{"id":439,"date":"2024-07-09T11:19:34","date_gmt":"2024-07-09T10:19:34","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/blogs.qub.ac.uk\/sssj\/?page_id=439"},"modified":"2024-07-09T11:19:34","modified_gmt":"2024-07-09T10:19:34","slug":"the-uk-private-security-industry-orwellian-or-benthams-utopia","status":"publish","type":"page","link":"https:\/\/blogs.qub.ac.uk\/sssj\/the-uk-private-security-industry-orwellian-or-benthams-utopia\/","title":{"rendered":"The UK Private Security Industry: Orwellian, or Bentham\u2019s Utopia?"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

By Saffron Baker<\/a><\/h1>\n\n\n\n

Year 3<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Criminology Undergraduate Student<\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/a><\/a>Introduction<\/a><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

This essay will examine and discuss the delivery of privatised policing within the context of the private security industry. It will acknowledge the developments within modern society that have contributed to the growth of the private security sector, and as such has led to a significant increase in the use of privatised policing. Expanding on this, the essay will further measure the impact privatised policing has had on public policing, and what that means for society. The essay will further examine the opportunities within privatised policing (such as the effectiveness of the service) and the challenges (such as democratic control and regulation). It will also discuss the significance of the murder of Jimmy Mubenga and other examples of when privatised policing has acted with successive use of force. Developing on this, the essay will then seek to examine the extent of democratic control and to bring into question if the industry needs significant reform in its practises as well as assessing the trajectory of privatised policing, and how it will reflect on society.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/a><\/a>The growth of privatised policing and the opportunities it presents.<\/a><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

The private security industry has seen a significant and \u2018widespread global trend of increasing commercialisation of security actors and governance\u2019 with the market for private security \u2018vast and expanding\u2019 (Berndtsson & Stern, 2016) in recent years. Private policing is by no means a new concept, only the industry has had a significant \u2018rebirth\u2019 in the societal period of late modernity (Giddens, 1990; Johnson, 1992; Wakefield, 2003). Giddens (1990) expands on his concept of late modernity in that society \u2018stands at the opening of a new era\u2019 in which, the system has moved away from the manufacture of material wealth, and instead is \u2018centrally concerned with information\u2019.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Berndtsson and Stern (2016) also suggest that there is an emerging global pattern of license personnel that not only exceed but also surpass public police \u2013 and in some cases, the military. The industry presents itself in many forms, such as surveillance or licensed personnel, that stem from a mass of private security companies such as G4S or Securitas, of whom are currently active on a global scale (Berndtsson & Stern, 2016). Liquid security has since become a \u2018unique form of customized corporate justice, explicitly tailored to the needs and interests of the paying client\u2019 (Williams, 2005: 330). The central opportunity that liquid security presents is that it maintains an appeal in which public policing are unable to provide; in short, private policing is not constrained by the same regulatory framework as its public counterpart is, allowing them to be more effective in their response and flexibility (Button, 2019). Steden (2007) expanded on this notion that the growth in the private security industry can be attributed down to \u2018system failures\u2019 in which the Criminal Justice System (CJS) has become \u2018increasingly bureaucratic\u2019 and from that perspective, \u2018public expectations around what the police can do have risen enormously\u2019 widening the gap in the market for the private security industry to grow (Steden, 2007: 44). <\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/a><\/a>Profitability and the distinction between \u2018public\u2019 and \u2018private\u2019 spheres.<\/a><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

