{"id":3143,"date":"2017-07-11T15:55:42","date_gmt":"2017-07-11T14:55:42","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/qpol.qub.ac.uk\/?p=3143"},"modified":"2017-07-11T15:55:42","modified_gmt":"2017-07-11T14:55:42","slug":"irish-border-oxymoron","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/blogs.qub.ac.uk\/qpol\/irish-border-oxymoron\/","title":{"rendered":"A hard Irish border is quite possible, a frictionless one is an oxymoron"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

Michel Barnier\u2019s dismissal of the notion of \u2018frictionless\u2019 trade<\/a> between the UK and EU after Brexit has direct ramifications for one of the most complex problems faced by the Brexit negotiators: how to manage the Irish border. The UK government has frequently emphasised its desire to see the continuation of the \u2018seamless frictionless border\u2019<\/a> with the Republic of Ireland after Brexit<\/a> and, more recently, David Davis has affirmed the UK government\u2019s desire to maintain an \u2018invisible border\u2019<\/a> between the UK and Ireland. For its part, the European Union has expressed a commitment to \u2018working hard to avoid a hard border\u2019<\/a> and a desire to find \u2018flexible and imaginative solutions\u2019 to achieve this.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The cautious realism of the EU on this front is notable: a \u2018hard\u2019 border is a real possibility, and a \u2018frictionless\u2019 border is almost an oxymoron. This is especially true given that the overall logic of Brexit is interpreted by the UK government as being to \u2018take back\u2019 control of immigration, laws and trade. A so-called \u2018hard Brexit\u2019 would mean that the Irish border would be a frontier to the free movement of people, goods, services and capital that is a feature and condition of membership of the EU. For the UK\u2019s land border with the EU to remain frictionless and seamless whilst its sea borders are more heavily controlled after Brexit, would mean one of three things: Northern Ireland would hold a different position within the UK (i.e. its territory would be treated differently from those in Great Britain), the Republic of Ireland would have a different position in the EU (i.e. its territory would be treated differently from the rest of the Single Market), or the EU would \u2018relax\u2019 its rules regarding freedom of movement and the integrity of its legal order.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Barnier\u2019s recent statement confirms that this latter option is nowhere near the negotiating table \u2013 it is a move that would be seen as turning Brexit into an act of self-harm for the EU itself. The Irish government has been equally consistent in its commitment to full EU membership. Any bespoke arrangements for Northern Ireland would have to be a matter for parallel, careful negotiation with the parties to the 1998 Agreement, including both governments. The current suspension of the talks between Northern Ireland parties does not bode well for the forward-thinking, creative and bold conversations that would have to be held in a re-working of the Agreement for the purposes of agreeing on a unique NI-centred arrangement. It is perhaps for such reasons that the language of the UK government has moved away from promises of a \u2018frictionless\u2019 border towards one focusing on the possibility that it may be \u2018invisible\u2019.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The physical manifestation of the Irish border has taken various forms over the course of its 95 year history \u2013 customs posts on both sides, military checkpoints, dumping grounds of marker dye \u2018laundered\u2019 by criminals from agricultural use diesel (a messy but lucrative form of duty evasion) \u2013 but for the most part it has been an imperceptible line that winds through fields and over rivers, even across farmyards. Its legacy is marked now not by boundary lines but by the lingering economic disadvantages of the mainly rural regions through which the border runs. The common UK and Irish membership of the EU Single Market did much to remove the visibility and friction associated with the Irish border. Membership has removed customs tariffs, harmonised regulation and indirect taxation, and created a more level playing field for trade and competitiveness across the border. The Republic of Ireland is Northern Ireland\u2019s most important export partner (31% of all Northern Ireland\u2019s exports, and 56% of its trade to the EU).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The risks posed by Brexit to cross-border relations on the island of Ireland thus not only have fraught symbolic resonance but also starkly concrete implications. The movement of goods is a particularly complicated matter if the border is to remain \u2018invisible\u2019, if not \u2018frictionless\u2019. The future designation of goods originating in Northern Ireland will affect the nature of the controls required on them in crossing the Irish border. Such controls will be necessary to uphold the integrity of the customs regime on either side of this border. Technological solutions in this area are limited and tend to rely on features that will be difficult to implement in the case of the Irish border. These include effective IT systems for traders to make customs declarations and for customs enforcement to perform risk analysis on these declared goods, on the predominance of single load containers for tracking (rather than those containing a range of products for delivery), on designated entry points along a land border for tracking\/stopping the movement of goods, and on large spaces for customs inspections (for undeclared items, duty evasion or dangerous goods) to be performed. There are problems associated with all these \u2018solutions\u2019 when applied to the context of the Irish border. Some of these problems arise from the nature of cross-border trade on the island (groupage, Just in Time logistics, the predominance of SMEs with small capacity and no experience of customs declarations, agri-food supply chains). Others arise from the nature of the border itself, with over 250 crossing points and an historical symbolism that would make any physical piece of monitoring equipment or customs checkpoint a security target.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Maintaining a truly invisible border if there is to be \u2018friction\u2019 in the movement of goods across the EU\u2019s external border on the island of Ireland would pose three major areas of risk:<\/p>\n\n\n\n