I\u2019m<\/a> Disabled. Why Do You Assume That Means I Don\u2019t<\/a> Have a Sex Life?\u2019 British Vogue,<\/em> December 10. Available at: https:\/\/www.vogue.co.uk\/article\/disabled-sex (Accessed 14 December 2023).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Naples, N.A., Mauldin, L., Dillaway, H., (2019), \u2018Gender, Disability, and Intersectionality,\u2019 in Gender & Society<\/em>, 33(1), pp. 5-18.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Oliver, M., (1990), The Politics of Disablement<\/em>, 1st edn., London: Macmillan Press.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Oliver, M., (1996), \u2018Defining Impairment and Disability: Issues at Stake,\u2019 in Barnes, C., Mercer, G., (eds), Exploring the Divide: Illness and Disability<\/em>, Leeds: The Disability Press, pp. 39-54.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Oliver, M., (2013) \u2018The Social Model of Disability: Thirty Years On,\u2019 in Disability & Society<\/em>, 28(7), pp. 1024\u20131026.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Owens, J., (2014), \u2018Exploring the Critiques of the Social Model of Disability: The Transformative Possibility of Arendt’s Notion of Power,\u2019 in Sociology of Health and Illness,<\/em> 37(3), pp. 385-403.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Pepper, P., (2016), \u2018Treating Disabled People as Asexual is Exasperating and Offensive,\u2019 The Guardian<\/em>, June 8. Available at: https:\/\/www.theguardian.com\/commentisfree\/2016\/jun\/08\/disabled-people-asexual-sex-lives-you-before-me-sexuality (Accessed 20 February 2024)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Riddle, C.A., (2020) \u2018Why We Do Not Need a \u2018Stronger\u2019 Social Model of Disability,\u2019 in Disability & Society<\/em>, 35(9), pp. 1509-1513.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Shildrick, M., (2005), \u2018The Disabled Body, Genealogy and Undecidability,\u2019 in Cultural Studies<\/em>, 19(6), pp. 755-770.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Shildrick, M., (2009), Dangerous Discourses of Disability, Subjectivity and Sexuality<\/em>, 1st edn., London: Palgrave Macmillan.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Shildrick, M., (2016), \u2018Sexuality.\u2019 in Cameron, C. (ed.), Disability Studies: A Student’s Guide<\/em>, London: SAGE Publications Ltd., pp. 135-136.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Snyder, S.L., Mitchell, D.T., (2001) \u2018Re-engaging the Body: Disability Studies and the Resistance to Embodiment,\u2019 in Public Culture<\/em>, 13(3), pp. 367-389. Vandebroeck, D., (2016), Distinctions in the Flesh: Social Class and the Embodiment of Inequality,<\/em> 1st ed., London: Routledge<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

By Maria Grant  Year 3 Social Policy and Sociology Undergraduate Student Introduction In December 2023, British Vogue published an article by editor and journalist Jennifer McShane, discussing her experiences of sex and sexual wellbeing as a disabled woman, and the joys, challenges, and assumptions that come with it (McShane, 2023). This is the first time a major lifestyle publication has covered the topic of sex and disability, which may be, in part, due to the omission of the body from disability studies and activism in the advent of the social model of disability. This omission is evidenced by the statement from leading social model scholar, Mike Oliver (1996, p. 42), that \u201cdisablement has nothing to do with the body.\u201d As the discipline of disability studies and broader social discourse have evolved, however, there have been calls to \u2018bring the body back in\u2019 and redevelop a social understanding of disability that includes, but does not medicalise or individualise, the bodies of disabled people. This paper, therefore, will consider the argument for excluding the body from disability presented by Oliver in the above statement by examining the social model of disability, and criticisms and defences thereof, particularly in relation to the place of the body in disability studies. Relevant literature will then be examined to explore how the body might best be incorporated into the model, before considering potential practical applications through the example of disabled people\u2019s experiences of sexuality and desirability. The Social Model of Disability Much of the literature and political activism surrounding disability since the late 20th century has been rooted in the social model of disability, which insists that social structures create disability, not individuals\u2019 bodies. The social model was first put forward in definitions provided by the Union of the Physically Impaired Against Segregation in 1976, and further developed by academics in the 1980s, with Oliver (1990) being one of the foremost academics credited with its development (Cameron, 2016). At the heart of the model is the distinction between impairment, taken to mean a chronic physiological or neurological dysfunction (although cognitive impairments\/disabilities are scarcely mentioned in early literature \u2013 see Owens, 2014), and disability, which is understood as the inability to fully partake in public life because of social structures and organisations that exclude those with impairments (Oliver, 1996). This distinction arose to counter the medical model that took prior dominance, in which disabled people\u2019s bodies were viewed as medical pathologies that must be cured, and people themselves were infantilised and paternalized (Oliver, 1990). Dissemination of the social model helped to strengthen the disability rights movement in the 1990s and created greater identification across diverse groups of disabled people, as they were now able to unite in the face of common barriers (Cameron, 2016). In turn, then, it contributed to the achievement of rights for disabled people. Thirty years after its creation, Oliver (2013, p. 1025) reflected on how the model and movement \u201cforced the media to change their images of us, transport providers to open up many of their services to us, public buildings to become much more accessible and the legal system changed to make it illegal to discriminate against us.