{"id":3979,"date":"2018-02-07T12:36:07","date_gmt":"2018-02-07T12:36:07","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/qpol.qub.ac.uk\/?p=3979"},"modified":"2018-02-07T12:36:07","modified_gmt":"2018-02-07T12:36:07","slug":"brexit-will-irish-question-be-solved","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/blogs.qub.ac.uk\/qpol\/brexit-will-irish-question-be-solved\/","title":{"rendered":"Will the Irish question be solved?"},"content":{"rendered":"\n
\n

During the second phase of the negotiations, in view of the unique circumstances and specific nature of issues related to the island of Ireland, the work on detailed arrangements required to give effect to the principles and commitments set out in the Joint Report should continue in a distinct Strand<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

(Council of the European Union,  supplementary directives for the negotiation of an agreement with the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland setting out the arrangements for its withdrawal from the European Union, 29 January 2018<\/a>).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\n

The implications of the UK\u2019s departure from the European Union for Northern Ireland, given their complexity and sensitivity, require special and urgent consideration by the Government<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

(House of Lords, Select Committee on the Constitution, European Union Withdrawal Bill, 29 January 2018<\/a>).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

On 15 December 2017, the Council of the European Union emitted a collective sigh: the UK withdrawal process could proceed, and even the \u201cIrish question\u201d seemed close to a solution.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Commission and the British negotiators had committed to avoid a hard border on the island of Ireland, to maintain rights of Northern Irish citizens to identify as Irish, British or both, and to enable continuity of cooperation across the island of Ireland while ensuring access of Northern Irish businesses to the UK internal market.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The joint negotiation report<\/a> defined \u201cphysical infrastructures\u201d and \u201crelated checks and controls\u201d as main elements of a \u201chard border\u201d to be avoided (paragraph 43), confirmed that all commitments must \u201cremain fully consistent\u201d with the \u201c1998 Agreement\u201d (otherwise known as the Good Friday Agreement or the Belfast Agreement) and \u201cthe principle of consent\u201d (paragraph 44), reiterating several times that the UK \u201cremains committed to protecting North-South cooperation and to its guarantee of avoiding a hard border\u201d (para 49, see also 47 and 48).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Citizens\u2019 rights in Northern Ireland are addressed as well: the negotiation parties confirm that the 1988 Agreement ensures that citizens of Northern Ireland can choose to assert British or Irish citizenship, or both \u2013 and that this means that rights of Irish citizens in Northern Ireland must be protected beyond \u2018Brexit\u2019 (paragraph 52). They also state that the UK commits to ensure that \u201cno diminution of rights is caused by its departure from the European Union\u201d (paragraph 53), stressing that this includes (but is not limited to) protection against discrimination.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

On closer inspection, the negotiators did not hatch a way forward to achieve all these aims. Paragraph 52 of their report states that the rights of Irish citizens in Northern Ireland will be addressed in the second phase of negotiations, during which the text of the withdrawal agreement is detailed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Paragraphs 49 and 50, which were changed at the last minute and are particularly convoluted, have been read as outlining three different versions of the border<\/a> between Ireland and Northern Ireland. Indeed, these paragraphs state three alternative ways to avoid a hard border:<\/p>\n\n\n\n