{"id":3984,"date":"2018-02-07T12:20:10","date_gmt":"2018-02-07T12:20:10","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/qpol.qub.ac.uk\/?p=3984"},"modified":"2018-02-07T12:20:10","modified_gmt":"2018-02-07T12:20:10","slug":"norway-plus-pluses-minuses","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/blogs.qub.ac.uk\/qpol\/norway-plus-pluses-minuses\/","title":{"rendered":"The pluses \u2013 and minuses \u2013 of \u2018Norway Plus\u2019"},"content":{"rendered":"\n
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What we want is a bespoke outcome: We\u2019ll probably start with the best of Canada, the best of Japan and the best of South Korea and then add to that the bits that are missing, which is services,<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

David Davis told the BBC\u2019s Andrew Marr<\/a> in December 2017.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Canada plus plus plus would be one way of putting it,<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

the Brexit Secretary added.<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

After \u2018satisfactory progress\u2019 was made in the first round of talks, this was the first major hint at what the UK would be seeking in its future relationship with the EU. But is a \u2018Canada plus plus plus\u2019 option available?<\/p>\n\n\n\n

On the face of it, no. Responding directly to Mr Davis\u2019s suggestion, the EU\u2019s Chief Negotiator warned that, \u201cThere is not a single trade agreement that is open to financial services. It doesn\u2019t exist.\u201d Illustrating his point, Michel Barnier presented this slide<\/a> to heads of state and government at the European Council on 15 December:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"Norway\"<\/figure>\n\n\n\n

It provides a striking summary of the range of existing relationships between the EU and third-party states, mapped alongside the UK\u2019s publicly stated \u2018red lines\u2019.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The UK has made clear that it will not accept some of the obligations of deeper types of relationship, while the EU insists that the UK cannot enjoy a special deal that is more favourable than the terms of existing deals.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

It\u2019s a question of flexibility: to what extent will the UK continue to push for a bespoke deal, keeping its own red lines intact, and to what extent will the EU continue to insist that the UK accepts the full terms of an \u2018off-the-shelf\u2019 model?<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This is where things have become more complicated in recent weeks. Just as members of the government have touted different degrees of possible divergence from the status quo<\/em>, so too have different leaders from the EU27.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Italian Economic Minister, Carlo Calenda, told Bloomberg<\/a> earlier this month that \u201cCanada plus plus plus will be the minimum that we need to achieve.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Meanwhile, speaking to Andrew Marr<\/a>, President Macron of France gave the strongest hint yet that a bespoke deal could be on the horizon. \u201cYou will have your own solution,\u201d he predicted. However, the French President added a crucial caveat: \u201cThis \u2018special\u2019 [deal] should be consistent with the preservation of the single market and [the EU\u2019s] collective interests.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Elaborating, he explained, \u201cYou cannot, by definition, have full access to the single market if you don\u2019t tick the box. And to get full access \u2026 you need contributions to the budget, and you have to accept the freedoms and the four pillars, and you have to accept the jurisdiction [of the European Court of Justice].\u201dAnything else, he added, \u201cis not full access;\u201d instead it would be \u201csomething between full access and a trade agreement.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

What could this entail in practice? Addressing the World Economic Forum<\/a> in Davos, Irish Taoiseach Leo Varadkar suggested that it could be possible to reach a \u201cspecific agreement\u201d between the UK and EU for which \u201cthere is no precedent.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This, he proposed, would be \u2018Norway plus\u2019. Reflecting Ireland\u2019s own economic and political interests, the Taoiseach was keen to point out that he wanted any future relationship between the UK and EU \u201cto be as close as possible. \u2026 But we need to get into the detail of what that means.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The trouble is, when other leaders from the EU27 speak in terms of \u2018pluses\u2019, UK government ministers tend to hear them in terms of \u2018minuses\u2019. The Taoiseach, for example, also emphasised<\/a> in Davos that the UK would not be able to simply \u201ccherry pick\u201d which obligations to respect and which could simply be ignored. This goes back to Michel Barnier\u2019s PowerPoint slide: the closer the relationship with the EU, the more obligations to be respected \u2013 obligations that are currently beyond the UK\u2019s red lines.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

An off-the-shelf Norway-style deal could involve the UK retaining access to the single market via the European Economic Area. But, as Emmanuel Macron emphasised, this would require the acceptance of the four freedoms \u2013 including freedom of movement of labour \u2013 and accompanying court rulings<\/a>.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The UK government has repeatedly stated that both elements would be unacceptable if it is to meaningfully \u2018take back control\u2019 from the EU.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Even a Norway-style deal, however, would still be insufficient to address the issue of the Irish border. Norway is not part of the EU\u2019s customs union, necessitating some ten customs stations along its 1,630km long border with Sweden.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

All six road crossings at its border with Finland have customs checkpoints. Perhaps this is what the Taoiseach meant when he advocated a \u2018Norway plus<\/em>\u2019 deal: the UK would continue to participate in the single market and<\/em> retain a customs union with the EU.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

A notable stumbling block is that by remaining in the customs union, the UK would be restricted in its ability to strike future bilateral trade deals with other countries. This would run contrary to the British government\u2019s key goal of \u201cseizing the opportunities<\/a>\u201d of Brexit by negotiating new free trade agreements beyond the EU.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

When the next phase of negotiations commence in March, these tensions will need to be resolved. If the UK is to get the \u2018pluses\u2019 it wants from a new relationship with the EU, it will need to decide whether its red lines are painted in bold scarlet or a milder pink. \u201cIt is in their hands how close they want the partnership to be,\u201d the German Chancellor insists<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

By that, she isn\u2019t ruling out the possibility of a bespoke deal. As other EU27 leaders are open to suggesting, there seems to be room on the shelf for a new kind of arrangement. But by \u2018bespoke\u2019 they do not mean there is room on the shelf for both a cake and an eaten cake. There are choices to be made.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Jamie Pow<\/a> is a postgraduate research student in the School of History, Anthropology, Philosophy and Politics at Queen’s University Belfast. <\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Article originally appeared in The UK in a Changing Europe <\/a>website.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The featured image<\/a><\/em> has been used courtesy of a <\/em>Creative Commons license.<\/em><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Jamie Pow and John Garry from the Brexit NI project look at the various options of what the UK’s future relationship with the EU could look like. <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2431,"featured_media":3988,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[41],"tags":[626,42,683,684,685,686],"class_list":["post-3984","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-europe","tag-barnier","tag-brexit","tag-canada-plus","tag-david-davis","tag-norway-plus","tag-trade-deal"],"mb":[],"acf":{"authors":{"simple_value_formatted":"