\u201d Critique of the Social Model The social model has not, however, been without critique. Some criticisms have been in relation to the demographic of early scholars, predominantly white male wheelchair users from the United States and United Kingdom, and there have been calls for a more intersectional approach that included a broader range of perspectives within the disability community (Naples et al, 2019). There have also been calls to move on from the Marxist and materialist roots of the social model, that mainly saw barriers as resulting from capitalist structures, and instead take on a postmodernist approach that more thoroughly considers cultural and power relations (Goodley, 2013). The combination of these two critiques resulted in the evolution of \u2018critical disability studies,\u2019 a self-reflective and interdisciplinary methodology, wherein disability acts as the base from which a myriad of other topics is studied (Goodley, 2013). The dominant criticism of the social model, however, pertains to the dichotomy drawn between impairment and disability. Anastasiou and Kauffman (2013, p. 449) referred to the model as an \u201cover socialized analysis,\u201d too deeply steeped in social constructionism. They argue that total ignorance of biology and difference would prove detrimental to disabled people, risking the elimination of important specialised services and their own bodily agency and autonomy. They also argue that, in dichotomising corporeal and social experience, the social model \u2018leaves\u2019 the body to the medical model, and in so doing continues to facilitate that which it aims to eradicate, namely the continued medicalisation and pathologisation of disabled people and their bodies. According to Hughes and Patterson (1997), the social model creates these problems by not allowing for a complete and holistic analysis of disabled people\u2019s experiences. They argue that because physical experiences (of pain, for example) and perception are intrinsic to disabled people\u2019s day-to-day lives, a considerable analytical gap is left when they are omitted. Defence of the Social Model Some academics, including (if not especially) Oliver (1996, 2013), have come to the social model\u2019s defence. In fact, the statement \u201cdisablement has nothing to do with the body,\u201d comes from a chapter in which Oliver (1996, p. 42) defends the social model\u2019s definitions of disability and impairment in response to (then new) discourse arising about chronic illness and where \u2013 or if \u2013 it fits into the model. In this chapter, Oliver (1996, p. 48) directly addresses criticisms related to the dismissal of impairment, saying that \u201cup to now and for very important reasons, the social model has insisted that there is no causal relationship between impairment and disability.\u201d The distinction is important, he argues, because internal arguments about pain and physical difference would only fuel justification by those in positions of power for the continuation of the medical model and apathetic, oppressive intervention. Much of the discourse related to the model, Oliver argues, boils down to differing conceptualisations. The social model, he says, \u201cis not a social theory of disability and it cannot do the work of social theory,\u201d (Oliver, 1996, p. 52), and he denies that the model was ever meant to be \u201can all-encompassing framework within which everything that happens to disabled people could be understood or explained,\u201d (Oliver, 2013, p. 1024). The social model, he says, is merely one of many tools that can be used to improve the lives of disabled people. He also believes that \u201cthe talking to has to stop,\u201d as protracted discussion over what the social model does and does not incorporate detracts from time that could be spent engaged in collective action that would bring about effective change (Oliver, 2013, p. 1026). Christopher Riddle (2020) puts forward a similar argument, stating that discourse over how disability should be conceptualised should not be engaged in until proper equality has been achieved under the social model, and current conversations of the sort are therefore overly prefigurative. Analysis of Social Model Arguments In examining these critiques and defences it must first be acknowledged that, despite Oliver\u2019s claims to the contrary, the place of the social model as the guiding perspective of contemporary social theory on disability is undeniable. This has led to significant advances for the disabled community in the last forty years, but as Levitt (2017) argues, its scope does not need to be and, in fact, has not been, limited to its immediate practical applications or the geo- and socio-political context in which it originated. Moreover, because of the guiding role the model and its definitions have played, the model and its theorists do, in turn, bear some responsibility for the consequences of omitting the body from disability studies. It may, at the time, have been a strategic choice to \u201cleave an overanalysed entity mercifully alone,\u201d (Snyder and Mitchell, 2001, p. 374) but arrogant insistence of the model\u2019s rigidity will not serve the movement going forward. It should also be acknowledged that evolving conceptualisation is not putting \u201cthe cart before the horse,\u201d (Riddle, 2020, p. 1510) and that there is no reason for