While liquid security is part of an industry that assesses its actions based on profitability, there is still confusion surrounding the distinction between public and private policing (Button, 2019). The increasing growth of quasi-public spaces within society contributes to the doubt over what is defined as \u2018private\u2019 and \u2018public\u2019 spheres. Button (2019) explains this using the British Transport Police (BTP). As the BTP is privatised through rail companies, they operate within a private sphere, but as they the serve publicinterest, they also operate within a public sphere. The BTP\u2019s dichotomy between public and private policing thus becomes a \u2018grey area\u2019 (Button, 2019: 13). Indeed, the increase in quasi-public space adheres to the \u2018social transformation\u2019 that has \u2018fundamentally altered the relationship between space and society\u2019 resulting in a significant \u2018spatial restructuring\u2019 (Wakefield, 2003: 11).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The private security industry has not only developed in size but also through status and power, propelled by a rapid acceleration of growth in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, such has the status and power of the private security industry developed that selective \u2018private bodies now rival some small states\u2019 (Button, 2019: 28).The growth of the private security industry is not due to one singular factor but is presents a complex relationship with the public sphere that has facilitated its expansion. While profitability remains a strong motive, the growth that has established the dominance of private security stems from the growth of a neoliberal society and the consolidation of the private sector (Button, 2019).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The fiscal constraints of public policing are not applicable in the privatised industry as they primarily operate based on profit. Considering the fiscal crisis of 2008, \u2018there have been significant reductions in resources available for the public police\u2019 (Button, 2019: 48). Due to the issues surrounding fiscal constraint in public policing, it has had a knock-on effect to the use of load shedding. Load shedding has seen the contracting out and charging of services from the public police to the private security sector, either because public police have \u2018abandoned certain functions\u2019 or simply because they are unable to keep up with the demand for a variation of services (Button, 2016). Consequently, this has created a gap in which the private sector has capitalised on.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Society has advanced in technology as much as it has evolved around crime (Wakefield, 2003). New technology has seen new waves of crime that public police are unfamiliar and unequipped to deal with; the continuous decline in resources as well as the sheer volume of such crime makes it difficult for public police to intercept and prevent (Wakefield, 2003; Button, 2019). Button (2019) suggests that new forms of cyber-crime have emerged (such as hacking, child trafficking, grooming) resulting in the private security industry \u2018taking over\u2019 in such crimes through their efficiency and resources \u2013 for a price. Williams (2005) uses the example of financial crimes: \u2018while it is true that the police are investigating fewer financial crimes\u2026 it is unlikely that these cases have been picked up by the private security sector due to the limited profitability of publicly reported incidents and the \u2018inability\u2019 of most victims to afford the services of the private security industry (Williams: 331).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Consequently, this presents a challenge in privatised policing. Historically, the function of public policing and security is \u2018frequently seen as public good\u2019, and while these conceptions of \u2018public good\u2019 are rooted within society, \u2018it is also clear that the public-private distinction is constructed through this storyline\u2019 (Berndtsson & Stern, 2016: 54).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Comparatively, the function of public policing and security is to act with moral goodness and intent, as well as offering profit-free protection to the rest of wider society (Shearing & Stenning, 1983). The invasiveness of the private security industry has not only consolidated its grip on security but has changed the meaning of security and protection entirely (Loader & Walker, 2001). When security and safety become less about the moral goodness and intent, and becomes more thoroughly associated with profit, it primarily works on the function of who can afford such services and who is willing to pay for them; bluntly, \u2018those who can afford, have\u2019 (Loader & Walker, 2007: 23).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The industry in privatised policing is primarily driven through generating profit, it has become ever more pervasive within society, continuously finding new ways to revolutionise products and market them at a selling point to their target audiences (Button, 2019). Loader and Walker (2007: 22) expand on this concept in that the privatised security industry have significantly increased fear levels around crime to market products and generate profit, which has consolidated to forms of self-policing.