Fall of the ‘Red Wall’: Why did Labour strongholds flip?
The 2019 General Election produced an unprecedented electoral realignment- the fall of the ‘Red Wall’ in the Northeast of England. In a cluster of constituencies that had once been regarded as a Labour stronghold, voters sent in a majority of Conservative ballots for the first time in decades. This switch from red to blue continued in the 2021 by-election in Hartlepool where the historically labour area voted for its first Conservative MP since 1974. While surprising the general public, the fall of the ‘Red Wall’ follows political theories concerning a changing political identity in the UK.
What is the ‘Red Wall’?
The ‘Red Wall’ is a bundle of 42 constituencies throughout the North of England that consistently and overwhelmingly vote for Labour (Kanagasooriam and Simon, 2021). These areas are made up of former industrial and coal mining communities (Soblewska and Ford, 2020). These communities were integral to the formation of the trade union demographic the Labour Party originally formed to represent (Thorpe, 2017). The working-class makeup of the region and the culture of party loyalty has made the region reliably red (Kanagasooriam and Simon, 2021).
Figure 1: General Election results by constituency. Source: McCann et al, (2019)
However, in the 2019 election, 30 out of the 42 seats voted Conservative and one became the Speaker’s seat, leaving only 11 remaining Labour seats (Kanagasooriam and Simon, 2021).
Why did it fall?
So then why did so many voters betray their historical ties with Labour? One explanation is that the Conservative Party was able to appeal to traditional Labour voters who fell into a category that transcends the traditional class divide- those who feel left behind by globalisation (Goodwin and Heath, 2016).
UK political culture has historically been dominated by a class divide- the working-class and the middle class (Chan and Goldthorpe, 2007). The Conservative Party represented the interests of the middle class, and Labour represented those of the working-class. However, some political scientists theorise that social and political identities are increasingly shaped by education, age, and ethnic diversity.
Figure 2: Brexit referendum results by constituency. Source: BBC, (2020)
Despite coming from a working-class community, older, white, less educated voters connected with the “get Brexit done” campaign. Figure 2 shows that the majority of the Red Wall voted to leave the EU. They didn’t see the benefits of EU integration such as the free movement of people and goods, and viewed the migration policy set by the EU as a threat to their jobs and resources. These new priorities broke the bond of class-party ties and enabled the Conservative Party to sweep in and pick up their votes with a hard stance on immigration and a pro-Brexit agenda.
New identity markers
The results of the 2019 general election are representative of a wider change in UK culture. According to Sobolewska and Ford (2020, p.5),
“The influence of class, income and left-right ideology have weakened while the influence of education, age and identity attachments have strengthened.”
Figure 3: Long-term ethnic diversity demographic change. Source: (Sobolewska and Ford, 2020)
Younger generations are increasingly more educated and diverse than ever before (Sobolewska and Ford, 2020). Older voters understand British identity in relation to the demographics of their formative years (16-25) and tend to see immigrants and ethnic minorities as outsiders who are taking resources (Abramsam and Inglehart 1985, Goodheart, 2004). Younger people and ethnic minorities have a distrust of the Conservative Party, and they tend to vote for labour regardless of their class background (Harrison, 2019).
The same trend is followed by those with a university degree (Sobolweska and Ford, 2020). These three demographics together are referred to as identity liberals, and their older, white, low-qualification counterparts are referred to as identity conservatives.
University graduates tend to have higher incomes and move to cities where they are exposed to higher levels of diversity (Hermans, 2015). They tend to see combatting hostility towards outgroups as a core political value, whereas those with lower qualifications see outgroups as threats to low-skill jobs and the culture established in their communities. More than ⅔ of graduates voted to remain in the EU (Goodwin and Heath, 2016). Low-skill workers feel left behind by fast economic change, as their qualifications put them at a disadvantage in the modern economy and were much more likely to vote for Brexit.
As these new identity markers formed, voters rearranged their party associations to better represent their priorities.
Conclusion
While the future voting patterns of the former and reduced ‘Red Wall’ is uncertain, it is reflective of wider trends of changing political values in the UK. Conservatives were able to mobilise older, white, and school leaver voters who supported Brexit to look beyond class and vote against their historical ties with Labour (Soblewska and Ford, 2020). The understanding of ‘us’ and ‘them’ and how those understandings translate to political views is complex and ever-evolving.
Sources:
Abramson, Paul R., and Ronald Inglehart. 1985. Generational Replacement and Value Change among the West European Public: 1970-1984; 1984-2000. Presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago
Chan, T.W. and Goldthorpe, J.H., 2007. Class and status: The conceptual distinction and its empirical relevance. American sociological review, 72(4), pp.512-532.
Goodhart, D. (2004). Too diverse? [online] dlv.prospect.gcpp.io. Available at: https://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/essays/59131/too-diverse.
Goodwin, M. and Heath, O. (2016). Brexit vote explained: poverty, low skills and lack of opportunities | Joseph Rowntree Foundation. [online] www.jrf.org.uk. Available at: https://www.jrf.org.uk/political-mindsets/brexit-vote-explained-poverty-low-skills-and-lack-of-opportunities.
Harrison, S. (2020). A Vote of Frustration? Young Voters in the UK General Election 2019. Parliamentary Affairs, 73(1), pp.259–271. doi:https://doi.org/10.1093/pa/gsaa032.
Gregersen-Hermans, J., 2015. The impact of exposure to diversity in the international university environment and the development of intercultural competence in students. The European higher education area: Between critical reflections and future policies, pp.73-92.
Kanagasooriam, J. and Simon, E. (2021). Red Wall: The Definitive Description. Political Insight, 12(3), pp.8–11.
Sobolewska, M. and Ford, R. (2020). Brexit and Britain’s Culture Wars. Political Insight, 11(1), pp.4–7.
Thorpe, A., 2017. A history of the British Labour Party. Bloomsbury Publishing.
Appendix:
BBC News (2016). EU Referendum Results. [online] BBC News. Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/politics/eu_referendum/results.
McCann, A., Leatherby, L. and Migliozzi, B. (2019). U.K. Election Results Map: How Conservatives Won in a Landslide. The New York Times. [online] 13 Dec. Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/12/13/world/europe/uk-general-election-results.html.
Sobolewska, M. and Ford, R. (2020). Brexit and Britain’s Culture Wars. Political Insight, 11(1), pp.4–7.
Week 9 – Comment on: Fall of the ‘Red Wall’: Why did Labour strongholds flip?
The author of this blog post has selection an extremely interesting topic to investigate, the fall of the ‘red wall’ in the 2019 General election was an unprecedented collapse of a region of England that was thought to be impenetrable by the conservatives across multiple generations, the advent of Brexit as well as increased focused on the migrant crisis exposed cracks within the red wall that were exploited by the conservatives in the 2019 election. The author raises a fantastic point by investigating the trend of young people who have a ‘distrust of the Conservative Party’, who are also more likely to have university degrees, moving away from areas such as northern England into larger cities such as London. Subsequently having the effect of leaving behind the older demographic that tended to be anti-immigration, pro-Brexit and more sympathetic to the new conservatives, contributing to the fall of the ‘Red wall’. This blog post offers a clear, concise and well-structured explanation as to the factors and change in trends within the ‘Red wall’ areas which lead to the conservative trumping of labour within these constituencies in the 2019 General Election.