ontological conversation and political action not to take place concurrently. It is for this reason that a socially grounded incorporation of the body into disability studies, and a congruent collapse of the disability\/impairment dichotomy, should be adopted going forward. Anastasiou and Kauffman (2013, p. 454) illustrate an understanding that both disability and impairment bear socially constructed and constituted aspects, and advocate for “a unified and multidimensional understanding of disabilities,\u201d incorporating social, biological, psychological, and behavioural \u201cfacts,\u201d among others. However, they do not provide any substantial explanation as to how this multidimensional understanding might best be approached, and do not give much consideration to the merits of incorporating an interpretative approach. Their argument, unfortunately, is ultimately quite divisive and dismissive of the social model, and in referring to theories based off the model as \u201cfalse arguments that ignore realities,\u201d and instead calling for \u201cscientific truths,\u201d (p. 456) their argument \u2013 quite hypocritically \u2013 all but returns to the biological determinism that it warns against. Instead, this paper will mainly turn to Hughes and Patterson\u2019s account (1997), which explores existing social theories that can be drawn upon to engage with the body more adequately in disability studies. \u2018Bringing the Body Back In\u2019: Approaches in Social Theory Hughes and Patterson (1997) put forward two theoretical approaches that they deem best suited to understanding the social place of the body in disability studies. The first is a postmodernist Foucauldian approach, which sees the body as a point of discourse, \u201can object of knowledge and a target for the exercise of power,\u201d (Hughes and Patterson, 1997, p. 332). This approach can most easily tie in with the social model, for when we consider that many of the barriers the model addresses are tangible, physical barriers (i.e., the built environment), we can observe them as tools deployed by social organisations and structures to exert control over disabled people by way of their bodies. Exploration of the body as an object of knowledge and discourse, then, challenges the social model to a certain degree, and has been most successfully carried out by feminist scholars of disability. Shildrick (2005, 2009), for example, has described how depictions of the impaired\/disabled body create a \u2018self\u2019 and \u2018other\u2019 distinction. This distinction is symptomatic of athletic and aesthetic hierarchies, but \u201ccan be contained only by the strict imposition of normative categories that separate out and hold apart the supposedly oppositional groups,\u201d (Shildrick, 2005, p. 757). What such categories and perceived distinctions have been created to mask, then, is an underlying anxiety borne from the more evident similarity of disabled and non-disabled bodies. This similarity, she says, serves as an unwelcome reminder of the fragility and ultimate lack of control individuals bear over their own bodies, and is therefore denied or avoided. Shildrick also identifies eugenics and forced sterilisation of disabled people in the 20th century as a prime example of control being directly imposed on disabled people\u2019s bodies by those in positions of power (Shildrick, 2005). Hughes and Patterson (1997) see the Foucauldian approach as useful to a certain extent but point out one major flaw: it only views disabled bodies as objects, not subjects of knowledge and discourse, and in so doing \u201crobs the body of agency and renders it biologically barren,\u201d (1997, p. 334). To supplement this gap, therefore, they put forward a phenomenological sociology of the body, applied to disability. This approach understands the body as \u201can experiencing agent, itself a subject [\u2026] and therefore a site of meaning and source of knowledge about the world,\u201d (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, cited in Hughes and Patterson, 1997, p. 334). Phenomenology, in many ways, hearkens back to the philosophy of Aristotle in marking the body as the starting point of all perception, but when applied sociologically, highlights the importance of non-discursive, embodied perception in social interactions. The approach has been utilised very successfully in other fields of social research (see, for example,…<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1441,"featured_media":0,"parent":0,"menu_order":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","template":"","meta":{"footnotes":""},"class_list":["post-449","page","type-page","status-publish","hentry"],"jetpack_likes_enabled":true,"jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.qub.ac.uk\/sssj\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/449","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.qub.ac.uk\/sssj\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.qub.ac.uk\/sssj\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/page"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.qub.ac.uk\/sssj\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1441"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.qub.ac.uk\/sssj\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=449"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.qub.ac.uk\/sssj\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/449\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":450,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.qub.ac.uk\/sssj\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/449\/revisions\/450"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.qub.ac.uk\/sssj\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=449"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}