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/a><\/a>The trajectory of privatised policing<\/a><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Outside of the moral and legal restrictions that the public police are arguably subject to, the trajectory of private policing will undoubtedly continue to grow and accelerate. Additionally, the operationalisation of private policing has created a new form of policing that state police do not necessarily have to be inclusive of (Button, 2019). It also creates other social problems and divisions as a by-product of capitalist society. By only offering security and protection to individuals who can afford the services of private security, it effectively widens the gap between the class system and allows for such things as \u2018gated communities\u2019 while also contributing to social categorisation (Shearing & Stenning, 1987). As the trajectory for privatised policing continues to grow and expand within society, the industry becomes more embedded and invasive than ever before, continuously finding new ways to privatise security in some form (BSIA, 2024). In changing the intrinsic moral nature of public policing, it normalises the idea of security and profit (Loader & Walker, 2007).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/a><\/a>Democratic control and regulation within the private security industry.<\/a><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Other challenges that private policing creates are the consistent debate on how democratic and regulated the industry truly is, with further questions being raised in relation to the \u2018overlapping spheres of authority and discontinuous lines of accountability\u2019 (Berndtsson & Stern, 2016: 56). The use of democratic control over \u2018national and international\u2019 security has become a consistent \u2018problem\u2019, with private contractors becoming a new and \u2018seemingly unregulated force\u2019 (Krahmann, 2010: 1).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The majority of democratic concerns that are shared within the private security sector relate to the use of private security in \u2018armed conflicts\u2019 that include but are not limited to Afghanistan and Iraq; this further raises concerns about the \u2018ethno-politics\u2019 of privatised policing in armed conflicts (Berndtsson & Stern, 2016: 57). As a result, the lines between what private security is by definition begin to blur, with \u2018private security guards\u2019 who work for private companies, often performing duties closely \u2018associated with the military, such as the interrogation of prisoners\u2019 (Berndtsson & Stern: 57). The use of unregulated and undemocratic practices has become increasingly conspicuous in this context (Button, 2019).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Moreover, the extent of regulation within the private security industry is a point of contention among scholars (Shearing & Stenning, 1983; Wakefield, 2003; Loader & Walker, 2007; Button, 2019). With the private security industry seemingly illimitable in the epoch of late modernity, the governance of private policing has \u2018made it increasingly difficult for established political institutions to ensure that policing remains democratically accountable\u2019 (Shearing & Stenning, 2016: 147). As the private security industry is increasingly extensive in the modern world and is not bound by a regulatory framework that state police must conform to, the use of private policing is becoming rapidly difficult to regulate and manage. Button (2019) expands on Shearing and Stenning\u2019s (1987) \u2018Micky Mouse\u2019 example of privatised policing and the separate set of regulations that reside within the industry to \u2018maximise\u2019 their grip on social control. The private security industry appropriates their own regulations and standards that must be adhered to, or sanctions will be met (Shearing & Stenning, 1983). While the private security industry has established their own regulations, it does not necessarily equate to the same democratic regulations implemented within the public security sector and as such, holds \u2018serious implications for the democratic control of the use of armed force\u2019 (Krahmann, 2010: 3).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Indeed, a consequence of the diluted democracy that blankets the private security industry, increasing issues have arisen that highlight the unchecked regulation and control within the industry. Incidents in which elements of the private security industry have used excessive, abusive, or violating force against citizens of the state or others have increased. Notably, more recent examples can be amplified in this context: the murder of Jimmy Mubenga (The Guardian, 2014), the Nisoor Square shootings (BBC, 2015) and the more recent controversy surrounding G4S\u2019 behaviour of intimidation against asylum seekers in the UK (The Independent, 2017). In all of these examples, accountability has been an arduous process to navigate. The G4S security guards who were trialled for the manslaughter of Mubenga were found not guilty, while those responsible for the Nisoor Square shootings in 2007 were only convicted in 2015. The use of intimidation from G4S on behalf of the government in relation to asylum seekers in the UK is another good example of the \u2018grey area\u2019 that blurs the lines of accountability and brings into question why G4S were contracted in to assert authority only the state should be permitted to use. As the private security industry set and abide by their own regulations, it gives them intangible freedom in which they may do as they please, and consequently, pay little to no price in the harms they not only facilitate but actively participate in (Button, 2019). Without the appropriate regulation of such a growing industry, the lines of accountability blur, and concerns of democratic practise are raised.