Northern Ireland: the volatile younger sibling of the devolved United Kingdom?

After just shy of two years, Northern Ireland’s devolved government has returned, but this return brings with it questions of the stability of government within Northern Ireland. The Northern Ireland Assembly and Northern Ireland Executive were formed in 1999, and have been amended in five agreements and suspended six separate times since then for a total time of almost ten years. Two of these suspensions came after ten years of uninterrupted power-sharing, which many believed would embed power-sharing fully, making collapse a much more remote possibility. Unfortunately, this proved not to be the case. This post aims to explore the institutions at hand to understand the underlying problems which cause Northern Ireland’s government to be so volatile and unstable.

A graph showing the number of years of three suspensions of the Northern Ireland Assembly: 2002 - 2007, 4.5 years, 2017 - 2020, 3 years; 2022 - 2024, 2 years. The text alongside this reads: Statistics as of February 2024. NI Assembly Suspenions. 11 Feb - 20 May 2000. 11 Aug 2001. 21 Sep 2001. 14 Oct 2002 - 8 May 2007. 9 Jan 2017 - 11 Jan 2020. 4 Feb 2022 - 3 Feb 2024.

Data: Torrance (2023), McCormack (2024)

Within the Northern Ireland Assembly, MLAs (Members of the Legislative Assembly) designate their community background as ‘unionist’, ‘nationalist’, or ‘other’. This allows for cross-community votes to take place on certain issues, ensuring a majority of the Assembly as well as a majority of unionist and nationalist MLAs vote in favour. However, as is immediately obvious, this excludes those who designate themselves as ‘other’, and arguably serves only to entrench and institutionalise the ‘culture war’ between unionists and nationalists; this leaves all policy positions to inevitably be viewed as one or the other, making progress that much more difficult. In turn, this limits the potential of small or more moderate parties, as those seen as more unionist or more nationalist are inevitably favoured by the public.

A photograph of Stormont, the Northern Ireland Assembly building in Belfast

Image source: Gateley (2006)

The D’Hondt method ensures that all bigger parties receive ministries proportionate to their share of Assembly seats; the largest party gets first pick, then the next largest, and so on. This allows the Executive to reflect seat distribution within the Assembly, an important aspect of consociationalism (the system used in Northern Ireland, in which power is proportionally shared by rival cultures while allowing both necessary autonomy). While this is important, this mandatory coalition is arguably undemocratic due to having no formal coalition or alternating government. This formal coalition in combination with the aforementioned political ‘culture war’ means that there is a lack of co-operation between ministries, with politicians and parties being well-known to be extremely protective over their portfolios and refuse to work with other ministries, even on policy areas that require such collaboration. Understandably, this makes it much more difficult to bring bills into law.

A crumpled white poster reading, in red all caps text, "Irish Language Act now #AchtAnois"

Image source: Quine (2022)

Bills are brought into law in the Northern Ireland Assembly much the same as in the UK Parliament, being introduced, debated, examined by a specialised committee, further debated, and finally voted on. Despite this fairly straightforward approach, many destabilising issues arise out of the creation and implementation of law, provoking political crises. Even when the Assembly and Executive are functioning as normal, the passage of law and progress are stalled by boycotts, walk-outs, and brinkmanship (the threat of violence or endangerment in order to gain an advantageous outcome). Minority veto rights also cause issues, allowing parties to essentially hold the Executive to ransom. Many long-term policy impasses cause frequent issues, such as the Irish Language Act, as do wider UK policies such as Brexit; Brexit affects Northern Ireland in particular as it is the only part of the UK to share a land border with the European Union. Here we also see another major issue brought about by the identification of policy position as being with one community or another: in the case of unexpected contentious issues, it means that the government lacks the strength to handle unanticipated challenges, as was the case with the Renewable Heating Initiative (which led to one of the most recent suspensions of the Assembly).

It seems clear that there is little appetite for compromise within the Northern Ireland Assembly, even if this means a years-long suspension. This raises many questions as to the commitment to devolution of larger parties, a worrying prospect in an already crumbling institution. While the Belfast / Good Friday Agreement (the agreement which brought peace to Northern Ireland and upon which its devolution was formed) brought an end to decades of conflict, it has also “reinstated this conflict as an organizing logic of governance in Northern Ireland” (p. 666). Without change, the Assembly and Executive will continue only to quasi-function as community divisions are continually deepened and progress struggles to be made.

References

Birrell, D. and Heenan, D. (2017) The Continuing Volatility of Devolution in Northern Ireland: The Shadow of Direct Rule. The Political Quarterly, 88(3) pp. 473-479. Available from https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-923X.12391 [accessed 8 February 2024].

Jenkins, S. (2024) Northern Ireland will leave the union, and Scotland could too. True devolution is the only way to save it. The Guardian, 2 February. Available from https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2024/feb/02/cardiff-edinburgh-devolved-labour-leadership-union [accessed 6 February 2024].

Knox, C. (2015) Sharing power and fragmenting public services: complex government in Northern Ireland. Public Money & Management, 35(1) pp. 25-30. Available from https://doi.org/10.1080/09540962.2015.986861 [accessed 8 February 2024].

McCormack, J. (2024) NI’s government has returned Stormont – what you need to know. London, UK: BBC. Available from https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-northern-ireland-67726389 [accessed 10 February 2024].

McCrudden, C., McGarry, J., O’Leary, B., and Schwartz, A. (2016) Why Northern Ireland’s Institutions Need Stability. Government and Opposition, 51(1) pp. 30-58. Available from https://www.jstor.org/stable/26349792 [accessed 8 February 2024].

Murphy, M. C. and Evershed, J. (2022) Contesting sovereignty and borders: Northern Ireland, devolution and the Union. Territory, Politics, Governance, 10(5) pp. 661-677. Available from https://doi.org/10.1080/21622671.2021.1892518[accessed 8 February 2024].

Torrance, D. (2023) Devolution in Northern Ireland. London, UK: The Stationery Office. Available from https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-8439/CBP-8439.pdf [accessed 8 February 2024].

Image Sources (Licensed under Creative Commons 2.0)

Gateley, L. (2006) DSC01766, Belfast Parliament, Belfast, Northern Ireland. Available from https://www.flickr.com/photos/lyng883/245153987/in/album-72157594287026917/ [accessed 10 February 2024].

Quine, T. (2022) Irish Language Act Now. Available from https://www.flickr.com/photos/quinet/52384575731/in/album-72177720299689261/ [accessed 11 February 2024].