Why does nothing change? The challenges faced in policy making.

Why is it that both parties are the same, it seems that whichever one is in government can never solve long standing issues such as in healthcare or in the defence budget, this blog will show the effects of incrementalism on how a government can change and create policy. 

The problem 

Policy makers and governments in the UK are limited as to what changes they can make in the largest government departments, this is due to the large scale budget and the fact that all current functions must continue, leaving little room for major change on an already stretched budget and narrowing down alternatives to current policy (Berry. 1990. P 167-173). In 2019 the government had a deficit of £38.7 Billion which shows how little money there is to implement different ideas. 

Additional issues arise due to the time it takes for policy to be carried out. It can often be the case that the government who created policy and who heavily invested is no longer in power and the political will for it is gone. The issue arises in how the taxpayer has already footed the large bill and as such the new government continues to enact a policy which they didn’t actually vote for or introduce, giving the sense that a new government does not actually create and enact major changes in policy. 

Example 1 – The NHS

The NHS is a prime example of these issues partly due to the amount of money which is spent on the service, with spending at 11.3% of GDP share (Office for National Statistics. 2023). The size of this figure is visible on this chart which shows real world spending increases up to 2016. 

File:NHS Spending 1948-2014.png” by Absolutelypuremilk is licensed under CC BY-SA 4.0.

With the amount of expenditure in the NHS and associated high costs of basic healthcare and functions of the NHS, it is difficult to take funds from a department to reassign them to a new focus within healthcare policy. Kieran Walshe suggested that even the restructuring of administration departments as set out in the 2012 Health and Social care act cost more than £1.5 billion in 2014 for little actual saving (Walshe. 2014. P 329). This presents a compelling argument as to why few policies can be carried out in a government department per electoral cycle as even for a change which does not require direct investment in equipment or buildings the cost is so high, this means it is unfeasible for a government to make completely sweeping reforms or even multiple large changes, even to the best funded areas of public spending. 

Example 2- HMS Prince of Wales 

The issue of time and incrementalism is clear through the example of HMS Prince of Wales, one of  the Royal Navy’s largest ships and the 2nd Queen Elizabeth class aircraft carrier built for the Royal Navy. 

HMS PRINCE OF WALES Naming Ceremony” by QEClassCarriers is marked with CC0 1.0.

The planning and construction of such a vessel takes place over multiple years including the process of giving the contract to builders, in the case of HMS Prince of Wales, she was ordered in 2008, laid down in 2011 and commissioned in 2019. This lengthy period meant a different government saw the majority of the construction and cost of the vessel than the Labour government who awarded the contract. Resultantly, a second aircraft carrier was deemed as unnecessary in a 2010 strategic defence review by the government (HM Government. 2010. P 23). However, as the ship had already been ordered and laid down, it was more costly to cancel the project than to continue with the building process. This meant that the conservative government, despite not wanting a second aircraft carrier, were stuck footing the bill for a previous government’s policy taking away possible capital to forge their own policy path in defence. 

Conclusion

The issues surrounding incrementalism can therefore be seen by both of these recent examples as a severe hurdle that has to be faced by a government to make enactable and reasonable policy in many of the major government departments. This issue of the policymaking process therefore gives the illusion that many of the most important things in society do not change at all no matter who is in control of the policy. 

Bibliography

Absolutelypuremilk. (2017). File:NHS Spending 1948-2014.png. CC by SA-4.0

Berry, W. D. (1990). The Confusing Case of Budgetary Incrementalism: Too Many Meanings for a Single Concept. The Journal of Politics, 52(1), 167–196. https://doi.org/10.2307/2131424

Cotterill, T. 2019. How building HMS Prince of Wales turned out to be a tricky mission for the Royal Navy. The Portsmouth News. https://www.portsmouth.co.uk/news/defence/how-building-hms-prince-of-wales-turned-out-to-be-a-tricky-mission-for-the-royal-navy-1044604

HM Government. (2010). Naval Forces. Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security Review. 22-23. https://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ukgwa/20121014230000/http://www.direct.gov.uk/prod_consum_dg/groups/dg_digitalassets/@dg/@en/documents/digitalasset/dg_191634.pdf

Office for National Statistics. (2020). 6: How much is the general government deficit?. UK government debt and deficit: September 2019. https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/governmentpublicsectorandtaxes/publicspending/bulletins/ukgovernmentdebtanddeficitforeurostatmaast/september2019#:~:text=In%20the%20financial%20year%20ending%20(FYE)%20March%202019%2C%20the,with%20the%20FYE%20March%202018.

Office for National Statistics. (2023). 1: Main Points. Healthcare expenditure, UK Health Accounts provisional estimates: 2022. https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/healthandsocialcare/healthcaresystem/bulletins/healthcareexpenditureukhealthaccountsprovisionalestimates/2022

 QEClassCarriers. (2017). HMS PRINCE OF WALES Naming Ceremony. CC0 1.0.

Royal Navy. (2019). Commissioning day for the HMS Prince of Wales. https://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/news-and-latest-activity/news/2019/december/10/191210-hms-prince-of-wales-commissioning

Walshe, K. (2014). Counting the cost of England’s NHS reorganisation. BMJ: British Medical Journal, 34.  https://www.jstor.org/stable/26517643