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Steden (2007) proposes in the \u2018radical\u2019 perspective, that \u2018public-private partnerships are an unwanted intrusion\u2019 within society, in which both public and private sectors \u2018interweave into an all seeing or panoptical network\u2019. This approach, distinct in its cynical and dystopian nature, draws stark contrast to the \u2018liberal democratic\u2019 belief in that it is believed to be a necessary \u2018safeguarding element of society\u2019 (Steden, 2007: 45). While it has certainly influenced the use and nature of public policing, the industry will no doubt continue to grow. In some sense, society is a combination of both the radial-liberal democratic belief. Policing, private, public, and self, has \u2018interweaved\u2019 itself through modern advancements, putting security before privacy (Button, 2019). However, in \u2018war on terrorism\u2019 undertone that circulated through society, many believe this to be necessary to protect individuals, the state, or assets (Wakefield, 2003; Button, 2019). Nevertheless, the use of privatised policing must acknowledge the need for reform in its democratic practises and regulation (Shearing & Stenning, 1983).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/a><\/a>Conclusion<\/a><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

To conclude, while the delivery of privatised policing to a degree, presents some opportunities, the challenges its creates and encompasses are that of a significantly higher number (Shearing & Stenning, 1983; Wakefield, 2003; Loader & Walker, 2007). The private security industry in the form of privatised policing presents the opportunity for malleable and effective protection for individuals to pay for; however, private security has since consolidated the divide between who can afford such services and those who cannot and has changed the meaning of \u2018security\u2019 altogether. The trajectory for privatised policing is one that will continue to grow, as to abolish it would create significant challenges (Button, 2019). As the growth in privatised policing is somewhat inevitable, it must undergo significant reform in its democratic practise and regulation (Shearing & Stenning, 1983). If privatised policing does not insist in reform on these fronts, the nature of the industry will continue to darken with increasing implications in the future.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

<\/a>References<\/a><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

BBC (2015) \u2018US Blackwater guards jailed for Iraq deaths<\/em>. BBC. 14th April. Available at: https:\/\/www.bbc.co.uk\/news\/world-us-canada-32292921 Accessed on: 26\/03\/2023.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Berndtsson, J., and Stern, M (2016) Private Security Guards: Authority, control, and governance?<\/em> In Abrahamsen, R. and Leander, A. (ed) Routledge Handbook of Private Security States<\/em>. Abingdon: Routledge. Pp 51 \u2013 61.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Bulman, M (2017) \u2018G4S warns asylum seekers \u2018behave or be deported\u2019 in potential breach of law\u2019<\/em>. The Independent. 24th April. Available at: https:\/\/www.independent.co.uk\/news\/uk\/home-news\/g4s-warns-asylum-seekers-behave-or-be-deported-a7695036.html Accessed: 26\/03\/2023.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Button, M (2019) Private Policing<\/em> (2nd eds) Abingdon: Routledge.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

BSIA (2024) \u2018Who we are\u2019<\/em>. Available at: https:\/\/www.bsia.co.uk\/who-we-are. Accessed (21\/01\/24).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Giddens, A (1990) The Consequences of Modernity<\/em>. Cambridge: Polity Press.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Johnson, L (1992) The Rebirth in Private Policing<\/em>. London: Routledge.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Krahmann, E. (2010) States, Citizens and the Privatization of Security<\/em>. Cambridge: University Press.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Loader, I., and Walker, N (2007) Civilising Security<\/em>. New York: Cambridge University Press.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Shearing, C., and Stenning, P (1987) \u2018Say Cheese!\u2019: The Disney order that is not so Micky mouse<\/em>. In Shearing, C., and Stenning, P (Eds) Private policing.<\/em> Pp 317-324. Newbury Park: Sage.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Shearing, C.D. and Stenning, P.C (1983) \u2018Private Security: Implications for Social Control\u2019<\/em>. Social Problems. 30(5). 493-506pp.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Shearing, C., and Stenning, P (2016) The privatisation of security: implications for democracy,<\/em> in Abrahamsen, R. and Leander, A. (ed) Routledge Handbook of Private Security States.<\/em> Abingdon: Routledge. Pp 140-149.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Steden, V, R. (2007) Privatised Policing: describing and explaining the growth of private security.<\/em> The Hague, Netherlands: BoomJuridische publishing.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Taylor, M., and Booth, R. (2014) \u2018G4S guards found not guilty of manslaughter of Jimmy Mubenga\u2019.<\/em> The Guardian. 16th December.  Available at: https:\/\/www.theguardian.com\/uk-news\/2014\/dec\/16\/g4s-guards-found-not-guilty-manslaughter-jimmy-mubenga Accessed on: 26\/03\/2023.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Wakefield, A (2003) Selling Security: The private policing of public space<\/em>. Devon: Willan Publishing.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Williams, J, W (2005) Reflections on the private versus public policing of economic crime.<\/em> British Journal of Criminology 45 (3). Pp 316-339.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

By Saffron Baker Year 3 Criminology Undergraduate Student Introduction This essay will examine and discuss the delivery of privatised policing within the context of the private security industry. It will acknowledge the developments within modern society that have contributed to the growth of the private security sector, and as such has led to a significant increase in the use of privatised policing. Expanding on this, the essay will further measure the impact privatised policing has had on public policing, and what that means for society. The essay will further examine the opportunities within privatised policing (such as the effectiveness of the service) and the challenges (such as democratic control and regulation). It will also discuss the significance of the murder of Jimmy Mubenga and other examples of when privatised policing has acted with successive use of force. Developing on this, the essay will then seek to examine the extent of democratic control and to bring into question if the industry needs significant reform in its practises as well as assessing the trajectory of privatised policing, and how it will reflect on society. The growth of privatised policing and the opportunities it presents. The private security industry has seen a significant and \u2018widespread global trend of increasing commercialisation of security actors and governance\u2019 with the market for private security \u2018vast and expanding\u2019 (Berndtsson & Stern, 2016) in recent years. Private policing is by no means a new concept, only the industry has had a significant \u2018rebirth\u2019 in the societal period of late modernity (Giddens, 1990; Johnson, 1992; Wakefield, 2003). Giddens (1990) expands on his concept of late modernity in that society \u2018stands at the opening of a new era\u2019 in which, the system has moved away from the manufacture of material wealth, and instead is \u2018centrally concerned with information\u2019. Berndtsson and Stern (2016) also suggest that there is an emerging global pattern of license personnel that not only exceed but also surpass public police \u2013 and in some cases, the military. The industry presents itself in many forms, such as surveillance or licensed personnel, that stem from a mass of private security companies such as G4S or Securitas, of whom are currently active on a global scale (Berndtsson & Stern, 2016). Liquid security has since become a \u2018unique form of customized corporate justice, explicitly tailored to the needs and interests of the paying client\u2019 (Williams, 2005: 330). The central opportunity that liquid security presents is that it maintains an appeal in which public policing are unable to provide; in short, private policing is not constrained by the same regulatory framework as its public counterpart is, allowing them to be more effective in their response and flexibility (Button, 2019). Steden (2007) expanded on this notion that the growth in the private security industry can be attributed down to \u2018system failures\u2019 in which the Criminal Justice System (CJS) has become \u2018increasingly bureaucratic\u2019 and from that perspective, \u2018public expectations around what the police can do have risen enormously\u2019 widening the gap in the market for the private security industry to grow (Steden, 2007: 44).  Profitability and the distinction between \u2018public\u2019 and \u2018private\u2019 spheres. While liquid security is part of an industry that assesses its actions based on profitability, there is still confusion surrounding the distinction between public and private policing (Button, 2019). The increasing growth of quasi-public spaces within society contributes to the doubt over what is defined as \u2018private\u2019 and \u2018public\u2019 spheres. Button (2019) explains this using the British Transport Police (BTP). As the BTP is privatised through rail companies, they operate within a private sphere, but as they the serve publicinterest, they also operate within a public sphere. The BTP\u2019s dichotomy between public and private policing thus becomes a \u2018grey area\u2019 (Button, 2019: 13). Indeed, the increase in quasi-public space adheres to the \u2018social transformation\u2019 that has \u2018fundamentally altered the relationship between space and society\u2019 resulting in a significant \u2018spatial restructuring\u2019 (Wakefield, 2003: 11). The private security industry has not only developed in size but also through status and power, propelled by a rapid acceleration of growth in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, such has the status and power of the private security industry developed that selective \u2018private bodies now rival some small states\u2019 (Button, 2019: 28).The growth of the private security industry is not due to one singular factor but is presents a complex relationship with the public sphere that has facilitated its expansion. While profitability remains a strong motive, the growth that has established the dominance of private security stems from the growth of a neoliberal society and the consolidation of the private sector (Button, 2019). The fiscal constraints of public policing are not applicable in the privatised industry as they primarily operate based on profit. Considering the fiscal crisis of 2008, \u2018there have been significant reductions in resources available for the public police\u2019 (Button, 2019: 48). Due to the issues surrounding fiscal constraint in public policing, it has had a knock-on effect to the use of load shedding. Load shedding has seen the contracting out and charging of services from the public police to the private security sector, either because public police have \u2018abandoned certain functions\u2019 or simply because they are unable to keep up with the demand for a variation of services (Button, 2016). Consequently, this has created a gap in which the private sector has capitalised on. Society has advanced in technology as much as it has evolved around crime (Wakefield, 2003). New technology has seen new waves of crime that public police are unfamiliar and unequipped to deal with; the continuous decline in resources as well as the sheer volume of such crime makes it difficult for public police to intercept and prevent (Wakefield, 2003; Button, 2019). Button (2019) suggests that new forms of cyber-crime have emerged (such as hacking, child trafficking, grooming) resulting in the private security industry \u2018taking over\u2019 in such crimes through their efficiency and resources \u2013 for a price. Williams (2005) uses the example of financial crimes: \u2018while it is true that the police are investigating fewer financial crimes\u2026 it is unlikely that these cases have been picked up by the private security sector due to the limited profitability of publicly reported incidents and the \u2018inability\u2019 of most victims to afford the services of the private security industry (Williams: 331). Consequently, this presents a challenge in privatised policing. Historically, the function of public policing and security is \u2018frequently seen as public good\u2019, and while these conceptions of \u2018public good\u2019 are rooted within society, \u2018it is also clear that the public-private distinction is constructed through this storyline\u2019 (Berndtsson & Stern, 2016: 54). Comparatively, the function of public policing and security is to act with moral goodness and intent, as well as offering profit-free protection to the rest of wider society (Shearing & Stenning, 1983). The invasiveness of the private security industry has not only consolidated its grip on security but has changed the meaning of security and protection entirely (Loader & Walker, 2001). When security and safety become less about the moral goodness and intent, and becomes more thoroughly associated with profit, it primarily works on the function of who can afford such services and who is willing to pay for them; bluntly, \u2018those who can afford, have\u2019 (Loader & Walker, 2007: 23). The industry in privatised policing is primarily driven through generating profit, it has become ever more pervasive within society, continuously finding new ways to revolutionise products and market them at a selling point to their target audiences (Button, 2019). Loader and Walker (2007: 22) expand on this concept in that the privatised security industry have significantly increased fear levels around crime to market products and generate profit, which has consolidated to forms of self-policing. The trajectory of privatised policing Outside of the moral and legal restrictions that the public police are arguably subject to, the trajectory of private policing will undoubtedly continue to grow and accelerate. Additionally, the operationalisation of private policing has created a new form of policing that state police do not necessarily have to be inclusive of (Button, 2019). It also creates other social problems and divisions as a by-product of capitalist society. By only offering security and protection to individuals who can afford the services of private security, it effectively widens the gap between the class system and allows for such things as \u2018gated communities\u2019 while also contributing to social categorisation (Shearing & Stenning, 1987). As the trajectory for privatised policing continues to grow and expand within society, the industry becomes more embedded and invasive than ever before, continuously finding new ways to privatise security in some form (BSIA, 2024). In changing the intrinsic moral nature of public policing, it normalises the idea of security and profit (Loader & Walker, 2007). Democratic control and regulation within the private security industry. Other challenges that private policing creates are the consistent debate on how democratic and regulated the industry truly is, with further questions being raised in relation to the \u2018overlapping spheres of authority and discontinuous lines of accountability\u2019 (Berndtsson & Stern, 2016: 56). The use of democratic control over \u2018national and international\u2019 security has become a consistent \u2018problem\u2019, with private contractors becoming a new and \u2018seemingly unregulated force\u2019 (Krahmann, 2010: 1). The majority of democratic concerns that are shared within the private security sector relate to the use of private security in \u2018armed conflicts\u2019 that include but are not limited to Afghanistan and Iraq; this further raises concerns about the \u2018ethno-politics\u2019 of privatised policing in armed conflicts (Berndtsson & Stern, 2016: 57). As a result, the lines between what private security is by definition begin to blur, with \u2018private security guards\u2019 who work for private companies, often performing duties closely \u2018associated with the military, such as the interrogation of prisoners\u2019 (Berndtsson & Stern: 57). The use of unregulated and undemocratic practices has become increasingly conspicuous in this context (Button, 2019). Moreover, the extent of regulation within the private security industry is a point of contention among scholars (Shearing & Stenning, 1983; Wakefield, 2003; Loader & Walker, 2007; Button, 2019). With the private security industry seemingly illimitable in the epoch of late modernity, the governance of private policing has \u2018made it increasingly difficult for established political institutions to ensure that policing remains democratically accountable\u2019 (Shearing & Stenning, 2016: 147). As the private security industry is increasingly extensive in the modern world and is not bound by a regulatory framework that state police must conform to, the use of private policing is becoming rapidly difficult to regulate and manage. Button (2019) expands on Shearing and Stenning\u2019s (1987) \u2018Micky Mouse\u2019 example of privatised policing and the separate set of regulations that reside within the industry to \u2018maximise\u2019 their grip on social control. The private security industry appropriates their own regulations and standards that must be adhered to, or sanctions will be met (Shearing & Stenning, 1983). While the private security industry has established their own regulations, it does not necessarily equate to the same democratic regulations implemented within the public security sector and as such, holds \u2018serious implications for the democratic control of the use of armed force\u2019 (Krahmann, 2010: 3). Indeed, a consequence of the diluted democracy that blankets the private security industry, increasing issues have arisen that highlight the unchecked regulation and control within the industry. Incidents in which elements of the private security industry have used excessive, abusive, or violating force against citizens of the state or others have increased. Notably, more recent examples can be amplified in this context: the murder of Jimmy Mubenga (The Guardian, 2014), the Nisoor Square shootings (BBC, 2015) and the more recent controversy surrounding G4S\u2019 behaviour of intimidation against asylum seekers in the UK (The Independent, 2017). In all of these examples, accountability has been an arduous process to navigate. The G4S security guards who were trialled for the manslaughter of Mubenga were found not guilty, while those responsible for the Nisoor Square shootings in 2007 were only convicted in 2015. The use of intimidation from G4S on behalf of the…<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1441,"featured_media":0,"parent":0,"menu_order":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","template":"","meta":{"footnotes":""},"class_list":["post-439","page","type-page","status-publish","hentry"],"jetpack_likes_enabled":true,"jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.qub.ac.uk\/sssj\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/439","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.qub.ac.uk\/sssj\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.qub.ac.uk\/sssj\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/page"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.qub.ac.uk\/sssj\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1441"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.qub.ac.uk\/sssj\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=439"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.qub.ac.uk\/sssj\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/439\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":440,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.qub.ac.uk\/sssj\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/439\/revisions\/440"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.qub.ac.uk\/sssj\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=439"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}